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I. INTRODUCTION
This article proposes that in all international civil litigation fed-
eral judges should use international and foreign law pragmatically as
an aid to decisions which further the substantive values of "world
civil society."' These values are similar to those of civil society in a
federal republic with an elaborate bill of rights-to preserve volun-
tary associations of human dignity and enterprise whose spirit
transcends the public order of sovereign states. As Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor recently observed:
As our domestic courts are increasingly asked to resolve disputes
that involve questions of foreign and international law about which
we have no special competence, I think there is great potential for
our Court to learn from the experience and logic of foreign courts
and international tribunals-just as we have offered these courts
some helpful approaches from our own legal traditions.
2
1. The term is offered by Ralf Dahrendorf. RALF DAHRENDORF, THE MODERN SOCIAL CON-
FuCr 181 (1988). Various other expressions are in use, such as "global civil society," "transna-
tional civil society," and "international civil society."
2. Sandra Day O'Connor, Federalism of Free Nations, in INTERNATIONAL LAW DECISIONS IN
NATIONAL COURTS 13,18 (Thomas M. Franck & Gregory H. Fox eds., 1996).
[Vol. 6:2 Supp.
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WORLD CIVIL SOCIETY
These traditions are mirrored most vividly in a contemporary
world by two intense human purposes: first, people pursue
economic well-being through voluntary work and exchange, with
opportunities for the creation and distribution of new wealth increas-
ingly driven by global market economies; second, all people seek
human dignity and respect through human rights and personal
security. These two intensities, protected by law through the courts,
reflect the most important ends of an emerging "world civil society"
as we approach the twenty-first century.
A. The Idea of "Civil Society"
"Civil society," said the late Ernest Geliner in the Tanner
Lectures delivered just before Soviet Marxism fell, "is first of all that
part of society which is not the state. It is residue."3 This residue is
large, powerful, and organized. In the North Atlantic civilization,
the idea "contains the assumption that civil society.., is in a position
to ensure that the state does its job but no more, and that it does it
properly."4 Later, Gellner wrote: "'Civil Society' is markedly supe-
rior to a notion such as 'democracy,' which, though it may highlight
the fact that we prefer consent over coercion, tells us precious little
concerning the social precognitions of the effectiveness of general
consent and participation."5 In customary and traditional societies,
"civil society" also keeps a check on the arbitrariness of rulers, as
Ummas do for Islamic civil societies.
The idea of "civil society" most often has accompanied social
contract thought in liberal political theory from Locke, Rousseau,
Ferguson, Kant, and other Europeans.6 French and German modern
equivalents use "civil society" to denote the social totality which in-
cludes the state. Anglo-American usage separates voluntary, reli-
gious, and private spheres over the state within capitalist society.
3. Ernest GelLner, The Civil and the Sacred, in XII THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES
301,303 (1990).
4. Id.
5. ERNEST GELLNER, CONDITIONS OF LIBERTY: CIVIL SOCIETY AND ITS RIVALS 211 (1994).
Democracy "lumps together participatory tribal segments, ancient or medieval city states and
modem growth-oriented national or supra-national states." Id. Civil society is linked to his-
torical destiny in that it is not possible to return to traditional agrarian society, nor some
traditional communitarianism, nor centralized authoritarian regimes, industrialism and techno-
logical innovation being "our manifest destiny." Id. at 211-13.
6. See JEAN L. COHEN & ANDREW ARATO, CIVIL SOCIETY AND POLmCAL THEORY (1992). For
the influence of pluralism on democratic theories of civil society, see DEMOCRACY AND
MODERNITY (S.N. Eisenstadt ed., 1992); J. KEANE, DEMOCRACY AND CIVIL SOCIETY (1988); and
ADAM B. SELIGMAN, THE IDEA OF CIVL SOCIETY (1992) (questioning the universalist-citizenship
model as against religious and traditional pre-political conceptions).
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J. OF TRANSNATIONAL L. & POLICY
Strands of Scottish Enlightenment, influential in eighteenth-century
America, embrace a moral philosophy which questions the ration-
ality of the old natural law basis for civil society by showing the
independent influence of customs, practices, and institutions (as
social fact) which resist formal law.7
In the West, "civil society" grew from two entirely different
points of view to fill a communal void as medieval society and the
feudal system were replaced by the modem national state with a
central monopoly of coercive power under some semblance of law.
This central public monopoly restrains violence from blood feuds,
and private wars as well as ethnic and religious violence and ordi-
nary crime, delicts and private disputes. The first viewpoint, in the
tradition of Hobbes held that hostile human nature organized within
nations in a state of nature requires the state with a monopoly of
coercive power to restrain the natural hostilities and selfishness of its
citizens in order to have a civil society where individuals might free-
ly associate, have commerce, exchange goods and opinions, and
tolerate diverse beliefs.8 The second tradition of civil society was
Lockean. Well articulated by the founders of the Scottish Enlighten-
ment, such as Hutcheson, Smith, and Hum, it reflected an ancient
tradition from Cicero where equal citizenship under law was the
bond of civil society.9 This tradition held that all persons were "born
fit" for civil society, which is necessary to keep government account-
able to the people for serving the general or common good and to
prevent corruption of power by faction, passion, or interest 1
Various analogues of these two variants of civil society in the
Western tradition may be found in governments of most countries
today and especially in competing legal philosophies in pluralistic
cultures. Such pluralism reigns in the United States, where suspicion
7. See ADAM FERGUSON, AN ESSAY ON THE HISTORY OF CIVIL SOCIETY (Duncan Forbes ed.,
1996) (1767) (first treatment in English of civil society based on ethical sensibilities of indi-
viduals); see also MARVIN B. BECKER, THE EMERGENCE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE EIGHTEENTH CEN-
TURY: A PRIVILEGED MOMENT IN THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND, SCOTLAND, AND FRANCE (1994);
Marvin B. Becker, An Essay on the Vicissitudes of Civil Society with Special Reference to Scotland in
the Eighteenth Century, 72 IND. L.]. 463 (1997).
8. THOMAS HOBBES, MAN AND CMzEN (De Homine and De Cive) 113, 118 (Bernard Gert ed.,
1991) ("[O1riginal of all great and lasting societies consisted not in the mutual good will men
had towards each other, but in the mutual fear they had of each other.").
9. See JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE TRUE ORIGINAL, EXTENT, AND THE END OF
CIVIL GOVERNMENT 41, reprinted in LOCKE'S SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT (Lester
DeKoster ed., 1978) (1690). Scottish enlightenment relied not on transcendence, but on an inner
sensibility or a common "sense." See FERGUSON, supra note 7; SEUGMAN, supra note 6, at 25-26
(arguing that ethical synthesis constructed by Ferguson, Hutcheson, Hume and Smith- of
reason and passion, individual and society, public and private-is no longer tenable).
10. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
[Vol. 6:2 Supp.
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WORLD CIVIL SOCIETY
of officials who seek the rents of office turns into a theory of
collective choice and competing theories of the public good become
republican virtue. Civil cultures which hold ruling classes to account
in their own behavior may be observed in traditions as distinct as
Persian, Chinese, Hindu, and Arab.11
B. The Marxist Interlude
During the nineteenth-century industrial revolution, Marx saw
that the so-called voluntary associations of civil society set against
the coercive order of the sovereign state in liberal theory were in fact
involuntary instruments at the mercy of the price of labor in a
capitalist society which dominated the European state. This critical
observation cast serious doubt on liberal claims for civil society.
"Free" labor has its nonmonetary price. As commodity, labor in a
so-called voluntary association, in effect, is compulsory, subordinat-
ing all members to an impersonal rule of value.' 2 "[B]ecause incor-
poration into this association through the labour contract takes the
form of a relation of exchange between legal equals, the process of
surplus extraction is reconstituted as a private activity of civil
society."13
Serious discussion of why the political in civil society should be
excluded from surplus extraction took ideological form culminating
in the Bolshevik revolution, nationalization of private production,
and a seventy-five-year purge of civil society in Russia. Revival of
the idea of civil society followed the post-cold war decline of Marxist
influence whose critical insights, some thought, would survive those
of Lenin and Stalin. In a recent post-Marxist analysis, for example,
Justin Rosenberg examines the structure of civil society from the
perspective of the whole Westphalian system of sovereign nation-
states.14 For Rosenberg, accumulation and capture of surplus by
transnational corporations through the capitalist system of global
market exchange, free from serious political control by any nation
(save background state enforcement of rights created by private
11. See SURYA PRAKAsH SINHA, LEGAL POLYCENTRISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 69-147
(1996) (discussing diversity of many different forms of civilizations and their effect on
contemporary international law).
12. See F. Perlman, Introduction to IsAAc RUBIN, ESSAYS ON MARX'S THEORY OF VALUE
(1973).
13. JUSTIN ROSENBERG, THE EMPIRE OF CIVIL SOCIETY: A CRITIQUE OF THE REALIST THEORY
OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 125 (1994).
14. Id. at 131; see also ELLEN WOOD, THE PRISTINE CULTURE OF CAPITALISM 34 (1991) ("It is
not at all as paradoxical as it may seem that the concept of the state has been least well defined
precisely where the formal separation of state and civil society characteristic of capitalism
occurred first and most 'naturally'-in Britain and the United States.")
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J. OF TRANSNATIONAL L. & POUCY
transactions through courts or administrative agencies), with their
massive economic displacements means creation of a new structure
of civil society. In the sovereign states-system sanctioned by world
trade agreements, it is now possible "to command and exploit pro-
ductive labour (and natural resources) located under the jurisdiction
of another state."15 This new circumstance becomes an "Empire of
Civil Society" made to order, in his view, for dominance by Anglo-
American institutions.16 The exercise of this power has two linked
aspects, "a public political aspect which concerns the management of
the states-system, and a private political aspect which effects the
extraction and relaying of surpluses."17
Totalitarianism denies the possibility of any civil society, for it
destroys both public and private life. 8 As totalitarianism recedes,
however, once-dormant civil institutions revive, now in tension with
governments of states in contemporary post-cold war societies,
whose public functions are understood to provide security, protect
environmental, health and safety concerns, and ensure the well-
being of their populations. Jurgen Habermas, a European social
philosopher, defines this renewal of civil society in a way reminis-
cent of Tocqueville, the European aristocrat who wrote about Ameri-
can civil society before Marx did. In his most recent book, Between
Facts and Norms, Habermas, who devotes an entire chapter to Civil
Society and the Political Public Sphere, proposes the following meaning:
Civil society is composed of those more or less spontaneously
emergent associations, organizations, and movements that, attuned
to how societal problems resonate in the private life spheres, distill
and transmit such reactions in amplified form to the public sphere.
The core of civil society comprises a network of associations that
institutionalizes problem-solving discourses on questions of
15. ROSENBERG, supra note 13, at 129.
16. Surveying the systematic character of... failure [of the international system to
recapture control over states and markets], one is driven to conclude that the US
has found in the modem clerisy of this "American social science" a rather more
serviceable ideologue than Charles V was able to command in the Dominican
Order of his day.
Id. at 173.
17. Id. at 131.
18. See HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORiGINs OF TOTAuTARIANISM 473-78 (1973). Totalitarianism
is a terror-ruled movement sustained in motion when government "presses masses of isolated
men together and supports them in a world that has become a wilderness for them," destroying
through their isolation any public capacities and the possibility of private life as well. Id.
[Vol. 6:2 Supp.
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WORLD CIVIL SOCIETY
general interest inside the framework of organized public
spheres. 19
Habermas overcomes the Marxist critique by excluding from re-
constructed civil society any capitalist private enterprises, sub-
ordinating them entirely to the new civil society through the public
sphere and the apparatus of liberal government. Only through civil
society are problems brought into the public sphere, he thinks,
problems such as those brought to the fore by ecological threats,
feminism, multiculturalism, and world economic order. Hardly "any
of these topics were initially brought up by exponents of the state
apparatus, large organizations, or functional systems."20 Communi-
cations media make possible a shift in the balance of power between
civil society and the political system in periods of mobilization.2
However, a "robust civil society can develop only in the context of a
liberal political culture" because without "an already rationalized
lifeworld... populist movements arise that blindly defend the fro-
zen traditions of a lifeworld endangered by capitalist moderniza-
tion."22 The public sphere lies between the political system and the
private sectors. "It represents a highly complex network that
branches out into a multitude of overlapping international, national,
regional, local, and subcultural arenas." 23
Under certain circumstances, in this view, civil society has influ-
ence in the public sphere and the courts, despite the sociology of
mass communication which "conveys a skeptical impression of the
power-ridden, mass-media-dominated public spheres of Western
democracies." 24 While groupings of civil society are generally too
weak to initiate or redirect decision-making in the short run, "public
processes of communication can take place with less distortion the
more they are left to the internal dynamic of a civil society that
emerges from the lifeworld."25 Communications from within civil
society to the public sphere thus become the most powerful instru-
ments of civil society, even more influential than capitalism.
19. JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FAcTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE
THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOcRACY 367 (1996). This sphere is constituted and preserved by
principles of constitutional rights. See id. at 368. The U.S. Supreme Court fulfills this civic
function in the pluralistic American system.
20. Id. at 381.
21. See id. at 379.
22. Id. at 371.
23. Id. at 373.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 375.
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J. OF TRANSNATIONAL L. & POLICY
Gellner, who began his work as a cultural anthropologist, em-
phatically disagreed with excluding private market transactions from
the domain of civil society and placing them exclusively within the
political realm. He pointed out that institutions of capital and mar-
ket exchange, being in tension with all governments, should not be
entirely subordinated, for they form part of those institutions of civil
society which check excesses of each other and of all governments
and also create new wealth more efficiently than if controlled from
within the public sphere.26 Moreover, in Gellner's view, we cannot
return to a preindustrial, prepolitical, agrarian communitarian view
of life. Post-industrial technological advance is our destiny 27 Pri-
vate capitalism once again becomes a valued part of civil society,
according to Gellner, but this time within a newly emerging world
civil society, one that does not necessarily require a liberal political
system, as Habermas' conception does; nor does transnational pri-
vate capitalism as part of world civil society have to dominate the
sovereign states-system.
C. "World Civil Society"
In contrast to civil society within liberal states, "world civil
society" 28 stands apart from the public spheres of the entire system
of sovereign states and international regimes. World civil society is
made up worldwide by individuals and groups in voluntary associa-
tion without regard to their identities as citizens of any particular
country, also outside the political and public spheres of the commu-
nity of nations. These voluntary associations of world civil society
include religious organizations, private business organizations, the
information and news media, educational and research organiza-
tions, and nongovernmental organizations.2 9 They exist in them-
selves and for themselves, apart from the state system, but not mere-
ly as transmitters of problem-solving discourses inside the public
26. GELLNER, CONDITIONS OF LIBERTY, supra note 5, at 193. ("Civil Society" -or separation
of social and economic institutions from the state through modularity of individuals and their
economic productivity through voluntary association -"can check and oppose the state [and]
the non-political institutions are not dominated by the political ones, and do not stifle
individuals either.").
27. Id. at 211-13.
28. DAHRENDORF, supra note 1, at 181.
29. See Dianne Otto, Nongovernmental Organizations in the United Nations System: The
Emerging Role of International Civil Society, 18 HUM. RTS. Q. 107, 125 (1996) (providing a
romanticized version of the role of human rights NGO's in a postliberal transnational society).
"A high priority would be given to the development of global civil information systems and
networks by ensuring that information technology is widely accessible." Id. at 135. Just who
would ensure this availability and access is left unclear.
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WORLD CIVIL SOCIETY
spheres, as Habermas sees them. These institutions of world civil
society thrive in spaces within and beyond all sovereign states and
international organizations both as instruments for the purpose of
shaping actions of public spheres and as ends in themselves
expressing human dignity and free choice.
A sovereign state is a creation of power by society and can
participate in world civil society only outside the community of
states which created and recognized it -a highly unlikely possibility.
States, too, as Hobbes saw firsthand during the Thirty Years War,
need alliances to restrain hostile other states. However, we should
not confuse world civil society with an international civil society of
sovereign states conceived as if these were persons in a state of
anarchy or nature, as Vattel, following Hobbes, did for European
nation-states. 30 This international society of nation-states operates in
the public sphere of balance of power and interests, explained by
international relations theory.3 '
The two most powerful demands now pervading global society
with the aid of communications and information - transnational free
market economics and international human rights movements -
have contributed to instability or change in the internal order of most
"sovereign" states. With the collapse of the Marxist-Leninist Soviet
empire and with increasing economic and social change within the
Third World and in some of the most advanced democratic welfare
states, the international community of sovereign states no longer can
rely upon national systems alone to integrate central control over
both the means of production and the social welfare, while also
providing a command system for maintaining security and civil
order. To Professor Louis Henkin, who made his Presidency of the
American Society of International Law the platform for his message,
"sovereignty" is nearly obsolete.
30. The late Professor Brierly seemingly rejected this conception, for he severely criticized
Vattel for his notion that states were like individuals, free and equal in a state of nature without
social bonds. J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 37-40 (Humphrey Waldock ed., 6th ed. 1963).
On closer inspection, however, it is clear that Brierly placed states in their own society-a
communal or social theory denying the realist's anarchistic conception of sovereign states, but a
form of Aristotelian society for states, nonetheless.
31. See ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOvEREIGNTY: COMPu-
ANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995); see also ROBERT 0. KEOHANE &
JOSEPH NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE WORLD POLITICS IN TRANSmON (1977); HANS J.
MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE (5th ed. 1978);
NEOREALISM AND ITS CRITICS (Robert 0. Keohane ed., 1986); NEOREALISM AND NEOLIBERALISM:
THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE (David A. Baldwin ed., 1993); KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1979); Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A
Prospectus for International Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 335 (1989); Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley,
International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 205.
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1. OF TRANSNATIONAL L. & POLICY
Such a broad conception of world civil society is not exclusively a
Western idea, nor did it originate only in Europe. This view sees in
the vast sea of human life with its variety of associations and designs
a "worldlife" which exists quite apart from governments or interna-
tional regimes. If we consider how great civilizations and cultures
have coexisted with rulers and governments in all societies, more or
less assimilated through science, custom, tradition, and religion, we
need not conclude that the civil society invented by European social
contractarians from the residue of medieval natural law as restraint
on absolutism should refer only to a political liberal tradition. In
Arab and Chinese civilizations and in Hindu and African cultures,
individual social, spiritual, and communal life go on despite the form
of a governor's or ruler's edicts.3 2
In any serious rejection of the totalitarian view of the state, we
find two parallel ideological arguments for world civil society-one
from the Right and the other from the Left. Each attacks the domi-
nance of the sovereign state in global society by strong positions
favoring voluntary human associations and freedom of expression
across borders to support decentralized institutions close to human
activities free of arbitrary state interference. These positions symbo-
lize the two most influential forces shaping world civil society. From
the pure Right, come demands for the freest transnational form of
capitalism, free-market investment, and exchange without trade
barriers. From the pure Left, come universal demands for the broad-
est program of internationally-recognized human rights, including
redistribution of social goods.
Always in tension, these polar opposites of world civil society are
often thought incompatible. Paradoxically, they have a common
bond. Each requires legal protection through governments and
regimes with their administrative apparatus-more specifically
through the courts - to enforce contracts, preserve property, and
guarantee basic human freedoms of association and choice. Coop-
eration is expected from all governments and international regimes
to ensure these background rights. Neither human dignity nor
voluntary transactions or investments can thrive in world civil
society without credible and legitimate international and national
legal systems in which participants may place at least some trust in
return for protection. The institutions of world civil society depend
upon internalized patterns of behavior from public and private
32. See SINHA, supra note 11; see also HUMAN RIGHTS IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES: A
QUEST FOR CONSENSUS (Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im ed., 1992).
(Vol. 6:2 Supp.
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WORLD CIVIL SOCIETY
decision-makers at all levels of society to promote economic well-
being and respect for human dignity.
D. The Mediation Function of International Law
International law, mediating between the political community of
sovereign states and the institutions of civil society, entrenches these
expectations further through state practice and international agree-
ments. To make these decisions effective, all institutions in world
civil society rely upon global telecommunications media, language,
symbols, or propaganda for exchanging information and opinion,
just as civil society does in liberal states. With the aid of the global
media, widespread values within world civil society press upon the
public spheres through the communication of practical decision
backed by horizontal and vertical systems of public order. Hori-
zontal public order systems are reciprocal and cooperative; these
prevail under traditional international law and balance of power
assumptions such as those underlying recent federal court litiga-
tion.33 Vertical public order systems -those in which a hierarchical
command of public power is brought to bear on disputes between
private persons or between the state or officials and private per-
sons - also may be found in recent federal court cases?4
When states no longer carry out the process of surplus extraction
but may seek to reallocate it for human welfare, the collective system
of states asserts a new "centralized monopoly of jurisdiction"
through an impersonal rule of law. Public power is now redefined:
"[I]t guarantees contracts between private individuals, it keeps the
33. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 US. 244 248 (1991) (finding that statute is
presumed not to extend beyond territory unless made explicit, accepting background interpre-
tation of political independence of territorial states under customary international law);
Argentine Rep. v. Amerada Hess Shipping Co., 488 US. 428,440 (1989) (finding that immunity
of foreign sovereign in US. courts is presumed unless it is explicitly withdrawn by Congress);
Smith v. Libya, 101 F.3d 239 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding that statutory exceptions to foreign
sovereign immunity should be interpreted narrowly and may not be overridden by doctrine of
jus cogens); Princz v. F.R.G., 26 F.3d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (stating that foreign sovereign
immunity may not be waived implicitly or be overridden by doctrine of jus cogens); LaFontant
v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128 (E.D.N.Y 1994) (visiting head of state immunity implied from
customary international law).
34. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 US. 764 (1993) (involving jurisdictional
challenge by defendant foreign reinsurers to parens patriae civil antitrust actions brought by
California and other states); Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993) (involving
private challenge to official action against refugees on high seas); United States v. Alvarez-
Machain, 504 U.. 655 (1992) (involving challenge to official conduct abroad in criminal
proceeding); Socitd Nationale Industrielle Adrospatiale v. United States Dist. Court, 482 US.
522 (1987) (involving a treaty challenge to a federal court order requiring defendant French-
owned companies to comply with discovery of documents under Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure).
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J. OF TRANSNATIONAL L. & POLICY
peace both internally and externally, it imparts a degree of collective
management to the overall social development of the society."35
However, the new public power allocated through the monopoly of
jurisdiction by the international political community of states may
not engage in the process of surplus extraction. And information
now commodified and outside of state control, is part of the profit
enterprises of world civil society where the surplus is extracted. The
liberal notion that free communication is necessary for political deli-
beration in the public spheres now must be reconsidered as part of
federal court protection of freedom of expression extending beyond
the borders.
Since problems flow from the civil to the public sphere, as
Habermas points out, courts may be among the first public organs to
receive claims from institutions of world civil society. In transna-
tional litigation, these problems often are not amenable to political
solution (even when private settlement is possible); nor would poli-
tical intervention necessarily serve the parties' interests. 6 If courts
and governments do not cooperate with each other in maintaining
primary legal systems with credibility and effectiveness to protect
both international human rights and transnational capitalist inter-
ests, the alternative would appear soon enough. Primitive systems
of private self-help and sanctions often through mercenaries would
spread throughout civil society, if they have not already, as gangs or
illicit mobs, illegal drug cartels, and global conspiracies run by enter-
prises for enforcement of bargains and social norms through private
customs and informal codes.37 Government officials would be more
35. ROSENBERG, supra note 13, at 125-26.
36. For example, the Bhopal class action litigation-brought first in federal court, then
before the Indian courts after forum non conveniens dismissal, with intervention by the Indian
government as parens patriae-is a case in which the claimants could have received faster
payment of greater amounts had the case settlement been supervised by the federal court. In re
Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, 634 F. Supp. 842, 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), affd as
modified, 809 F.2d 195, 197 (2d Cir. 1987). For further discussion of this case, see infra Part III.B.
37. As Harold Lasswell observed:
A competitive market occurs when there is a consensus sustained by violence
which safeguards bargaining arrangements. The close connection between vio-
lence and bargaining was never obscure to the merchants of the Italian cities, for
they were compelled to use their own private forces to open markets, defend
depots, protect cargoes, and enforce contracts. As the enterpriser in the British
domestic market of the eighteenth century and nineteenth century became emanci-
pated from the necessity of providing his own violence, the close connection
between violence and bargaining fell into the background. There were, of course,
many surviving indications of the classical relation between brigandage and
economics, since the foreign trading companies continued to supply their own
violence until quite late, and labor troubles sometimes brought unofficial as well as
official violence to the front. Yet the peaceful expansion of the domestic market
[Vol. 6:2 Supp.
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WORLD CIVIL SOCIETY
easily corrupted, exchanging protection for power and becoming de
facto agents of these primitive systems of private exchange under
cover of state legitimacy. In enforcing background rights for the
institutions of world civil society, courts compose these disputes as
arms of world public order.
Professor Thomas Franck has described the diversity of tribal,
religious, and traditional social structures for peoples in every cul-
ture by which they bond together for protection and identity 8 Any
promises of government protection in return for allegiance are
viewed with deep suspicion, but government suppression of ethnic
or religious violence is certainly part of the Hobbesian tradition of
civil society. For Professor Huntington, however, all political and
civil associations are deeply imbedded within their own historical
roots with all the attendant conflicts in perception, values, and
power, which accompany clashes of civilization without respect for
state boundaries.39 All political entities experience loss of exclusive
control over their populations. Transnational telecommunications,
religions, businesses, and nongovernmental organizations alike are
all subject to changes and pressures no longer cabined within the
territorial boundaries of sovereign states. No longer are voluntary
associations in complete subordination to the states to which they are
most closely tied in return for state protection. More often private
enterprises or associations seek advantage for their goals from
alliances negotiated with the most powerful or effective of states for
the moment.
We may refer descriptively to these remarkable phenomena as
the beginning of world civil society, not in the Western sense that
civil society is the raison d'etre for the liberal state or that civil society
includes the state, but rather that a diverse and pluralistic burgeon-
ing of international life as a matter of empirical fact is becoming freer
from dominance by the system of sovereign states. Driving these
social phenomena are forces of efficient capital markets of transna-
tional exchange and investment and the rapid spread of the interna-
tional human rights movements in all countries.
furnished the experiential basis for extensive preoccuptaion with marketing
mechanics.
HAROLD D. LASSWELL, WORLD POLITICS AND PERSONAL INSECURITY 22-23 (1935).
38. Thomas M. Franck, Clan and Superclan: Loyalty, Identity and Community in Law and Prac-
tice, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 359 (1996) (stating that individuals worldwide choose multiple identities
and loyalties).
39. See generally SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING
OF WORLD ORDER (1996) (arguing that democratic processes in non-Western societies often do
not protect human rights to the same extent as they do commercial interests or cultural
traditions).
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J. OF TRANSNATIONAL L. & POLICY
II. THE TRADITION OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN FEDERAL COURT
A. Post-Cold War Tensions Between Economic and Human Rights
We know that world market economies, now aided by interna-
tional economic institutions such as the International Monetary
Fund, the World Bank, the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development, the new World Trade Organization and other
regional and bilateral arrangements, progressively displace those old
inefficient command and control economies run by the apparatus of
central states and their central banks. At this very same time, how-
ever, powerful worldwide demands for human rights (social, eco-
nomic, environmental, political, and civil) also place onerous interna-
tional obligations upon central governments to advance human
freedoms and the quality of human life within national polities. The
ideal model for achieving these goals within the United Nations
context generally implies national or regional systems for imple-
menting human rights, usually requiring courts, administrative
expertise or national welfare bureaucracies and command systems
under some central rule of law and regulation.4 In the human rights
conception that has held sway since 1945, the ordering arrangements
internal to each sovereign state are presumed capable of coping with
internal violence, social upheavals, or disruptions of public order
while redistributing social and economic goods considered basic hu-
man entitlements. Moreover, during the cold war period, the human
rights conception, which tolerates economic, cultural, and social di-
versity, left to each country the decision whether to socialize the
economy or to maintain a private market economy. National choices
40. Article 55 of the United Nations Charter states: "[Tihe United Nations shall promote...
universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all with-
out distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion." The text refers to the obligation by mem-
ber states to promote universal respect and observance of human rights and fundamental
freedoms, not to an obligation to implement universal human rights and fundamental
freedoms. Article 1 lists, among the purposes and principles of the United Nations, "pro-
moting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all ...."
Respect for the political independence and territorial integrity of another state may include
that country's own laws protecting human dignity and self-determination of peoples, even
when abused in practice. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is a "common standard
of achievement for all peoples and all nations ... to secure their universal and effective recog-
nition and observance...." Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., pt.1, pmbl., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights refer in identical language to the "obligation of States
under the Charter... to promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and
freedoms." International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, pmbl., 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, Dec. 16,1966, pmbl., 993 U.N.T.S. 3; see also U.N. CHARTER arts. 55-56.
[Vol. 6:2 Supp.
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were made internally within a context of a geopolitical struggle
between superpowers and blocs. A state's capacity to make choices
with relative autonomy depended upon its background alliances as
part of strategic coalitions of power, whether focused in the United
Nations Security Council, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, War-
saw Pact, Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development,
or alliances from the nonaligned powers.
All these relationships are now changing as economic develop-
ment and world trade become at least as urgent as the struggle for
political and civil rights in an integrated global market economy with
complex institutions for dispute resolution and arbitration 1  A
growing economy, moreover, is a strong priority in reformulating
global security arrangements, the most obvious example being
changes in relations between China and the United States and
conditions within Hong Kong, now returned to Chinese rule. The
human rights conception that a post-World War II community of
nations would maintain international peace and security by holding
lawless or tyrannical governments and officials to account for
external aggression or internal abuse such as genocide, torture, or
terror requires each state to maintain domestic public order under
United Nations principles, which limit its "sovereignty."42 Collective
intervention for peacekeeping or enforcement when the Security
Council finds a breach of peace43 is still led by the Western coalition
with China and Islamic countries having strategic leverage. As
internal violence and breach of human rights continue or grow
within many countries, the problem of country-building through
democracy and human rights is seen by non-Western countries,
more now than during the cold war, as an imposition of Western
culture contradicting their "sovereignty."44
In his work on collisions of civilizations, Samuel P. Huntington
reviewed the dilemma through new coalitions at the Vienna Con-
ference on Human Rights, held in the wake of the end of the cold
war:
41. See Martin Shapiro, The Globalization of Law, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 37 (1993).
42. For a discussion of the International Criminal Court for Rwanda and the former
Yugoslavia, see materials cited infra note 198. For a discussion of China's triumph in organiz-
ing southern hemisphere nations against internal accountability for human rights violations,
invoking "sovereignty" before the United Nations Human Rights Commission in Geneva, see
Beijing Again Blocks U.N. Censure on Rights, WASH. POST, Apr. 24,1996, at A25.
43. U.N. CHARTER arts. 40-41.
44. See HUNTINGTON, supra 39, at 195-98 (reviewing differences between the West and
other civilizations on promoting democracy, monitoring human rights, and conditioning eco-
nomic assistance on human rights performance).
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J. OF TRANSNATIONAL L. & POLICY
The issues on which countries divided along civilizational lines
included universality vs. cultural relativism with respect to human
rights; the relative priority of economic and social rights including
the right to development versus political and civil rights; political
conditionality with respect to economic assistance; the creation of a
U.N. Commissioner for Human Rights; the extent to which the non-
governmental human rights organizations simultaneously meeting
in Vienna should be allowed to participate in the governmental
conference; the particular rights which should be endorsed by the
conference; and more specific issues such as whether the Dalai
Lama should be allowed to address the conference and whether
human rights abuses in Bosnia should be explicitly condemned.
Major differences existed between the Western countries and
the Asian-Islamic bloc on these issues. Two months before the
Vienna conference the Asian countries met in Bangkok and
endorsed a declaration which emphasized that human rights must
be considered "in the context.., of national and regional particu-
larities and various historical religious and cultural backgrounds,"
that human rights monitoring violated state sovereignty, and that
conditioning economic assistance on human rights performance
was contrary to the right to development. The differences over
these and other issues were so great that almost the entire docu-
ment produced by the final pre-Vienna conference preparatory
meeting in Geneva in early May was in brackets, indicating dissents
by one or more countries.
The Western nations were ill prepared for Vienna . . . . The
Vienna declaration contained no explicit endorsement of the rights
to freedom of speech, the press, assembly, and religion, and was
thus in many respects weaker than the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights the U.N. had adopted in 1948. This shift reflected
the decline in the power of the West. "The international human
rights regime of 1945," an American human rights supporter
remarked, "is no more. American hegemony has eroded. Europe,
even with the events of 1992, is little more than a peninsula. The
world is now as Arab, Asian, and African, as it is Western. Today
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International
Covenants are less relevant to much of the planet than during the
immediate post-World War II era." An Asian critic of the West had
similar views: "For the first time since the Universal Declaration
was adopted in 1948, countries not thoroughly steeped in the
Judeo-Christian and natural law traditions are in the first rank.
That unprecedented situation will define the new international
[Vol. 6:2 Supp.
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WORLD CIVIL SOCIETY
politics of human rights. It will also multiply the occasions for
conflict." 45
B. Protection for Global Wealth Processes and Human Dignity
Federal courts in the United States have struggled with similar
tensions early in the context of building a national economy while
reconstructing civil rights and, more recently, while adjudicating
claims (individual, corporate, or class-action) which extend beyond
traditional national boundaries. These claims, at some point, rest
upon an assumption of tacit reciprocity, that governments and their
courts will cooperate in protecting the most important expectations
of world civil society, which may be summarized in two normative
statements:
* Regularity in the flow of voluntary economic transactions,
trade and investment agreements across national boundaries
should not be seriously disrupted or grossly abused.
* Respect for human dignity or for basic human rights should not
be callously disregarded or systematically deprived by acts or
omissions of governments anywhere.
As a political reality, national officials charged with the function
of providing protection or recourse for citizens, corporations, or
residents under national law have no direct political allegiance or
responsibility to the international community of sovereign states
except as directed by the municipal law of their own countries or as
they, by conscience or reason, choose independently as part of a
more universal social awareness. Because no universal or imperial
world government exercises a public power on behalf of world
citizens in the sense that the complex of social interactions called
identities and loyalties develop, there can be no practical plea by
individuals to accessible officials responsible to any such govern-
ment for protection from private or public injuries.
Pleas for help most often use institutions within world civil
society, namely the media or nongovernmental human rights
groups, to press political officials of states and international regimes
into corrective action. But the United Nations is still an organization
of states only, and the status of nongovernmental organizations, once
thought recognized in international law, has not received compar-
able political status. Human rights commissions and courts are not
yet independent of national governments, despite the availability of
45. Id. at 196-97 (citations omitted).
Summer 1997]
HeinOnline  -- 6 J. Transnat'l L. & Pol'y 421 1996-1997
r   421 
  
 45 
tion  l  sses   it  
l   l  l r 
    
ti   ti g 
 ,   
i l  .  t 
    ts ir 
     t  
  i ed  i  
 
• l it    
t   
  
•  
 ll    
  
l l    ti n 
 ti   ,  
          
t   l it    
  l   i s  
   tly    
l   
t    lf  
  l     
      
 i l   i l    
  
      
   l   
   i l  
i     i tion 
   t l i ,  
 i l  
     
 t l  ilit   
. l . t  it ti  itt . 
I. OF TRANSNATIONAL L. & POLICY
individual petition. Even the European Union and its institutions is a
community of European states, not of European citizens, although
private parties do have limited access to the European Court of
Justice and free movement within the European Union. Private
companies do have limited access to dispute resolution panels of the
North American Free Trade Agreement but only for judicial review
of national administrative decisions on countervailing duties and
antidumping.46 Access to the arbitral tribunals of the World Trade
Organization, like access to the International Court of Justice, is
limited to member states. Public and private international arbitra-
tion under special agreements, on the other hand, are conducted
with considerable party autonomy, free of court control in most
cases.
While a sense of universal right and wrong might arise from
shared vicarious experiences of various peoples of the world,
through their courts and tribunals, their civilizations and their cul-
tures, this shared experience alone does not mean that national
courts easily transcend loyalty to national political institutions.
Through methods beyond formal incorporation of international law,
national courts adopt various techniques of presumptions, fictions,
and common sense in transnational litigation to accommodate the
twin expectations of world civil society.
For minimum respect for human rights, governments, through
law, are still expected to subordinate to the common good within
their jurisdictions those predatory instincts of the rapacious aspects
of human nature and private enterprise, as well as to restrain offi-
cials from their own abuses and omissions. This respect includes
wide freedoms of religion and voluntary or private human associa-
tions such as new and traditional families and communities of
interest run by nonprofit foundations or public interest groups. In
the complex global economy where old businesses are displaced by
competitive new technological products and services, the cumulative
effects of complex displacement and renewal processes place enorm-
ous welfare burdens upon governments and upon traditional cul-
tures and families. Courts here often exercise marginal influence.
46. As Justice O'Connor points out, many important substantive issues need to be ad-
dressed by federal courts, including whether Congress has exceeded its authority in delegating
power to decide cases and controversies to international panels and tribunals. O'Connor, supra
note 2, at 19. The "effect international tribunals have on domestic courts may inform the
analysis as to whether Congress acted constitutionally" and the "success of multinational
tribunals in resolving disputes depends critically on their ability to transcend parochial
interests and render legitimate judgments." Id.
[Vol. 6:2 Supp.
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WORLD CIVIL SOCIETY
To minimize social upheaval, governments are pressed by
private groups and the media to undertake programs to promote
human dignity actively through education, income redistribution, or
social intervention to increase individual and group opportunities.
Interminable change places many at the mercy of global forces over
which they have no control. Inescapable contradictions and tensions
arise between governments' function of protecting freedoms in
voluntary processes of investment and exchange and the relatively
new affirmative functions required of governments for the active
protection of human social and individual well-being. While global
democratic political processes are a means both necessary and desir-
able for adjusting these tensions, courts in each country decide the
disputes allowed them, but increasingly these are linked to activities
of the institutions of civil societies within their own cultures,
allowing private grievances a way into the public sphere.
C. American Federalism and "Civil Society"
From the time of Tocqueville's observations in the 1830s to the
present global society,47 American democracy and law have subordi-
nated all governments in the federal system to popular sovereignty
and fundamental law, implicitly in service of free associations of civil
society. Until recently, this experience had little relevance for the
rest of global society. But just as federalism in the United States uni-
fied the national economy over time because no state could seriously
assume responsibility for the social effects of national commerce, so
also in the new global economy no sovereign state has resources to
assume by itself responsibility for the effects on its population of
transnational capitalism's drive for accumulation of surplus outside
the political control of the system of sovereign states. The federalist
ideal, according to Justice O'Connor, describes
the proper relationship between domestic courts and transnational
tribunals... "the federalism of free nations," to use a phrase of the
philosopher Immanuel Kant. Just as our domestic laws develop
through a free exchange of ideas among state and federal courts, so
too should international law evolve through a dialogue between
national courts and transnational tribunals and through the inter-
dependent effect of their judgments.48
47. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOcRACY IN AMERICA (Doubleday ed., 1969).
48. O'CONNOR, supra note 2, at 17-18.
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J. OF TRANSNATIONAL L. & POLICY
As Justice O'Connor explains, U.S. federal courts have "repeatedly
recognized the autonomy of the political branches to formulate poli-
cy according to their best judgment of the nation's interests."49
From the beginning of the American Republic, questions of fed-
eralism, popular sovereignty, and fundamental rights - analogues
for similar movements now developing in other parts of the world -
have engaged the Supreme Court and federal courts. 0 Courts in
other cultures or civilizations, usually with much less independence
from political authority, have not experimented with pluralism com-
mitted to preserving civil society for as long a time as courts have in
the American federal system. Supreme Court decisions have been
cited extensively in other countries'5 1 possibly as an example as other
courts have tried to advance their countries' own attempts to guaran-
tee civil society, though often deferring to local political prejudices 2
Now as institutions of civil society begin to develop in each country
and globally, federal courts are drawn more extensively into more
complex transnational litigation where conscious judicial choices at
each stage of the process not only are informed by international and
foreign law but have consequences in other countries and courts.3
Courts are not expected to fathom where post-cold war circum-
stances and technological change will lead; yet, foreign policy which
should, often does not. 54 U.S. federal courts, nonetheless, continue
deference to foreign policy dominance by the political branches even
in private litigation brought by foreign plaintiffs. Consider, for
example, the case of Sequilhua v. Texaco, Inc.,55 in which residents
of Equador sued Texaco in Texas courts, seeking a remedy for
49. Id. at 14 (citing Chicago & S. Airlines v. Waterman Steamship Co., 333 U.S. 103, 111
(1948)).
50. See generally ROBERT MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT (Sanford Levinson
ed., 2d ed. 1994).
51. See Louis Henkin, Constitutionalism and Human Rights, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
HUMAN RIGHTS 383, 392-95 (Henkin ed., 1990); Anthony Lester, The Overseas Trade in the Ameri-
can Bill of Rights, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 537,537-38 (1988).
52. See Andrew J. Cunningham, The European Convention on Human Rights, Customary Inter-
national Law and the Constitution, 43 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 537, 546-47 (1994) (arguing that English
courts ought to follow the example of U.S. courts in incorporating customary international
human rights law and not just to buttress decisions under other rules). In Spycatcher (No.1), the
judges forcefully decried the ability of the common law to safeguard human rights in England.
See Attorney General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd., [1987] 1 W.L.R. 1248, 1286 (per Bridge,
L.J.); see also id. at 1321 (per Oliver, L.J.).
53. See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS:
COMMIENTARY AND MATERIALS (3d ed. 1996).
54. See MICHAEL MANDELBAUM, THE DAWN OF PEACE IN EUROPE (1996) (cataloguing con-
fusion and self-deception in post-cold war American foreign policy for expanding NATO to
Eastern Europe and extending its influence into the Balkans).
55. 847 F. Supp. 61 (S.D. Tex. 1994).
[Vol. 6:2 Supp.
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environmental deprivation to their property in Equador5 6 Texaco
removed the case to federal court, no doubt trying to escape Texas
law, which at that time had abolished or put in doubt stateforum non
conveniens doctrine. The federal judge retained jurisdiction over the
claim as a federal question arising from international law but then
dismissed the action because it involved important foreign policy
implications including the principle that each country has a right to
control its own natural resources and that its courts are better situ-
ated to decide the case, under federalforum non conveniens doctrine5 7
Here, a federal court created an exclusive federal question from a
dispute raising international law questions before a state court.
International law was used as a substantive limitation on state court
jurisdiction when combined with a federal forum non conveniens
doctrine.
The thesis that customary international law is part of U.S. law
under the Supremacy Clause is not so clearly authoritative as a
general principle today, despite prevailing views otherwise. 8 While
lower federal courts have inventively broadened their transnational
judicial role, the Supreme Court has furnished practically no
guidance for when the oft-cited rhetoric of The Paquete Habana,59
decided at the beginning of the twentieth century -that international
56. Id. at 61-62.
57. See id.
58. For a restatement of the prevailing contemporary view, see Louis Henkin, International
Law as Law in the United States, 82 MIcH. L. REV. 1555, 1564 (1984); Jordan J. Paust, Customary
International Law: Its Nature, Sources and Status as Law of the United States 12 MIcH. J. INT'L L. 59
(1990); and RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702
cmts. a, c (1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS]. For recent doctrinal
criticism of this view, see Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as
Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1205, 1239-40 (1997);
Arthur Weisburd, The Executive Branch and International Law, 41 VAND. L. REV. 1205, 1239-40
(1988); and A.M. Weisburd, State Courts, Federal Courts, and International Cases, 20 YALE J. INT'L
L. 1, 38-44 (1995).
59. 175 U.S. 677 (1900) (sitting in admiralty as the highest prize court in a different era to
decide ownership or compensation due for wrongful capture at sea under prize law of the day
determined by international customs during time of war). Prize law provided a remedy under
ancient custom and usage for wrongful seizure of a private vessel on the high seas during time
of war, thereby incorporating customary international law to determine a claim of title or
compensation, absent political directives otherwise. The circumstances of The Paquete Habana
involved no executive directive to seize the vessel on the high seas notwithstanding a violation
of international law. The seizure occurred under a general executive order to conduct the war
in accord with international law. See id. at 677. This distinction, allowing a directive to violate
customary international law, was extended to the attorney general acting within discretionary
statutory authority in Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1453-55 (11th Cir. 1986), and its
progeny. Commentators are split in their appraisal of this extension.
New customary international human rights law purports to create direct rights and duties
between private individuals and individual officials acting under color of state authority within
the same state, enforceable in civil litigation before domestic or foreign courts. See, e.g.,
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
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J. OF TRANSNATIONAL L. & POLICY
law forms part of United States law6° - should be taken seriously,
even when no statute is available. The Sabbatino case (and its pro-
geny) is an important guide for lower court decisions, although
arising in the cold war era.61 It, too, made a state choice of law
question into an exclusive federal question-whether state courts
should respect a Cuban law authorizing the taking of property of
U.S. nationals by the revolutionary socialist government in Cuba
subsequently brought to New York. The Cuban government applied
to federal courts to "federalize" the claim, then to abstain from decid-
ing it, thus confirming de facto the validity of titles passed under the
nationalization decree in Cuba, pending political branch resolution
of cold war issues which linger still. In the post-cold war era of
Sequihua v. Texaco, Inc.,62 American transnational corporations use
federal courts to "federalize" claims brought by foreign plaintiffs in
state court against them for wrongful acts abroad, finding advantage
in federal abstention or deference to resolution in foreign courts.
Another post-cold war decision, Hartford Insurance, took jurisdiction
over foreign reinsurers under federal antitrust law in a suit by the
states led by California.63 The case demonstrated how vast was an
alleged insurance conspiracy by multinational reinsurers
Early in judicial history, Chief Justice Jay's opinion in Chisholm v.
Georgia" placed in federal courts the constitutional power to deter-
mine the public responsibilities of a nation newly admitted to the
family of nations. It held that state courts were not competent to de-
cide questions involving the law of nations or performance of treaties
under either the Articles of Confederation or the Constitution be-
cause the "United States were responsible to foreign nations for the
conduct of each State ... and ... the inexpediency of referring all
such questions to State Courts, and particularly to the Courts of
delinquent States became apparent."65
The Supreme Court has continued that position whenever trans-
national litigation between private parties raises important new fed-
eral questions. Thus Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino66 restrained
New York courts from refusing, for reasons of public policy, to give
60. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700.
61. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
62. 847 F. Supp. 61 (S.D. Tex. 1994).
63. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 764 (1993) (considering limits to U.S.
jurisdiction to adjudicate or to prescribe governed by principles of international comity or
international law).
64. 2 US. 419 (1793).
65. Id. at 474.
66. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
[Vol. 6:2 Supp.
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respect to Cuban expropriations during the cold war and, in the
process of the decision, ironically strengthened the institutions of
negotiable titles in international commercial transactions.6 7 After
global trade soared in the 1980s and 1990s, the Sequihua federal dis-
trict court announced that federal law did not allow a state court to
litigate matters arising in foreign jurisdictions which would present
serious foreign relations problems.68 Implicitly favoring less forum-
shopping in state courts against multinational enterprises, this
judicial stance leaves to federal courts the discretionary power to
shape outcomes to fit the policy preferences of the free enterprise
side of world civil society.
D. Trend in Federal Court Decisions: Nationalization of International Law
Ironically, human rights groups and free-market enterprises alike
demand protection from strong national institutions, even as "sover-
eignty" weakens.69 Since individuals and groups have practically no
political or military allegiance to international institutions, they
cannot expect much legal protection from new international regimes
without political and strategic alliances by governments. In the
United States, moreover, federal judges have responded variously to
cases brought before them, but certain trends emerge. Federal courts
have effectively "nationalized" the decision whether to apply inter-
national law to protect both sets of expectations, strangely reinforc-
ing the position of the Asian-Islamic coalition. They have developed
distinct interpretive devices and presumptions, reflecting differences
between economic and personal freedoms, which may run counter to
international consensus.
The trend of federal court decisions affirmatively supports trans-
national production and exchange based upon free markets, trade,
and investment whenever the political branches or common law give
the slightest grounds for incorporating these expectations as federal
law. Beginning in the nineteenth century, federal courts absorbed
and nationalized the law merchant, maritime law, and prize law
from the law of nations, often without explicit direction from the
political branches, as rules of decision.7 Protecting universal human
rights beyond that which is already provided in the Constitution,
67. Id. at 398-99.
68. Sequihua v. Texaco, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 61, 61 (S.D. Tex. 1994).
69. See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 31.
70. See, e.g., Joseph Modeste Sweeney, A Tort Only in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 445,458-62 (1995) (discussing "nationalization" of the custom-
ary prize law by U.S. courts).
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however, is simply not considered within the judicial power without
political direction. Here, the federal courts do not innovate. Access
to federal courts or administrative agencies to implement inter-
nationally-recognized human rights -either affirmatively by public
entitlements or negatively by restraining abuses of public and
private power-requires legislation or support from the political
branches of government. Private enterprises, however, demand pro-
tection through courts and administrative agencies to safeguard
investment and provide reasonable regularity in transnational busi-
ness dealings and risk.
In the U.S., decisional trends in the federal courts have moved
away from a cosmopolitan or natural law view of human rights and
toward their "nationalization." We shall see this best in my later
analysis of the international peremptory norm, jus cogens. For
international human rights law this means that while federal courts
interpret national standards or principles as consistent with those
which are universally accepted, it is universality which bends to
national standards. National standards are used as baseline - as if
they represent the universally accepted standards. International hu-
man rights principles as such are then used to embellish, but not
necessarily to control, a national decision in specific human rights
cases.71 Without a political green light, courts here instinctively back
away from any judicial intervention into the political relation or
bond between citizen and government. Direct communicative dis-
course from human rights organizations within a world civil society
perspective urging courts to recognize the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights as U.S. law, for example, is met with federal court
resistance. The public sphere first must be galvanized to persuade a
reluctant Congress to enact effective human rights rules of decision
available for U.S. citizens against government acts or omissions con-
sidered wrongful under international law.
Very little, if any, "new" international human rights law has been
incorporated in decisions by federal judges without the aid of a
statute, despite a tradition in which customary international law is
part of U.S. law and treaties are the supreme law of the land72 Pro-
hibitions against genocide, apartheid, slavery, physical torture, or
arbitrary murder have been provided by statute or constitutional
71. See Paul L. Hoffman & Nadine Strossen, Enforcing International Human Rights Law in the
United States, in HUMAN RIGHTS: AN AGENDA FOR THE NExT CVuRY 477 (Louis Henkin & John
Lawrence Hargrove eds., 1994).
72. See Henkin, supra note 58, at 1564; Paust, supra note 58, at 59; RESTATEMENT OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 58, § 702, cmts. a, c.
[Vol. 6:2 Supp.
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provision, but international human rights claims to gender, racial,
ethnic, and religious equality are given little attention in U.S. courts
from sources of international law, not even in interpreting ambi-
guous treaties, statutes, or constitutional clauses73 Affirmative hu-
man rights claims for positive public goods such as subsistence,
education, employment, health care, and personal security have
fared no better.74 Likewise, contemporary courts in the United States
have not recognized international human rights law as the basis for
implied causes of action between private and nonstate parties with-
out a statutory basis.75 Rules of procedure or evidence remain large-
ly uninfluenced by international law even in the face of treaties or
statutes unless their provisions are explicit and self-executing 6 - an
exact replica of the influence on courts of human rights treaties
which are ratified with non-self-executing reservations 77
In international economic rights cases, the courts also have
"nationalized" the protection of private transactions but have done
so while moving toward a cosmopolitan view of free markets and
exchange - that is, background protection of contract and property
are viewed as if they are universally recognized as the backbone of
the emerging world civil society. Here, capitalist demands from
within world civil society for the public sphere to enforce the private
73. See Anne F. Bayefsky, General Approaches to Domestic Application of Women's International
Human Rights Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES
351, 361-62 (Rebecca J. Cook ed., 1994); Andrew Byrnes, Women, Feminism and International
Human Rights Law -Methodological Myopia, Fundamental Flaws or Meaningful Marginalisation?
AuSTL Y.B. INT'L L. 12 (1992). For a theoretical critique, see Karen Engle, International Human
Rights and Feminism: When Discourses Meet 13 MICH. J. INT'L L. 517 (1992).
74. For a less pessimistic review of decisions, see Connie de la Vega, Protecting Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, 15 WHrrrIER L. REV. 471, 478-86 (1994); Connie de la Vega, The Right
to Equal Education: Merely a Guiding Principle or Customary International Legal Right? 11 HARV.
BLAcKLETTER J. 37 (1994); and Bert B. Lockwood, Jr., Toward the Economic Brown: Economic
Rights in the United States and the Possible Contribution of International Human Rights Lau; in
WORLD JUSTICE?: U.S. COURTS AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 149 (George A Lopez &
Michael Stohl eds., 1991).
75. United States courts almost never exercise federal jurisdiction by implying private
causes of action arising under this new customary international human rights law between
nonstate private parties without aid of a statute. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d. 252 (2d Cir.
1996) (upholding, but under statutes, actions against the de facto head of Bosnian-Serb forces in
his private as well as de facto leadership capacity for condoning brutal rapes and human rights
violations in former Yugoslavia); see also Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 206-07
(D.C. Cir. 1985); Tel-Oren v. Libya, 726 F.2d 774, 792 (D.C. Cir. 1984). But see Jordan J. Paust,
The Other Side of Right: Private Duties Under Human Rights Law, 5 HARV. HUM. Ris. J. 51 (1992)
(arguing that private individuals can have direct duties under customary international law).
76. See Soci~t6 Nationale Industrielle Arospatiale v. United States Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522
(1987).
77. Thus in 1992, ratifying the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, the United States made a number of reservations concerning non-self-execution.
See Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, 138 CONG. REc. 4781-01 (daily ed., Apr. 2,1992).
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law institutions of contract and property claims -and new claims as
"international intellectual property" -both serve and are readily
accepted by the legal systems of sovereign states while severely criti-
cized for denying gender equality78
The international economic rights perspective maintains an inte-
grated system of global free market exchange across national bor-
ders, one that penetrates national legal orders by vertical enforce-
ment of private ordering systems by agreements and comity and
presumes federal court cooperation unless the political branches
determine otherwise.79 It leaves the private political relationship
between individuals and transnational corporations to the global
marketplace, unless there is political direction otherwise, subject to
international supervision of treaty regimes, such as the World Trade
Organization, for discriminatory tariffs and advancing protections
for new property rights.80
Federal courts hesitate less in giving effect even to ambiguous
provisions in economic treaties, however, so long as they do not in-
volve the prerogatives of government (as in tax treaties), sometimes
in the face of later, apparently inconsistent civil rights statutes81
78. See, e.g., Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, reprinted
in OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS: GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADES 319 (1994); see also JOHN H. JACK-
SON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS
(1989). But from a feminist perspective, global privatization denies gender equality. See, e.g.,
Saskia Sassen, Toward a Feminist Analytic of the Global Economy, 4 IND. J. GLOBAL STUD. 7 (1996).
79. This observed difference in baseline presumptions contrasts with Professor Koh's
conclusion which equates federal court treatment of transnational human rights litigation with
that of transnational commercial litigation. See Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law
Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347, 2479 n.167 (1991). For a comparison of the "cosmopolitan" struc-
ture of John Jackson's conception of international economic law with the "metropolitan" archi-
tecture of Hans Kelson's unitary public international law conception, neither of which would
permit courts to defer to the political branches, see David Kennedy, The International Style in
Postwar Law and Policy, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 7 (arguing that both would transform sovereignty-
Kelsen's by internationalizing it, Jackson's by displacing it).
80. See Paul E. Geller, Intellectual Property in the Global Marketplace: Impact of TRIPS Dispute
Settlements?, 29 INT'L L. 99, 104 (1995); see also HANS KELSEN, LAW AND PEACE IN INTER-
NATIONAL RELATIONS: THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES LECTURES: 1940-41 (1942).
81. See Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 US. 176 (1982) (holding that the
defendant was not a Japanese company and that, therefore, the conflict between the Treaty of
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation ("FCN") with Japan and U.S. Civil Rights Act was
avoided); Papaila v. Uniden America Corp., 51 F.3d 54 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that FCN Treaty
with Japan prevailed over later Civil Rights Act); Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d 389 (7th Cir.
1991) (construing Civil Rights Act of 1964 to avoid conflict by deferring to treaty which
reciprocally protects American and Japanese investments and business operations, including
presence of managers and technical personnel, thereby avoiding abrogation of treaty); Starrett
v. Iberia Airlines of Spain, 756 F. Supp. 292 (S.D. Tex. 1989) (holding that treaty with Spain did
not cover discriminatory replacement of U.S. national with national not a citizen of Spain); see
also Martin A. Rogoff, Interpretation of International Agreements by Domestic Courts and the Politics
of International Treaty Relations: Reflections on Some Recent Decisions of the United States Supreme
HeinOnline  -- 6 J. Transnat'l L. & Pol'y 430 1996-1997
430 .  NA TIONAL . lley  
   aims-and   
tional t al t " oth  l  
  i   
 i   lity. 8 
ti al  ti    
 t  
 l 
   ts    
     s 
i  ?9  t  i  
 ls l i s  
,  i l   t  
i l  t     
, SCriminator    i  
  80 
  t   s 
  ,    
 t   
i  t    l t , tl  i i t t i il i t  t t t .81 
, t lated  l t al t  ted 
    s   
'll  TI S:     
,  s : w  oU I L I   
.     , l i    . ,  
 .  t  l , lN .  uo  
   li e ti ns t    '  
     t l  ti   
t i l rcial  j  . snational lic  
i tion,  . .       
 '    i l ic   itan" 
t t r    l '   li  i t ti l     l  
it t  t   t  t  liti l ,  i  ,  t tional t l  i  
r  i y,  v    reignty-
l '   i t ti li i  it, '  i l i  it . 
SO.   . , t l rty   l al t lace: t  te 
ttl ts ,  I '  . ,  ( ); s  ls  s s , w   I  I -
I  :    
.  it  ji ., . . li ,  . .   l i  t t t  
t       t t, t , t  li t t  t  t   
, r e ti n U n )    . .     
);     i    t  
it   il   l t  i il i t  t ; ti  .  .,  .   t  ir. 
        i    i     
r i r ally r t ts ri    i t ts  i  r ti , i l i g 
    t i l l, t  i i  ti   t t ; t tt 
. i  i li   i ,  . . . . . .  l i  t t t t  it  i  i  
t  i i i t  l t  . . ti l it  ti l t  iti   i ;  
ls  rti  . ff, I t r retation f I t rnational r ts  sti  rts  t  litics 
rnational ty tions:  ions  ited   
WORLD CIVIL SOCIETY
International law is influential and recognized in state-to-state public
law limitations on jurisdiction such as claims of sovereign immunity
or judicial restraint in construing statutes to have extraterritorial
reach.82 But when market economies, backed by central state coer-
cive power, need protection, antitrust laws and security laws are
readily extended to acts abroad with effects within the jurisdiction
without explicit statutory authority.83 Treaties -being supreme law
of the land when ratified after approval by the Senate -are inter-
preted as self-executing when private economic or commercial inter-
ests are protected but not when fundamental human rights are at
stake.84 Any international limitation on national powers which
federal courts might enforce constitutionally against the executive or
legislative branches on behalf of the international community is sus-
pect unless it supports international freedom of the flow of capital,
management, products and services, and commercial information
(but not labor).
Sometimes, domestic courts avoid a choice of allegiance by incor-
porating older customary international law, horizontal, interstate
law.85 In an early example, Henfield's Case,86 the public law of na-
tions provided the jurisdictional basis from common law to punish
U.S. citizens who served as officers on board an armed schooner
commissioned by France as a privateer to interrupt British commerce
in violation of the law of neutrality. President Washington's pro-
clamation declared, "I have given instructions to those officers to
whom it belongs, to cause prosecutions to be instituted against all
persons who shall within the cognizance of the courts of the United
States, violate the law of nations, with respect to the powers at war,
Court, 11 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & P. 559, 563 (1996) (criticizing Court's narrow interpretation of
treaties to permit executive action considered by most international authorities as being outside
generally accepted rules of international law).
82. See, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244,244 (1991).
83. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993); Alcoa S.. Co. v. United
States, 338 U.S. 421 (1949); see also Jonathan Turley, Transnational Discrimination and the Eco-
nomics of Extraterritorial Regulation, 70 B.U. L REV. 339 (1990).
84. While the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights prohibits all forms of
discrimination, ICCPR, supra note 40, art. 26, 999 U.N.T.S. at 226, federal courts, nonetheless,
consistently uphold FCN treaties which allow foreign companies to discriminate on the basis of
citizenship. See, e.g., Fortino v. Quasar, Co., 950 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that dis-
crimination on basis of Japanese citizenship as authorized by FCN Treaty between the United
States and Japan was not actionable under Title VII); see also MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines,
863 F.2d 1135 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that citizenship-based discrimination under FCN Treaty
between the United States and South Korea did not conflict with antidiscrimination principles
of international law).
85. See generally LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLur OF LAWS: FOUNDATIONS AND FUTURE DIREC-
TIONS (2d ed. 1995).
86. 11 F. Cas. 1099 (Cir. Ct. D. Penn. 1793).
Summer 1997]
HeinOnline  -- 6 J. Transnat'l L. & Pol'y 431 1996-1997
 aV  a  431 
l  i l  i  t t   
 i ti n  i   
l  i    i l 
82     l  
 t  it    
l     i  ti  
t  rity.83 aties-being   
    l   are 
 ting    i l 
ted       
84  l     
ts  ll    
    l t  
t  l   
 t     i l ti  
 
    
  ti nal l,  
85 l   l 's se,86   
i  i ti al     
u s        
   r t  
ti    t t 's 
 I  i s    
  t t    
     
      rs   
rt,  u . 'L . :  ,   ' r  t tion  
  i   red   l i s  i e 
 t d   tional . 
, .,  . , ). 
.   i  . . . li i ,  . .  ); l  .5. . . it  
,  . .     t an l , ational i ination  t  
 / xtrater itorial tion, . . . 
l   r tional t    t     
ra  . . . l , , 
t tly   ties  ll  i  i  t  i i i ate  t  i  f 
, i  ) 
 is se ip  ized   t  en   
    le   ls  ra    
 i -based i i ation r   
      i i tion  
ti al  
.  r lly  I , NmCf  : I   uro  I -
 
.  . .  . t. . . . 
J. OF TRANSNATIONAL L. & POLICY
or any of them."87 The stated reason was to maintain peaceful
nation-to-nation relations by enforcing a proclaimed neutrality
against its own citizens. This older customary international law main-
tained horizontal equilibrium among sovereign nations, and loyalty
to it was the same as loyalty to the state and its sovereignty. Prize
law, maritime law, the law merchant, and sovereign or diplomatic
immunities did not affect the fundamental relationship of citizen to
state and thus did not threaten the political equilibrium between
states.88
Thus federal courts choose to avoid loyalty to a cosmopolitan
international community, when the new customary law might re-
quire it, by resorting to an older law of nations, the public law of
sovereigns.89 They nationalize customary international law, thereby
assimilating allegiances. They perform the functions of this liberal
state as if it were applied in transnational society regulated by the
ideology of a society of liberal states, in effect acting as the "lead
State" in Professor Slaughter's multilevel international society.9 For
example, Judge Weinstein used older customary international law to
hold a visiting foreign head of state immune from suit to avoid
reaching the substance of a human rights claim against that person
under newer customary international human rights law 91 But even
in a society of liberal states, the ideologies of overriding public inter-
est in states to control persons within a single jurisdiction to prevent
hostile actions, terrorism, or provocations interfering with a policy of
nonintervention may require the invocation of traditional boundaries
of responsibility.
These descriptions of decisional trends reflect nationalization of
international law by federal courts, but each is explained from
87. Id. at 1102. The presidential proclamation warned and exhorted citizens from engaging
in hostile actions against a neutral country and declared that any citizens who engaged in such
actions would be liable to "punishment or forfeiture, under the law of nations, by committing.
aiding, or abetting hostilities against any of the said powers or by carrying to them those
articles which are deemed contraband, by the modern usage of nations" and also declared that
such persons "will not receive the protection of the United States against such punishment or
forfeiture." Id.
88. See generally Sweeney, supra note 70.
89. See Lea Brilmayer, International Law in American Courts: A Modest Proposal, 100 YALE L.J.
2277 (1991).
90. Slaughter, supra note 31, at 205.
91. Note in this regard Judge Weinstein's opinion that the "court has subject matter juris-
diction, but it cannot exercise in personam jurisdiction" because common and international law
immunity survived the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1994). LaFontant
v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128, 139 (E.D.N.Y. 1994); see also Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349
(1993); Argentine Rep. v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 US. 428 (1989); Siderman de
Blake v. Argentina, 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992); Von Dardel v. U.S.S.R., 736 F. Supp. 1 (D.C.
1990).
[Vol. 6:2 Supp.
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WORLD CIVIL SOCIETY
different theoretical assumptions. Paradoxically, the status of inter-
national human rights in federal courts depends upon the traditional
political institutions of the states system, which leaves the relation-
ship between the national polity and its citizens or residents to the
internal structure of the state. This position requires even greater
deference to the political branches. Federal courts nearly always
await guidance from the political branches before invoking this law.
International monitoring of sovereign behavior by the United Na-
tions Human Rights Committee, the United Nations Human Rights
Commission, and regional systems of courts and commissions, or
through country reports on human rights issued annually by the
United States, is profoundly influenced by parallel work of non-
governmental human rights organizations from within the emerging
world civil society independent of states. 2
These differences simply reflect, as Edwin Dickinson pointed out
at the beginning of the Great Depression, that the "law of nations
became a source, rather than an integral part, of the national sys-
tem."93 Like the source of contract or tort law-now found in state
not federal law - international or foreign law is chosen for decision
by federal courts through its sources. This choice may be made at
each phase of litigation but not on the basis of court allegiance to an
international legal order or from a syllogism deriving the authority
of international law from the Supremacy Clause. The most influen-
tial sources are those which reflect a pragmatic analysis of the inter-
ests of litigants, governments, the international system, and the inde-
pendent private relationships and interests now within a rapidly
developing world civil society -what Professor Lowenfeld otherwise
calls "reasonableness." 94
When such nationalization occurs in interpreting the sources of
international law, whether in the United States or in other countries,
national courts invariably may reflect different, perhaps inconsistent,
versions of international law. As a consequence, private internation-
al law and international conflict-of-laws theory, themselves formerly
part of the law of nations and concerned only with choice of law in
92. What federal courts are doing seems at odds with Professor Brilmayer's recommenda-
tion that domestic courts should defer to political authority in traditional horizontal state-to-
state relationships, such as territorial jurisdiction or sovereign immunity, but should invoke
customary international law to adjudicate human rights claims as vertical relationships be-
tween individuals and governments. Brilmayer, supra note 89.
93. Edwin D. Dickinson, Changing Concepts and the Doctrine of Incorporation, 26 AM. J. INTL
L. 239,260 (1932).
94. ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND THE QUEST FOR REASON-
ABLENESS: ESSAYS IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 15 (1996).
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private actions, assume increasing importance to the formulation of
rules of decision by forum courts in civil litigation. In itself, this
formulation need not offend a cosmopolitan view of a universal
human community under a common rule of law. 5 In these circum-
stances, choice-of-law analysis by forum courts should broaden
beyond governmental interest analysis to include the interests of
international systems and public policy, a position consistent with
that of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws.96 Federal courts
have experience with this kind of analysis. As important decisions
are communicated among other courts also struggling with disputes
with roots beyond sovereignty, within world civil society, U.S.
federal court decisions, once thought limited to American pluralism,
might serve as model.
A federal cause of action, for example, might be demonstrated
and chosen under the Alien Tort Statute97 or the Torture Victim Pro-
tection Act98 for certain "international common law torts," when
recognized by universal consensus among nations, a choice permit-
ted but not required by Congress9 9 Foreign law might provide the
95. See Vmjo HEISKANEN, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ToPics 23-24,61-64 (1992).
96. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFuCT OF LAWS § 6(2) (1971). This point is illustrated by
Judge Nickerson's opinion in the Filartiga case on remand to the District Court. Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). Therein, the district court referred to conflict of
laws as part of the common law of the United States and shaped a rule of decision from that
theoretical premise. Id. at 863. Citing the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, supra, § 6(1),
Judge Nickerson considered the needs of the international system. Filartiga, 577 F. Supp. at 863.
Clearly, he did not apply any one single rule but constructed a hybrid rule of decision for the
particular case beginning first with foreign law, then analyzing its consistency with customary
international law and forum law:
The international law prohibiting torture established the standard and referred to
the national states the task of enforcing it .... Congress entrusted that task to the
federal courts and gave them power to choose and develop federal remedies to
effectuate the purposes of the international law incorporated into United States
common law .... [Alny remedy they fashion must recognize that this case
concerns an act so monstrous as to make its perpetrator an outlaw around the
globe .... [That] the interests of the global community transcend those of any one
state. . . does not mean that traditional choice-of-law principles are irrelevant....
All these factors make it appropriate to look first to Paraguayan law in determin-
ing the remedy for the violation of international law .... In concert with the other
nations of the world Paraguay prohibited torture and thereby reaped the benefits
the condemnation brought with it. Paraguayan citizens may not pretend that no
such condemnation exists.
Id. at 863-64; see also Luther L. McDougal III, Toward the Increased Use of Interstate and Interna-
tional Policies in Choice-of-Law Analysis in Tort Cases Under the Second Restatement and Leflar's
Choice-Influencing Considerations, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2465 (1996).
97. 28 US.C. § 1350 (1994) (originally enacted as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §
12,1 Stat. 73, 79 (1789)).
98. Pub. L. No. 102-256,106 Stat 73 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a)(2) (1994)).
99. See Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844 (11th Cir. 1996); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232
(2d Cir. 1995); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (agreeing with Judge
Edwards in Tel-Oren v. Libya, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
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WORLD CIVIL SOCIETY
rule of decision, as Judge Kaufman carefully explained in the
important Filartiga case, giving respect to the rule of law in other
countries: "Our holding on subject matter jurisdiction decides only
whether Congress intended to confer judicial power, and whether it
is authorized to do so by Article III. The choice of law inquiry is a
much broader one, primarily concerned with fairness; . . . conse-
quently it looks to wholly different considerations."' 00 Forum law
also might be chosen, especially if it incorporates the international
common law tort standard, avoiding a choice between loyalties by
nationalizing the choice. Judge Kaufman's opinion in Filartiga made
clear that "the district court may well decide that fairness requires it
to apply Paraguayan law to the instant case,"101 taking a broad range
of factors of Lauritsen v. Larsen1°2 into account.
E. International Law as Judicial Lawmaking by Federal Courts
Chief Justice Marshall's classic opinion in Brown v. United
States,103 often cited in debating whether the president is constitu-
tionally bound by international law, also deserves a fresh reading on
whether international law can be applied by federal courts without
Congressional action. That decision refused a claim which arose
during the War of 1812 which was that the law of nations, without
Congressional authorization, could expand the president's constitu-
tional authority to seize alien property within the United States after
a Congressional declaration of war.1 °4 In the cold war era, with Viet-
nam and the War Powers Resolution still in mind, Professor Michael
Glennon read this case to mean that the president can derive no
constitutional power from international law to execute the law of na-
tions when Congress is silent'0 5 While Congress was not so clearly
100. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876,889 (2d Cir. 1980) (citation omitted).
101. Id. at 889 n.25.
102. 345 US. 571 (1953).
103. 12 U.S. 110 (1814) (holding that federal government seizure of property in U.S. belong-
ing to British nationals is illegal under constitution unless Congress expressly approved by
statute, other than declaration of war, a permissible rule authorizing seizure of enemy property
under laws of war).
104. Id. at 110-11.
105. MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 242-43 (1990). Glennon's syllo-
gism seems to be:
* All authority for the national government derives from the Constitution;
* The president has no power to seize alien property under any provision of
Constitution or from a Congressional declaration of war alone, although laws of
war may permit it;
* Therefore, the president has no authority to seize alien property even to execute
international law without Congressional approval, although permitted under
international law.
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silent about not confiscating enemy property even then,106 today the
Supreme Court is more likely in foreign affairs to imply tacit consent
by Congress to actions of the president following custom, as it did in
Dames & Moore v. Regan,107 where a sole executive agreement settling
claims arising from the Iranian Hostage Crisis was in the tradition of
prior settlements, even though not expressly authorized.1 8
In United States v. Alvarez-Machain,10 9 federal enforcement of U.S.
drug laws by abductions in Mexico showed the dark side of transna-
tional society in drug trafficking.n ° Haitian Refugee Centers' defer-
ence to executive orders for the Navy to turn back Haitian refugees
on the high seas (so long as not expressly prohibited by treaty or
statute) strengthened the president's power to influence the making
or changing of customary international law by disregarding it,111 as
Truman had done by unilaterally extending territorial jurisdiction
over the continental shelf at the beginning of the cold war. These
decisions gave very little regard to arguments invoking international
law as a judicially imposed limitation on executive, congressional, or
judicial power but made much of the presumption derived from the
territorial principle of international law against extraterritorial exten-
sion of the laws.11 2 They have been criticized extensively. 1 3 Yet,
Id.
106. In those circumstances, as the Chief Justice Marshall pointed out, Congress had
enacted measures delegating power to grant letters of marque and reprisal to the president and
also implicitly disapproving the confiscation of alien property, especially when reciprocal
measures might endanger American property abroad as retaliation.
107. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
108. Id. at 654-58.
109. 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
110. In this case, the Court refused to interpret ambiguous provision in extradition treaty
in light of rule of customary international law and reversed the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991). Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at
665, 667-68. For an analysis of the Court's decision in Alvarez-Machain, see Jonathan A. Bush,
How Did We Get Here?: Foreign Abduction After Alvarez-Machain, 45 STAN. L. REV. 939 (1993);
Michael J. Glennon, State-Sponsored Abduction: A Comment on United States v. Alvarez-Machain,
86 AM. J. INT'L L. 746 (1992). For an analysis of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal's decision,
see Mark D. Hobson, Note, Abducting Foreign Nationals Abroad United States v. Alvarez-
Machain, 1 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 253 (1992).
111. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 US. 155 (1993) (refusing to apply international
law of nonrefoulement to limit executive's action returning refugees found on high seas
without explicitly clear statute).
112. Justice Blackmun strongly disagreed with the Court's territorial limitations of the
Convention Relating to Status of Refugees, July 28, 1991, art. 1, 189 U.N.T.S. 137. See Sale, 509
U.S. at 188-94 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
113. See Thomas D. Jones, The Haitian Refugee Crisis: A Quest for Human Rights, 15 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 77 (1993); Nicholas R. Koberstein, Without Justification: Reliance on the Presumption
Against Extraterritoriality in Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 7 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 569 (1993);
Harold Hongju Koh, The Human Face of the Haitian Interdiction Program, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 483
(1993); Robert L. Newmark, Non-Refoulement Run Afoul: The Questionable Legality of Extraterrito-
rial Repatriation Programs, 71 WASH. U. L. Q. (1993); Scott M. Martin, Non-Refoulement of
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they have much to do with the widening influence of the executive in
global life and commerce - and in subjecting foreign citizens or
companies to U.S. jurisdiction or power." 4
Whatever one thinks about the contemporary rhetoric that inter-
national law is part of U.S. law, it is clear that most of the earliest
Supreme Court cases incorporated the law of nations as special rules
of decision dealing with the laws of war, prize law, maritime law, the
law of piracy, and perhaps the law merchant 1 5  Consider how
specially tied the questions presented were to the high seas and trade
and sovereign prerogative." 6 Even early decisions in prize law
(under maritime law or laws of war under admiralty jurisdiction)
denote a special incorporation of the law of nations under a federal
jurisdictional statute in admiralty cases or under the laws of war 17
It was a time dominated by mercantilism and close relations between
governments and business within classic nineteenth-century rules of
public international law." 8 In contemporary transactions, the insti-
tutions of private international law embrace those of public interna-
tional law.119 As Professor Lowenfeld proclaims, "indeed ... this is
Refugees: United States Compliance with International Obligations, 23 HARV. INT'L L. J. 357 (1983);
see also Bush, supra note 110; Glennon, supra note 105; Fernando R. Tes6n, International Abduc-
tions, Low-Intensity Conflicts and State Sovereignty: A Moral Inquiry, 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
551 (1994).
114. For Justice Blackmun's parting criticisms, see Harry A. Blackmun, The Supreme Court
and the Law of Nations, 104 YALE L.J. 39 (1994); and Harold Hongju Koh, Justice Blackmun and the
'World Out There," 104 YALE L. J. 23 (1994). But see Jimmy Guruld, Terrorism, Territorial Sover-
eignty, and the Forcible Apprehension of International Criminals Abroad,17 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP.
L. REV. 457 (1994); Malvina Halberstam, In Defense of the Supreme Court Decision in Alvarez-
Machain, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 736 (1992).
115. Stewart Jay, The Status of the Law of Nations in Early American Law, 42 VAND. L. REV.
819,821-22 (1989).
116. McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10 (1963)
(finding that law of the flag state ordinarily governs the internal affairs of a ship under
international law); Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953) (finding that choice of law in
maritime torts involved weighing the interests of foreign nations in regulation of maritime
commerce as part of legitimate concern in international community); The Neriede, 13 U.S. 388
(1815) (applying law of nations to rights of capture against belligerents and neutrals on high
seas during times of war).
117. Compare Sweeney, supra note 70 (advancing narrow incorporation principle) with
William S. Dodge, The Historical Origins of the Alien Tort Statute: A Response to the "Originalists,"
19 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 221 (1996) (expanding concept of incorporation).
118. The best pre-World War II summaries of incorporation under federal jurisdiction
were Edwin D. Dickinson, supra note 93, and Harold H. Sprout, Theories as to the Applicability of
International Law in the Federal Courts of the United States, 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 280 (1932) (discussing
five grounds for incorporating under federal jurisdiction).
119. See JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1996)
(arguing that trends indicate that international law was part of U.S. law from beginning of
nationhood); Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role of International Law as a Canon of Domestic Statutory
Construction, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1103 (1990).
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where the action is." 120 Rules of cooperation governing the choice of
law in complex interactions within a civil society find their roots in a
public sphere, one mediated by the courts more than by the political
branches.
A Supreme Court custom refusing to extend the reach of a statute
to violations of civil rights laws by U.S. companies abroad, however,
gives deference to traditional horizontal political relations among
sovereign states. Reading the statute strictly, despite fair inferences
of Congressional intent, the Court used customary international law
as background to reflect the presumption that statutes are territorial
(Congress promptly amended the civil rights act to reach U.S.
companies abroad).121 The nineteenth-century era of state positivism
and sovereignty carried a presumption against extraterritorial exten-
sion of statutes without express language in regulation of markets.
The modern Supreme Court sometimes invokes that presumption
but often does not, for ambiguous statutes are interpreted to reach
conduct abroad with effects in the United States. 22 As much as the
presumption entrenched the law of nations as between independent
and equal sovereign states, that canon of interpreting statutes yields
when federal courts face complex global conspiracies under loose
protective statutes.123
Without explicit legislative directives by the political branches,
there is little evidence that federal courts are influenced much by
new customary law in the human rights field. A recent report finds
that "with few exceptions, U.S. courts have not treated customary
international human rights law as binding in domestic litigation."'124
120. LOWENFELD, supra note 94, at 232.
121. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991).
122. "As Aramco and Hartford Fire illustrate, the Court's recent approach to the extraterrito-
rial reach of federal legislation leaves much to be desired .... The result [of confusing different
approaches] is confusion for litigants and lower courts, and arbitrary, unpredictable results."
BORN, supra note 53, at 594-95.
123. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 US. 764, 803 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Justice Scalia's dissent in Hartford Insurance strongly disagrees with Justice Souter's majority
opinion and analysis of the application of international comity. in his dissent, he said that "the
practice of using international law to limit the extraterritorial reach of statutes is firmly
established in our jurisprudence." Id. at 818. Justice Scalia cited the Restatement of the Foreign
Relations and strongly relied upon Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th
Cir. 1976). Hartford Fire Ins., 509 U.S. at 817-18. By contrast, Justice Souter barely mentioned
that case and did not rely upon its reasoning. Id. at 798 n.24. He would have merely limited
jurisdiction to adjudicate but only after first considering the federal jurisdiction, and then only
when a foreign defendant could not comply both with foreign law and U.S. law. The Scalia dis-
sent would have considered limitations from international law in the initial decision prescrib-
ing a jurisdiction.
124. Paul L. Hoffman & Nadine Strossen, Enforcing International Human Rights Law in the
United States, in ACLU INToL CIVIL LIBERTIES REP., Aug. 1994, at 2.
[Vol. 6:2 Supp.
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WORLD CIVIL SOCIETY
Even with a statutory basis for jurisdiction, federal courts resist justi-
fying decisions solely on the basis of customary human rights law
unless it meets the most stringent substantive requirements. There is
little evidence that the new law of human rights even influences judi-
cial interpretation of ambiguous statutes or constitutions. Supreme
Court decisions suggest it makes little difference in interpreting
existing law.
The circuit courts of appeals that have allowed subject matter
jurisdiction for breaches of international human rights law under the
Alien Tort Statute limit causes of action to "violations of specific,
universal and obligatory international human rights standards which
'confer .. .fundamental rights upon all people vis-A-vis their own
governments."' 125 The Second Circuit found frivolous one appeal
brought after Filartiga was decided. That court limited the reach of
the Alien Tort Statute to "shockingly egregious violations of uni-
versally recognized principles of international law."126 The Ninth
and Fifth Circuits recognize customary international human rights
law under the statute to prohibit official torture, summary execu-
tions, murder, causing disappearances, prolonged arbitrary deten-
tion, and perhaps inhuman and degrading treatment, in addition to
prohibiting slavery and genocide.1 27 However, a violation of free
speech "does not rise to the level of such universally recognized
rights and so does not constitute a 'law of nations."'128 Claims of
privacy,129 protection for cultural rights of indigenous peoples,130 or
fundamental right to education' 31 do not state causes of action for
violating international law under statutes usually invoked. Govern-
ment confiscation of property of a citizen and resident "was not a
violation of the law of nations, which governs civilized states in their
dealings with each other" and thus does not state a cause of
125. In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 885-87 (2d Cir. 1994) and recognizing prohibitions against summary
execution and disappearances in addition to official torture under the Alien Tort Statute).
126. Zapata v. Quinn, 707 F. 2d 691, 692 (2d Cir. 1983). In this case, the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals upheld dismissal of an action under the Alien Tort Statute by a Colombian
national for deprivation of property for alleged failure to pay promptly the proceeds of a
winning lottery prize. Id. In a warning against "unreasonable and vexatious ... proceedings
by appellant's attorney," the court found the appeal frivolous and awarded double costs
against appellant and her attorney. Id.
127. In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 25 F.3d at 1466-67; see also De Sanchez v. Banco
Central de Nicaragua, 770 F.2d 1385,1397 (5th Cir. 1985).
128. Guinto v. Marcos, 654 F. Supp. 276, 280 (D.C. S.D. Cal. 1986).
129. U.S. v. Covos, 872 F.2d 805 (8th Cir. 1989).
130. Inupiat Community of the Arctic Slope v. U.S. 746 F.2d 570 (9th Cir. 1984) (finding
that there is no right to protection of indigenous peoples' subsistence culture).
131. In re Alien Children Educ. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 544,596 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
Summer 1997]
HeinOnline  -- 6 J. Transnat'l L. & Pol'y 439 1996-1997
r  I IL I  439 
  t t ry  i ti , l ts  ti-
i s l l    is  t ary an i ts  
  ts   i t t tive ir ts. re  
 e t     an t   s j i-
 r tation  s t t s  i . re e 
t  t t s l    r ting 
  
it   ls t    tter 
is iction s  tional  t     
 t  t s   tions  ifi , 
l  t ry i l   ards  
, confer . . . fundamental rights upon all people is-a- is ir  
m t . '125   it   l 
t  Z iga  t t    f 
 i   t  i ly i s l ti ns  i-
 ized l s l ."126  
  i  t ry ti al   
  t  it i l  -
 , l ed r  
 aps an     ti   
i  ry  .1     
      l  ized 
    t   . ' 28   
acy,129 t tion l t   plesPo  
l ti n1       
ti al     
      
     
        
   i .  iti  il ti  . 
,      
. ).  
l  
      
. l  .  
 i  
. . 
  lso .  
   
.  c  
. .   
 s  
 '   
  .,  . . 4,  ( . . . ). 
J. OF TRANSNATIONAL L. & POLICY
action.132 Judge Kaufman's distinction in recognizing federal juris-
diction for claims by aliens of official torture is based upon a univer-
sal consensus that he does not find for deprivations of freedom of
expression or property.133
Oscar Schachter proposes a theoretical distinction in customary
international human rights law between physical torture or genocide
and property rights or freedom of expression. He finds difference in
the relative intensity of claims. Individual claims arising from
breaches of international law prohibitions against slavery, genocide,
torture, or apartheid are recognized for their more powerful inten-
sity, closer to "shocking the conscience" than those arising from cen-
sorship or property takings.134
Most federal courts resist the use of customary international law
as an aid to interpret treaties, statutes, or constitutional provisions or
to fill interstices in the domestic law in areas involving human rights,
as Justice Blackmun pointed out in his dinner address to the Ameri-
can Society of International Lawj 35 The Court of Appeals for the
D.C. circuit has not agreed (nor has it ruled in disagreement) with
the Second Circuit's interpretation of the Alien Tort Statute and has
declined to use general international law to recognize, in effect, an
international tort to U.S. citizens abroad for wrongful injury from
terrorist activity.136
132. Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F. 2d 24, 31 (2d Cir. 1976); see also Jafari v. Islamic Rep. of
Iran, 539 F. Supp. 209 (N.D. Ill. 1982); see also De Sanchez, 770 F.2d at 1397 ("[T]he taking by a
state of its national's property does not contravene the international law of minimum human
rights"). But see Siderman de Blake v. Argentina 965 F.2d 699, 711-12 (9th Cir. 1992) (proceed-
ing at trial on a claim that expropriation without compensation of a US. citizen's property in
Argentina by the Argentine government violates international law).
133. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
134. OSCAR SCHAcHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE [178 REC. DES
COURS] 336-38 (1982). Alston and Simma, though critical of this approach, nonetheless, agree.
Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and General
Principles, 12 AuSTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 82, 82-85 (1992).
135. Modem jurists . . . are notably lacking in the diplomatic experience of early
Justices such as John Jay and John Marshall, who were familiar with the law of
nations and felt comfortable navigating by it. Today's jurists, furthermore, are
relatively unfamiliar with interpreting instruments of international law ....
Although the recent decisions of the Supreme Court do not offer much hope for
the immediate future, I look forward to the day when the Supreme Court, too,
will inform its opinions almost all the time with a decent respect to the opinions
of mankind.
Harry A. Blackmun, The Supreme Court and the Law of Nations: Owing a Decent Respect to the
Opinions of Mankind, Address at the 1994 Annual Meeting of American Society of International
Law (Apr. 1994), in ASIL NEWSLETR, Mar.-May 1994, at 1, 6-7.
136. Tel-Oren v. Libya, 726 F.2d 774,795-96 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring).
[Vol. 6:2 Supp.
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WORLD CIVIL SOCIETY
Would federal courts ever apply customary international law in a
civil action when judicial authority from the Supreme Court is
wanting or Congress is silent?
If Congress is truly silent about incorporating rules of interna-
tional law in deciding cases or controversies, how does the federal
judiciary obtain its power to apply international law from extracon-
stitutional sources, those public spheres which respond to the institu-
tions of world civil society, unless it "makes" federal law from those
sources? The Supremacy Clause refers to laws "made in Pursuance"
of the Constitution, not to preexisting customary international law as
if bound by it.137 An act of judicial lawmaking which nationalizes
any recognized international law is required to satisfy the plain text
of that phrase. Also, why should the Supreme Court assume this
power to make federal common law without Congressional authori-
zation if the president does not have the power to execute his inter-
pretation of international law?
Glennon relies upon Henkin's and the Restatement's position to
find a constitutional grant of lawmaking (or nationalization) power
in federal courts to receive customary international law if no Con-
gressional authority can be found, where he finds none for a similar
exercise of presidential power. 38 This position rests upon a contro-
versial reading of the phrase in the Supremacy Clause that "Laws of
the United States which shall be made in Pursuance [of this Consti-
tution] ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land ... -139 The argu-
ment is that "Laws of the United States" include federal common law
which incorporates customary international law as if part of federal
common law.140 However, this conclusion is dangerously broad, for
if these laws are "made in Pursuance" of the Constitution by the
international community of states, would they not be made outside
constitutional legislative processes and powers? Unless federal
courts are bound constitutionally by some dual allegiance to trans-
form this extraconstitutionally made "customary world law" into
United States law, any such judicial lawmaking would be purely
national lawmaking. Assuming that federal judges do make law on
occasion, what is the constitutional justification for federal judges to
invoke extraconstitutionally made customary international law rules
of decisions as if they were binding (even though the country as a
137. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
138. GLENNoN, supra note 105, at 111.
139. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
140. For the view that customary international law after Erie is not federal common law,
see Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 58, at 855-56.
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1. OF TRANSNATIONAL L. & POLICY
whole may be bound in its legal relations to other countries)? For if
they have power to nationalize customary international law, they
would also have considerable power to modify it.
F. Making International Law for World Civil Society
The Restatement of Foreign Relations accepts dictum from Justice
Brennan that laws of the United States may be made by judicial
decision, whose effect is the same as if made by Congress for the
purpose of federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331j 4 1 Using that
interpretation together with Justice Sutherland's interpretation that
the judicial power in Article III of the Constitution includes inter-
national law and agreements in "Laws of the United States" derived
from national sovereignty,142 the Restatement of Foreign Relations in-
fers that new customary international law is supreme over at least
state law at the mystical moment when it becomes binding as inter-
national law. The Supreme Court, in that sense, makes it U.S. law.
But in making or "nationalizing" international law for domestic pur-
poses, federal courts following Supreme Court guidance might also
help "make" customary international law in the legal process of con-
ducting transnational litigation within the context of world civil soci-
ety, pragmatically using their own judicial experience from United
States federalism.
In making national law under such circumstances, the Supreme
Court would not necessarily purport to speak for world civil society,
but it would project judicial power outwardly. This creative act of
reasoned decision within its own circumstances contains the best
realistic balance of pluralistic interests derived from experience in a
federal system imbedded in transnational processes. Federal judicial
lawmaking easily internalizes all external circumstances, makes a
new rule, and then extends that rule into the transnational process of
decision without the myth of universality.
Most contemporary international law scholars urge federal courts
to recognize the nature and sources of international law as if federal
common law, simply bypassing any interpretation limiting judicial
power.143 Federal courts, they believe, should use these sources
of authority to determine the validity of rules of customary
141. RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 58, § 11 rptr. note 4 (citing
Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 US. 354,393 (1959)).
142. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-21 (1936).
143. See Major International Judicial Conference to Meet in Washington, INT'L JUD. OBSERVER,
Sep. 1996, at 1 (reporting on the IVth International Judicial Conference for justices of supreme
courts and constitutional courts in Europe and discussing the role of the judiciary in democratic
market societies during stages of transition and international issues and obligations).
[Vol. 6:2 Supp.
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WORLD CIVIL SOCIETY
international law, which they should be free to apply in decision as if
supreme federal law under the Constitution. At the same time,
scholars are questioning whether the very concept of national
sovereignty is valid.144
In an era of world civil society, however, programs encouraging
federal judges to use the sources of customary international law
(which include writings of academics as well as state practice and
decisions of international tribunals) as formal authority for U.S. law,
which binds all judges under the supremacy clause of the Consti-
tution without approval first by the appropriate political branches, is
likely to encounter profound resistance. More valuable would be a
judicial architecture for making decisions in each phase of transna-
tional civil litigation involving foreign and domestic parties whose
interests are determined from their international scope and perspec-
tives.145 Even more important would be a critical analysis of some of
the more obvious biases in judicial presumptions and attitudes about
the use of international law and treaty interpretation in practical
decision-making. 146
Federal courts, under Supreme Court supervision, are already
undertaking a more pervasive, decentralized function of judicial
leadership than generally recognized because transnational cases of
great complexity arise from within the nature of civil life beyond that
of any single country. Whether these cases are class actions with
worldwide membership, complex international transactions, or inter-
national civil conspiracies, federal courts handling them seldom find
public international law as relevant as private international law,
party autonomy in forum selection (pervasively, arbitration), and
choice of law. In these cases, federal courts pragmatically advance
the decentralized values of world civil society as against the system
of sovereign states as a whole -in the same structural relationship as
they have in the federal system -to ensure a flourishing civil society,
144. See Lois HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLMCS, VALUES AND FUNCIoNS [216 REc.
DES COURS] 24 (1990) (arguing that the notion of sovereignty is mythology which should be
avoided as tool of precise thinking); Luzius Wildhaber, Sovereignty and International Law, in THE
STRUCrURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 425 (R. St. J. MacDonald & Douglas M.
Johnston eds., 1983) (arguing that "sovereignty" adaptable to new situations and exigencies is a
relative notion).
145. See discussion infra Part IV.D.
146. There is a growing literature on the incoherence and underlying biases in treaty inter-
pretation by federal courts. See, e.g., David J. Bederman, Revivalist Canons and Treaty Interpre-
tation, 41 UCLA L. REV. 953 (1994); Maria Frankowska, The Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties Before United States Courts, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 281 (1988); Rogoff, supra note 81, at 559;
Detlev F. Vagts, Treaty Interpretation and the New American Ways of Law Reading, 4 EuR. J. INT'L L.
472 (1993).
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J. OF TRANSNATIONAL L. & POLICY
one whose freedoms are not consumed by any government or
private monopoly at any level.
Let us now turn from a conceptual presentation of the role of
federal courts in an emerging world civil society to some concrete
hypothetical situations in which decision-making has to consider the
interpenetrating rules of public and private international law. After
we have a practical sense of some problems, I shall return to con-
tinue exploring the decision functions of the federal courts when
they adjudicate these kinds of questions in this new era where
sovereignty is changing but not disappearing and where world life is
becoming a social fact.
III. JUDICIAL REMEDIES FOR INJURIES TO INTERESTS BASIC TO WORLD
CIVIL SOCIETY
For federal courts operating within world civil society, we might
best visualize their functions through specific categories of relation-
ships in which there is a perceived conflict or gap between the pro-
tection or remedies afforded by the law of the country of injury or
jurisdiction, on one hand, and international law aimed at protecting
against persistent wrongs or gross abuse of power by states, on the
other hand. We might imagine at least four primary sets of rela-
tionships requiring judicial protection in a world civil society that
moves beyond the present system of sovereignty: (i) where aliens,
while within U.S. jurisdiction, claim injury by a U.S. state or local
authority; (ii) where aliens claim, in a federal forum, injury by
officials of their own country; (iii) where U.S. nationals claim
violation of international law by U.S. officials; and (iv) where third
parties claim violation of international law on behalf of injured
parties.
These four scenarios vary in approaching the above questions
concerning the best rules of decisions for federal courts when foreign
or domestic state and local law is in tension with transnational eco-
nomic expectations and international human rights law. They are,
however, at the heart of a civil society, which transects boundaries
and cultures while instructing the public spheres about interpreting
existing law.
A. National Treatment of Aliens Fails Expectations Within a World Civil
Society
Illustrating the first relationship, an alien or foreign national or
corporation within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States,
claims injury to personal or economic interests by a U.S. state or local
[Vol. 6:2 Supp.
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WORLD CIVIL SOCIETY
official in violation of a rule of customary international law:' 47 A
remedy is sought by the alien within federal jurisdiction, because it is
claimed that any remedy available under state or federal (usually, 42
U.S.C. § 1983) law is less than required by customary international
law. Local and national authorities claim otherwise. One example of
such a claim in federal court would be that a regulatory taking for
environmental purposes not compensated under the Fifth Amend-
ment to the Constitution arguably falls within the international rules
governing prompt, adequate, and effective compensation for the tak-
ing of property in violation of international law. If an alien seeks a
remedy under the Alien Tort Statute or the Tucker Act" (a remedy
preserved, for example, in Dames & Moore149), the federal courts (or
state courts) will exercise "quasi-international jurisdiction" over the
subject matter of the claim because it is a wrong that might also
violate international law. This jurisdictional threshold thereby serves
the important federal policy of avoiding an international dispute
which may arise were a diplomatic claim to be presented by the
alien's government because it is not remedied domestically.
The policy for world civil society is one of maximizing voluntary
associations across national boundaries and of maintaining the coop-
eration of all governments to ensure minimum interference in these
activities. A federal remedy to forestall such violations, thereby serv-
ing the interests of world civil society as well as governments, seems
to have been an underlying principle for the passage of the original
Alien Tort Statute.150 If, in exercising quasi-international jurisdiction
to remedy a potential international wrong, the federal courts denied
an appropriate remedy, the claim would pass to the international
plane and enter traditional international jurisdiction for the resolu-
tion of an international dispute state-to-state. Federal jurisdiction is
necessary for attribution of any denial of justice of states of the
United States to the national government. Failure of the national
government and federal courts to protect an alien lawfully present in
a political subdivision (a state or local government) within a
decentralized federal system, would be attributable to the national
147. This was an original reason for the transitory tort cause of action. See Dodge, supra
note 117.
148. Tucker Act of 1887,24 Stat. 505 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1994)).
149. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 654 (1981).
150. 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CoNsTrTUmoN OF THE UNTED STATES 523 n.3
(1833); see also Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of 1789: A Badge of
Honor, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 461, 490 (1989); William R. Castro, The Federal Courts' Protective
Jurisdiction over Torts Committed in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 CONN. L. REV. 467, 467-91
(1986); J. Cicero, The Alien Tort Statute of 1789 as a Remedy for Injuries to Foreign Nationals Hosted
by the United States, 23 COLUM. HUM. RIS. L. REV. 315,316-17 n.7 (1992).
Summer 1997]
HeinOnline  -- 6 J. Transnat'l L. & Pol'y 445 1996-1997
 I   445 
l    i l .1   
      
       
. .c.     ry ti l 
l  le  
       
t l s ted  
  ti al  
i  ,   tion 
rt   l  
     l48  
     I     
 r ational    
       
ti al i ti al   
t  l  
  i      
t   i  . 
     
  l i s    
i  ts   r ce   
   
  t   ,  
   i le     
 1SO tional i tion 
   i l    
 t   l  l 
  l l  
  l t  l i tion  
 ti     
 l    
nt   t  
 liti l i i i   t t   l l t  it i   
li ed  t le  l 
. i    ri i l r  f r t  tr it r  t t   ti .  , ra 
 . 
.    ,24 . S       .S.c.   ». 
.    . ,  S  . 
ISO.  . o , I   '  ONsrntmO   '  ITE  r   .  
   t   i ry   f 
or, . l   eral ' tive 
isdiction    i  i   t    i ns,  . v. ,  
( ); J. i r ,  li  t t t t  f1  s   f  I j i s t  i n ti ls t  
 t  it  t t s,  . . T . . v. , 316-17 .  ( ). 
J. OF TRANSNATIONAL L. & POLICY
government (here, to the United States as a member of the inter-
national community of states) under the international law of state
responsibility.' 5' Governments and courts have interests in restraint
in order to capture surpluses from voluntary transactions and to
avoid sanctions for violations of human rights deterring the flow of
voluntary transactions that maximize wealth production and
distribution.
B. Aliens Claim Violation of International Law by Officials in Their Own
Countries
To illustrate the second relationship important to protect world
civil society, an alien or class of aliens claims in a federal forum that
wrongs done by officials, usually foreign officials in the alien's own
country, breach the obligations of international human rights law
between the officials and their own citizens. An adequate remedy is
denied or is unavailable in that country, even though the applicable
domestic law is also breached because the official acted outside
domestic legal authority. Being under color of law, the act or omis-
sion implicates the state, which cannot be brought before U.S. courts
unless immunity is waived or the action falls within the restrictive
theory of sovereign immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immuni-
ties Act.152 In the United States, federal courts have possible quasi-
international subject matter jurisdiction, whereby a cause of action
might be determined under customary international law. At the
very least, a court could assist in the international administration of
justice by choosing to apply foreign or domestic law to provide a
remedy.
In this relationship, cases or controversies arising under custom-
ary international law of human rights provide at least the threshold
constitutional basis for a federal interest sufficient to sustain a juris-
dictional statute, also providing a cause of action for events taking
place solely abroad and not involving U.S. citizens. 53 The Alien Tort
Statute and the Torture Victim Protection Act provide such juris-
diction in federal court for the exercise of quasi-international subject
matter jurisdiction. Nothing in the Alien Tort Statute requires
federal courts to apply international law as the substantive rule of
151. See Gordon A. Christenson, The Doctrine of Attribution in State Responsibility, in INTER-
NATIONAL LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS 321, 333-35 (Richard B. Lillich
ed., 1983); see also RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 58, § 111 rptr. notes.
152. Pub. L. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2898 (1976) (codified as 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330(a), 1441(d), 1602-1611
(1994)). See Siderman de Blake v. Argentina, 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Saudi Arabia
v. Nelson, 507 US. 349 (1993).
153. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 885 (2d. Cir. 1980).
[Vol. 6:2 Supp.
HeinOnline  -- 6 J. Transnat'l L. & Pol'y 446 1996-1997
446 .  NATIONAL .  ouey  
t     
l t   ti al   
sibility.151 ts  t 
 r       
    
 i s  i   i   
 
. i  tion rnational i ls   
tries 
t      t  
     
Wro       '   
 i s  l    
 l      te   
  l      
     l  
i  r   
   ,  t    u.  
t     ti  
   r  
152     
ti al ,    
   i l  
 l t,  t l  i t i  t  i t ti nal i i tr tion  
    
 
  i s  
i l       ld 
l    i  
l     
    l53  t 
    i   
 t ti al t 
      
 ti l   i    
.   . ,  i e ti    ility,  · 
I L w  s I I  }   ,   Ull  
., ;  l  FsrA   l  I  I ,  t  ,   tr. t . 
  fied  . . ( ), ·  
( ».  i r   l  . r ti ,  .   ( t  ir. ); s  ls  i r i  
. lson,  .  ( ). 
. See ilartiga v. ena·Irala, 630 .2d 876, 885 (2d. ir. 1980). 
WORLD CIVIL SOCIETY
decision, however, and a judge might decide the case using private
international law or choice of law principles to formulate the rule of
decision, as well as to consider consistency with customary interna-
tional law. Whether the rule of decision formulated would be for-
eign law or international law is within the district court's discretion,
using a fairness and interest analysis, as the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals in the Filartiga case made clear.154
The interest analysis or minimum contacts analysis normally
would consider the lex loci delicti as one appropriate substantive rule
of decision, respecting the state creating those rights under the policy
of its political institutions, for the protection of all of its citizens.
When a universal basis of jurisdiction to adjudicate is also present,
U.S. interests may prefer international law to foreign law where
there is a gap in law, or if domestic law falls short of customary or
general human rights law standards and upsets the peace of nations
by gross human rights violations (as in genocide, apartheid, torture,
arbitrary executions, disappearances, or mass expulsions). However,
the choice of rules of decision in a case is at least shaped by the
general policies of customary international law, whose rules are
often difficult to identify or apply. The public policy of the forum
court, assigned the task by Congress, provides the theoretical basis
under choice of law principles for shaping a rule of decision to
incorporate extant obligations under customary international law in
addition to other sources for judicially constructed rules of decision.
If the law of the place of the wrong does not afford an adequate
remedy, customary human rights law could become the sole rule of
decision under federal court jurisdiction, as instruments designated
by Congress to serve international public order. In other cases,
foreign law may provide a standard more protective of individual
rights than that afforded in customary international law. The best
choice of substantive law is not necessarily reflected in the principle
of selecting the law which gives most favored treatment to the vic-
tim.155 A court may wish to consider international relations among
independent and equal sovereign states, respecting the choice of
national authority to provide better treatment than afforded under
customary international law. It may also wish to choose interna-
tional law as the rule of decision when, for example, the law of the
place provides punitive damages not considered appropriate under
customary international law.
154. Id. at 889.
155. Anne Bayefsky & Joan Fitzpatrick, International Human Rights Law in United States
Courts: A Comparative Perspective, 14 MICH. J. INt'L L. 1, 27 (1992).
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J. OF TRANSNATIONAL L. & POLICY
These distinctions in rules of decision between domestic law and
international human rights law may seem hollow if the result is the
same. Why not use international law directly? One reason why
international law is not used directly is because initial deference to
the place of the wrong gives respect to the political system of the
country in which the grave breach occurred. It also supports a fed-
eral interest by encouraging the government of that state to take full
responsibility for bringing its laws into compliance with the legal
expectation of the community of states, which requires every state
protect all citizens or residents within its jurisdiction at least to the
minimum standards of international law. Justification for the prin-
ciple that domestic remedies must be exhausted before resorting to
international remedy is also grounded in mutual respect. C. F.
Amerasinghe concludes his appraisal as follows:
The rule sprang up primarily as an instrument designed to
ensure respect for the sovereignty of host States in a particular area
of international dispute settlement. Basically this is the principal
reason for its survival today and also for its projection into
international systems of human rights protection ....
In some areas ... the rule has been developed in the direction
of giving more recognition to the interests of the individual.
However, the general application of the rule in this area does not
show a reduced respect for the sovereignty of the respondent
State.156
When courts in another country apply customary international
human rights law as the sole rule of substantive decision to deter-
mine liability of a former official without first looking to the law of
the place, this choice would deny respect, for example, to a newly
emerging democracy whose former officials, by definition, exceeded
their own law.157 It was to moderate the extremes of the doctrines of
act of state and sovereign immunity that federal courts interpreted
the Alien Tort Statute to apply to foreign officials acting under color
of law (implicating the state under the law of nations) but not on
behalf of the state (giving the state the benefit of the doubt that its
officials did not follow its own law).
When foreign court paternalism displaces the law of the place
without initial deference, it chooses not to respect the expectation
156. C. F. AMERASiNGHE, LOCAL REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 359,364 (1990).
157. For a discussion of this issue within the context of the Siderman de Blake case, see Tim
Golden, Argentina is Reported to Settle Rights Suit in the U.S, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4,1996, at A5.
[Vol. 6:2 Supp.
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WORLD CIVIL SOCIETY
that a country (perhaps a developing democracy) will interpret its
own laws to meet international human rights standards. In human
rights or economic matters, this kind of predilection hints at return-
ing to an era of consular courts in the Near East or extraterritorial
jurisdiction for federal courts sitting in China, which lasted well into
the twentieth century.158 Initial deference at least reduces the un-
seemly appearance of federal courts in the United States applying
fundamental human rights standards to a foreign official's treatment
of the foreign state's own citizens while resisting application of the
same standard in the United States for its own citizens.
Similar analysis extends to choice of law in rules for determining
general and punitive damages. The law of damages in most juris-
dictions and in international law is not as favorable to plaintiffs as in
the United States. Punitive damages have very little support in inter-
national law, with other countries looking askance at United States
civil antitrust or other actions which impose punitive treble damages
for acts arising in those countries with effects in the United States. Is
it sound judgment for U.S. courts to apply forum law punitive
damages for human rights abuses abroad without considering their
status under the law of the place or in international law generally?5 9
In the litigation against Ferdinand Marcos' estate, the trial judge bi-
furcated damages, allowing a jury to award $1.2 billion in exemplary
damages against the estate before trying the issue of actual damages
of the entire class.16° Philippine law allows punitive or exemplary
damages.161 If no punitive damages are allowed under applicable
foreign law, however, they might still be justified in the forum if cus-
tomary or general international law would allow them in an interna-
tional forum under the policy of legal deterrence in any state-to-state
remedy.
This policy is not so clearly established, however, even though it
should be considered as an outside check against a collective policy
of no punitive damages in the customary law of the community of
nation-states, also supports of the values of a world civil society
whose institutions ought not necessarily be bound by U.S. tort law.
Recognition and enforcement of the Marcos judgment against estate
158. See 2 JOHN BASSEIr MOORE, A DIGEsT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 644-53, 662-722 (1906)
(discussing principles of extraterritorial jurisdiction in Chinese and Turkish law).
159. See Richard B. Lillich, Damages for Gross Violations of International Human Rights
Awarded by US Courts, 15 HuM. RIS. Q. 207 (1993) (cataloging actual and punitive damage
awards in judgments under Alien Tort Statute and questioning choice of law of forum to
govern punitive damages).
160. See In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467,1467-68 (9th Cir. 1994).
161. See id. at 1472.
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J. OF TRANSNATIONAL L. & POLICY
assets abroad will put exemplary damages in question, and the
reasonableness of choosing between either the law of the Philippines
or customary international law could be central to an ordre publique
challenge. Unless considered a legitimate countermeasure against a
"crime of state" authorized for unilateral action under the emerging
international law of state responsibility, why would a foreign court
recognize or enforce a U.S. forum court's award of punitive
damages? 162
Would procedure follow forum law, too, as in the certification by
U.S. federal courts of a plaintiffs' class comprised of all those aliens
wrongfully injured in another country? The award of $1.2 billion in
exemplary damages to the class of 10,000 Filipinos in the suit against
the estate of Ferdinand Marcos is the first judgment involving a large
class exclusively of aliens against a former head of their government
under the Alien Tort Statute.163
The class action brought in the United States against Union Car-
bide for damages to Indian nationals and residents arising under
Indian law from the Bhopal incident might have presented similar
questions of whether procedure always is determined by forum law,
even if it might implicate foreign relations. In re Union Carbide Corp.
Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal'64 was dismissed upon the court's accep-
tance of defendants' motion for forum non conveniens.165 This case
resulted in a rather unusual situation in that while courts are gen-
erally concerned with avoiding the "delicate problem of foreign rela-
tions," 166 the court decided to dismiss an action on behalf of those
injured at Bhopal, despite the fact that the Indian Government
wished to keep the case in U.S. courts.1 67
In examining the forum non conveniens question, the Bhopal court
followed the defendants' argument and relied on Piper Aircraft Co. v.
Reyno.168 In Piper, the Supreme Court held that a court should
"determine first whether the proposed alternative forum is 'ade-
quate' .. . [t]hen, as a matter within its 'sound discretion,' the district
162. For codification of "crimes of state" in the law of state responsibility, see International
Law Commission Draft Articles on State Responsibility: Report of the International Law Commission on
the Work of Its 28th Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.4/1976, addendum 1, pt. 2.
163. See In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994) (affirming
jtisdiction over subject matter and injunctive relief).
164. 634 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), affd as modified, 809 F.2d 195,197 (2d Cir. 1987).
165. Id. at 867.
166. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1975) (citing Investment
Properties Int'l, Ltd. v. lOS, Ltd., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 93,011
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 21,1971)).
167. See In re Bhopal, 809 F.2d at 198; see also JAMIE CASSELS, THE UNCERTAIN PROMISE OF
LAW: LESSONS FROM BHOPAL 130 (1993).
168. 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
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WORLD CIVIL SOCIETY
court should consider relevant public and private interest factors...
in order to determine whether dismissal is favored."169 Following
the Piper holding, the court in In re Bhopal explained that the pre-
sumption in favor of the plaintiff's choice of forum is significantly
lessened when the plaintiff is foreign. 7° After establishing that the
Indian forum was indeed adequate,171 the court balanced public and
private interests and conditionally dismissed the action. 72 Although
the conditions on which the action was dismissed were modified, the
dismissal was upheld. 73
Judge Keenan explained that "to retain the litigation in this
forum . . .would be yet another example of imperialism, another
situation in which an established sovereign inflicted its rules, its
standards and values on a developing nation."174 Despite Judge
Keenan's honorable intentions in dismissing the case, the resulting
litigation and settlement in India, as well as the disbursement of
settlement funds, are hard to view positively. The length of time re-
quired to organize the case, gather information from the injured,
reach the settlement, and appeal the settlement was overwhelming.
"By the time the final compensation package was determined, in-
creased numbers of victims and the effects of inflation had severely
eroded the funds and, predictably, award levels were once again
revised downwards."175
Recent settlements of class action suits in federal courts where
the class is international -as in the heart valve implant settlement or
the breast implant settlement176 -will be certain to raise not only
169. Id. at 257.
170. In re Bhopal, 634 F. Supp. at 845 (citing Piper, 454 US. at 256).
171. See Mark A. Chinen, Jurisdiction: Foreign Plaintiffs, Forum Non Conveniens, and Litigation
Against Multinational Corporations: In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal,
India, in December, 1984, 28 HARV. NT'L LJ. 202 (1987). Chinen explains that "the threshold
question ... is whether the defendant is amenable to process," id. at 203, and then explains that
the U.S. court considered the Indian courts use of innovative procedure, the potential for
delay, whether there would be adequate representation in the alternate forum, whether the law
of India could handle the complexity of the case, and whether procedural law, including
discovery procedures would preclude an adequate trial. Id. at 204-05. The Bhopal court found
all of these factors met and granted the dismissal. Id. at 203-05 (citing In re Bhopal, 634 F. Supp.
at 845, 847-50).
172. See In re Bhopal, 809 F.2d at 199-201.
173. Id. at 206.
174. In re Bhopal, 634 F. Supp. at 867.
175. CASSELS, supra note 167, at 247.
176. See New Zealand Women Challenge Breast Implant Settlemen N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 19, 1994,
at A12 (national edition) (reporting an appeal of class action settlement in In re Silicone Gel
Breast Implants Products Liability Litigation, 887 F. Supp. 1469 (1995), in which foreign members
of the class claimed procedural unfairness in rules governing settlement: denial of parti-
cipation, inadequate representation, and an arbitrarily decided amount of compensation to
foreign members of the class).
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1. OF TRANSNATIONAL L. & POUCY
private international law questions of proper choice of procedure but
also public international law questions. Should the country whose
citizens form a substantial part of the class object to the intrusive
settlement techniques wholly governed by U.S. procedural law?1 77 If
a country's attorney general were to assert a parens patriae interest in
public representation of a class, a direct conflict with federal proce-
dure could be elevated to the international level, with jurisdiction
assuming public international law dimensions and remedies taking
on classic international claims dimensions, made more complex by
the technology of class action settlement claims management.
In a suit to recognize and enforce in another foreign country any
judicial class action settlement or judgment against, for example, un-
numbered bank accounts in the Marcos case, what rules of procedure
and decision would govern or regulate the emerging international
class action litigation?178 Normally, forum law in an action to recog-
nize or enforce a foreign judgment includes questions of public
policy. A federal forum should be willing to consider all interests,
including international public order and compensating victims of
human rights abuses.
C. U.S. Nationals Claim Violation of International Law by U.S. Officials
The third situation is the most troublesome for constructing a
cause of action purely from customary international human rights
law. In a federal forum, a U.S. citizen or national seeks compensa-
tion from U.S. state or federal officials for gross violations of cus-
tomary international human rights or international economic rights
law by those officials acting under the color of law either within U.S.
territory or outside it.179 This case is purely theoretical because
under U.S. statutes adequate remedies are available in any fore-
seeable case. Nevertheless, the question should be asked: Would
177. See Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 143 F.R.D. 141 (S.D. Ohio 1992).
178. An enforcement action in the judgment against Marcos' Estate is now under active liti-
gation in Switzerland. See Phillipine Marcos Victims Protest Swiss Cotirt Decision, Agence France-
Press, Feb. 27, 1997, available in WESTLAW, 1997 WL 2067298. In this litigation, the Swiss
government is taking a cooperative position but the Swiss banks are resisting the penetration of
their secret accounts. See id.; see also Swiss Government Helps out on Marcos Fund, BuSINESS
WORLD (MANILA), Apr. 3,1997, at 8, available in WESTLAW, 1997 WL 10161624.
179. This is not the question raised in the civil suit brought by Alvarez-Machain against
former agents of the Drug Enforcement Agency for injuries suffered in Mexico at or about the
time of his abduction to the United States. See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655
(1992). There, Alvarez-Machain, a Mexican national, brought suit under the Alien Tort Statute
and the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1994). See Alvarez-Machain v. United States,
107 F.3d 696, 696 (9th Cir. 1996). He might have also prevailed under the Torture Victim Pro-
tection Act if it were extended retroactively.
[Vol. 6:2 Supp.
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WORLD CIVIL SOCIETY
customary international law provide a remedy if there were no
adequate remedy available under U.S. law? The short answer is al-
most certainly not. Under comity or reciprocity principles, why,
then, should the federal forum provide a remedy for wrongs by
foreign officials against their own citizens abroad? Why does the
Alien Tort Statute provide an international law remedy different
from that provided by 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which allows private causes
of actions for deprivations of civil rights under color of law?
180
Might a federal court choose to construe the two statutes consistently
with customary international human rights law as a policy of the
forum developed by common law reasoning?
D. Third Party Champion Claims Violation of International Law on Behalf
of Any Person or Class
In the fourth situation, a third party, either public or private,
claims in a domestic or international forum that a state is treating
any legal or natural person under domestic norms which fall short of
customary international human rights law, thereby breaching a duty
erga omnes, one owed to all. Is legal standing available for a third
party to request an international remedy under customary interna-
tional law on behalf of an injured foreign citizen against her own
government? In a class action suit, may a private attorney general -
an entrepreneurial lawyer or human rights litigation group -
adequately champion an international class? A human rights com-
mission or, now, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights, 181 might afford functional structures of protection under
international agreement. Is there a counterpart under the customary
international law of state responsibility? Might laws governing
international class actions and lump sum international claims settle-
ments merge in effect?
In the third party champion relationship, neither a public
(another state or international organization) nor a private (a
180. Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code provides, in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). Is protection based solely upon the bond of national allegiance
considered outmoded in a world civil society?
181. See G.A. Res. 48/141, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/141(1994) (creat-
ing a High Commissioner for Human Rights). For a discussion of the High Commissioner
position, see ROGER CLARK, THE U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (1972).
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J. OF TRANSNATIONAL L. & POLICY
nongovernmental human rights organization) entity has standing
under customary international law of human rights to pursue or
perfect a legal remedy on behalf of a national injured by the
claimant's own government in breach of that law.'82 Under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, class actions are being used to
achieve the same result.183 The legal basis of citizen-claimants' inter-
national remedies against their own states under customary interna-
tional law of human rights, according to the Restatement of Foreign
Relations, rests on dictum in the Barcelona Traction case, that each
state owes an obligation erga omnes for its breach of a fundamental
human rights norm under customary international law, even against
its own citizens.184 The normal self-help remedies would apply to
this situation according to the Restatement's reporters. 185
Though it is not impossible to imagine a kind of quasi-espousal
representation theory were there to develop a political relationship
or allegiance of the citizen to the community of states as a whole (a
kind of federalism), at present, a citizen has no international legal
relationship through a third party state or private organization
allowing legal protection. The theoretical basis for recognizing such
legal responsibility under a political bond is highly problematic in
customary or general international law for the simple reason that
there is no effective political bond of citizen to a higher polity as
there would be in a federal system. In fact, on a critical evaluation of
the Barcelona Traction case, despite the concept of jus cogens, the
theory of protection moves in the opposite direction toward the
formal bond of nationality, or corporate nationality as a condition of
international standing or a claim to protection.
Oscar Schachter reasons that the acceptance of the doctrine of
obligations erga omnes by the International Court of Justice in the
Barcelona Traction case, lays the groundwork for a remedy by a third
state before the court or by special measure on the Roman law
procedure of actio popularis, whereby any Roman citizen could
182. Some commentators think espousal of an international claim for compensation for
violation of a fundamental human right is available as a remedy against a citizen's own
government when presented formally by any nation under the theory that the obligation is erga
omnes, owing to all states by each state not to violate fundamental human rights of anyone. See
AMERASINGHE, supra note 156, at 76-95. However, state practice invoking international law as a
formal matter is absent in these matters, although as a diplomatic and political measure minori-
ties often are subject of outside pressure.
183. FED. R. Cv. P. 23.
184. See RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 58, § 703 rptr. notes 2, 3
(citing Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 5)).
185. Id.
[Vol. 6:2 Supp.
HeinOnline  -- 6 J. Transnat'l L. & Pol'y 454 1996-1997
454 . NATIONAL  ouey l. :  . 
t l    
 r       
    l  
'  t    .182   
     
   l8   i ts' 
     r  
  t  ign 
i s,   l a tion  
    a  t l 
     i l  t 
 l84       
  '  1SS 
      l 
tion    i  
       
 ,   i l  
i      t  tion 
  i l i   
it     tic  
r  l     
  i  l    
  ti   
l a tion t  ,  
  ti       
 t  lit    
i l    
 r  t t t  t   t  t i  f 
ti s   i l  
l na ti n     
        
r   laris,  i  l  
 t t rs   l    
     i t i  il l    r  i t  iti '   
t t   ti  i  
         t l  i t   .  
SINGHE,    m tional    
f r l tt r i  t i  t  tt r , lt  s  i l ti   litical eas re i ri-
ti  ft  r  j t f t i  r r . 
. . . avo . . 
. sr T  1   L no  ra  ,   .  ,  
 .   . . ,  . .}.  . ». 
SS . 
Summer 1997] WORLD CIVIL SOCIETY
enforce Roman law by maintaining claim to the penalty1 86  In
Roman law, however, no citizen could bring such an action without a
proper procedure tantamount to authorization. The prior procedure
seems equivalent to Congressional authorization of self-help by
letters of marque and reprisal187 or public acquiescence in private
bounty-hunting practices, such as those in qui tam procedures
recently revived in U.S. law, which allow bounties for disinterested
whistleblowers who find fraudulent claims against the govern-
ment.188 Private claimants are authorized to bring suit, subject to
being taken over by the Department of Justice, but are entitled to a
percentage of recovery. An international remedy by a third state
against another state's abuse of its own citizens in violation of an
obligation erga omnes, by analogy, would require permission from
some international body, for example the Security Council or Human
Rights Commission, before standing would lie to take or bring such
an action.189
If actio popularis type remedies are unavailable state-to-state to
collect a penalty,190 what international legal remedy, then, is availa-
ble to U.S. citizens against their own government other than under
domestic law through domestic courts?191 Later, we shall consider
186. See SCHACHTER, supra note 134, at 196-201.
187. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
188. See 31 U.S.C. 3730 (1994). A number of cases have been brought under this section.
See, e.g., Gravitt v. General Electric Co., 680 F. Supp. 1162 (S.D. Ohio 1988) (allowing a qui tam
private party to recover against corporate employer who had been overcharging the govern-
ment).
189. See SCHACHTER, supra note 134, at 199-201. For an able justification from doctrine and
practice for third state remedial action for such breaches, see MENNO T. KAMMINGA, INTER-
STATE ACCOUNTABILITY FOR VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 171-90 (1992). Kamminga explains
the development by the International Law Commission of the concept of "international crime"
as injury to all states, thereby authorizing noncoercive special measures for violations of funda-
mental human rights by a state of its own citizens without needing the anachronistic metaphor,
actiones populares. Id. at 73-77.
190. The Permanent Court of International Justice laid down the old rule of standing in
Panevezys-Salditiskis Railway.
[W]here the injury was done to the national of some other State, no claim to which
such injury may give rise falls within the scope of the diplomatic protection which
a State is entitled to afford nor can it give rise to a claim which that State is entitled
to espouse.
Panevezys-Salditiskis Ry., 1939 PCIJ, (ser. A/B) No. 76, at 16 (Feb. 18); see also International
Status of South-West Africa, 1950 I.C.J. Rep. 128 (July 11) (rejecting expressly the remedy of
actio popularis).
191. "[A]buses are much more likely to occur when a state is exercising protection on
behalf of its own nationals than when it is acting on behalf of foreign nationals." KAMMINGA,
supra note 189, at 189. The attack on internal protection and allegiance systems echoes feminist
and critical legal studies attacks on structural repression within the states system itself. Less
convincing is Kamminga's observation that "victims of human rights violations who are
nationals of the offending state may benefit from wider protection-that is, from more than 170
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J. OF TRANSNATIONAL L. & POLICY
the unsuccessful attempts to invoke jus cogens to incorporate uni-
versal customary norms as part of U.S. law to redress the most
grievous internal abuses of human rights law. Consider how civil
societies might have developed practical means of protecting privi-
leges and immunities of persons when they were attempting to break
out of feudal or other structures.
IV. HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL STRUCTURES OF WORLD CIVIL
SOCIETY
An underlying principle for national political allegiance in a
hierarchical federal structure is that subordinate states lack power to
abridge certain privileges and immunities of persons derived from
the status of national citizenship. In external relations, the principle
is the responsibility of the political superior for acts of subordinate
political entities.192 This structure is identical to that of the hierarchi-
cal protection given by the liege lord in the feudal era in favor of
certain outsiders, mainly merchants and traders, from the lesser
lord's jurisdiction. These immunities and privileges grew from dif-
ferent economic and political milieu but served the same common
function of protection of individuals against a subordinate power,
based either on allegiance or on economic and political advantage.
They formed the backdrop for later protection of the beginning
institutions of civil society -markets, the great fairs and commerce,
the break-up of feudalism, and the stirring of revolution through
peasants revolts and religious protest in Europe.
A. Central and Local Structures in History
Horizontal and vertical structural relationships which evolved
finally to protect the institutions of civil society used what are now
constitutional concepts of privileges and immunities. There were
roughly six different periods through which this evolution took place
in the West. The first, during the feudal era, is dated from the
Magna Carta in 1215 until the emergence of the centralized territorial
nation-state, conveniently fixed at the time of the Treaty of West-
phalia in 1648. This period is marked by a rearrangement of hier-
archical relationships, with a shift of loyalty and protection from the
lord ultimately to the central state and the king, who protected
commerce and travel by merchants and others, the loosening of
states- than may be enjoyed by victims who are nationals of the interceding state under the old
system of diplomatic protection." Id. at 188.
192. This principle is implicit in Chief Justice Jay's reasoning in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S.
419,474 (1793).
[Vol. 6:2 Supp.
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WORLD CIVIL SOCIETY
feudal bonds by alienation of free-hold estates, and a freer civil
society.193
The second period overlaps the first, and is also noted for the
central protection of individual privileges and immunities from the
power of the charter companies by the king. It begins with the
European discovery of America in 1492 and ends with the American
Revolution in 1776. In this colonial period, the British Privy Council
protected the privileges and immunities of "Englishmen" from abuse
by the chartered colonial governments. The charters made provision
for a type of quasi-judicial review.
The third period is a brief time (1776-1781) of horizontal relation-
ships among the thirteen newly sovereign American states, whose
relationships, even with a common heritage, were based on the
concept of sovereign equality of states under a law of nations, then
being shaped in a European setting, in the tradition of Suarez,
Vitoria, Grotius, and Vattel. The dominant structure was formed in
1781 by the Articles of Confederation, whose weak vertical and
strong horizontal organization led to the invention of union seven
years later in the Constitution. Through the comity clause, equal
treatment in one state of citizens of the several states did no favors
for free states in the handling of citizen status of former slaves or of
fugitive slaves. In the community of purely sovereign states (for
only a five year period), ironically, if a fugitive slave went to a free
state, there was no impediment under the law of nations against the
state's granting freedom and citizenship to the former slave if it
chose. A price of union, however, was the infamous Fugitive Slave
Clause of Article IV of the new constitution requiring return of
fugitives slaves to the owners in another state. Freed slaves could
not form part of civil society unless they remained within the free
state.
The fourth period, which emerged from the Constitution of 1787,
introduced a more perfect union with greater central powers, while
still basically horizontal in the treatment of privileges and immuni-
ties of citizens of one state while in another, but with central or
vertical enforcement of slavery as exception. This fourth period,
exacerbated by the Dred Scott decision,194 lasted until the Civil War
and the adoption of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
Amendments.
The fifth period reintroduces a central hierarchical protection
of citizens of the states by the national government through the
193. See generally 1-2 WILuAM STUBBS, THE CONSTITLMONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND (1897).
194. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
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J. OF TRANSNATIONAL L. & POUCY
Fourteenth Amendment, empowering the national government to
interpose itself between state and citizen. This period lasted from
1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, through the
New Deal transformation, in which national protection was power-
fully extended, and until the end of World War II, when the United
Nations Charter sought to interpose the international community's
interest in the protection of human and economic rights between the
sovereign nation-state and its citizens or nationalsi 95 It was compli-
cated by the cold war struggles, which came to a close in 1991,
leading into an era of increased anxiety and uncertainty both from
devolution of national power and from globalization1 96
The sixth period -formation of world civil society post-cold
war-is an era of rapid technological change and complex global
interconnectedness, made up of both hierarchical and vertical
structures infused with information from the media and computer
networks. As we enter the twenty-first century, the international
community of states is in transition, without any clear juridical or
theoretical assimilation by effective international regimes which
might protect international privileges and immunities, or interna-
tional human rights of individuals and groups in return for their
allegiance. Yet, powerful movements outside state control, including
messages in cyberspace, press upon the public spheres for decen-
tralized protection of developing civil societies whose interests in
global markets and human rights penetrate all states.
Effective international protection for human rights develops
haltingly and within spheres of core civilizations when common
interests coalesce.197 International economic institutions are far more
integrated. Without credible and reliable effective power to protect
hated minorities from their own governments, free from the cynicism
that the major powers will abandon them when other interests
prevail or power fades, local groups and factions turn to their own
forms of self-protection and self-help, hostage to the equilibrium of
195. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(I), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,
pt.1, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
196. ERIC HOBSBAWM, THE AGE OF EXTREMES: A HISTORY OF THE WORLD, 1914-1991, at 8,16,
257-86 (1994) (noting that unprecedented Golden Age of 1947-1973, followed by age of crisis
after the cold war ended in 1991, led "the most profound revolution in society since the stone
age").
197. Compare Slaughter, supra note 31, at 226-38 (discussing an imagined society of liberal
states, whose ideological assumptions for transnational society flow from foundations of
Western civilization) with HUNTINGTON, supra note 39 (discussing a hypothetical clash of
civilizations, in which the coming world order will have to focus on the conflicts between core
civilizations rather than upon notions of competing territorial sovereignty or traditional realist
international relations theory centered upon coalitions of autonomous states based upon their
purely statist interests outside any bonds of common culture).
[Vol. 6:2 Supp.
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WORLD CIVIL SOCIETY
power calculation that the strong take what they can and the weak
yield what they must.198 Brutish world civil society contains a streak
of anarchism. U.S. federal courts, from their own tradition beginning
with Chief Justice Marshall, and most recently Justice O'Connor,
instinctively have understood that to be effective in judicial protec-
tion of human rights of citizens against their own governments and
powerful transnational companies, the judges cannot be seen as
transferring their own allegiance away from democratic national
institutions.
One way judges have ensured this protection while exercising
their function of political allegiance is by nationalizing public and
private international law deciding transnational cases as if federal
courts were setting the example within world civil society. To
understand how this ironic movement might contribute to a freer
global life, we first have to come to grips with the problem of dual
loyalties and federal court resistance to any constitutional loyalty to
the political collective of sovereign states who make international
law, which is supposedly part of U.S. law.
B. The Problem of Dual Loyalties
In a decentralized state system, courts remain instruments in
service of the policies and values of national political institutions
through a domestic rule of law. Events, things, and processes may
be global; however, the dominant system of protection and ale-
giance for individuals and groups-the architecture for their civil
society-is still centered in nation-states.1 99 All international human
198. For a discussion of problems confronting the War Crimes Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda and proposals for a permanent tribunal, see Christopher L. Blakesley,
Obstacles to the Creation of a Permanent War Crimes Tribuna, 18 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 77
(1994); Robert F. Drinan, Is a Permanent Nuremberg on the Horizon?, 18 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF.
103 (1994); Jeri Laber & Ivana Nizich, The War Crimes Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia: Problems
and Prospects, 18 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 7 (1994).
The protection of the Kurdish minorities in the region of the Middle East from regional
powers, for example, does not readily lead the Kurdish factions to give allegiance to an
international regime or coalition in return for protection offered in international law from the
international community backed up in a domestic constitutional arrangement. Juridical
protection and allegiance for minorities, which depend upon a national or international
judiciary's own allegiance to the political community to which it owes its power, seems
currently to be beyond the realm of the possible in situations such as these, despite advances
toward a permanent international tribunal for crimes against humanity.
199. "Notwithstanding their international thrust and flavor, international human rights
are, at bottom, national rights." Louis Henkin, A Post-Cold War Human Rights Agenda, 19 YALE
J. INT'L L. 249, 249 (1994); see also Louis Henkin, International Human Rights as "Rights," 1
CARDoZO L. REv. 425 (1979). But see Nicholas Onuf, The Constitution of International Society, 5
EuR. J. INT'L L. 1, 19 (1994) (theorizing about postmodern conversation towards universal
international society from within the structure of a modem states system).
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1. OF TRANSNATIONAL L. & POLICY
rights rhetoric operates on states in the state system. All private
international contracts and property interests ultimately require
protection through national judicial systems, even when covered by
international treaty regimes. While international regimes facilitate
compliance, they succeed through influencing decisions in states and
transnational organizations.200 Nongovernmental organizations of-
ten parallel the interpenetration of regimes and national bureaucra-
cies, influencing them from the stance of a separate world civil
society.20 1
According to Richard Falk, domestic courts necessarily function
both as national institutions and as agents of international legal
order.20 2 In cases raising international human rights questions, we
have seen that federal courts struggle with the pragmatics of dual
loyalties, refusing to incorporate a rule of customary international
law without approval of the political branches. Yet, in cases raising
international economic questions of free markets and exchange,
domestic courts seem to struggle less with dual loyalties than with
merging national protection of property and contract within an
integrated global economy.203 Questions of dual loyalty arise most
often when domestic courts are faced with incorporating interna-
tional law as municipal law2 04 or deciding cases within general or
quasi-international jurisdiction. 20 5 Here, I mean the power to decide
a question in a case the outcome of which is governed by substantive
sources of international law or where public or private international
legal arguments will influence or have consequence to the outcome
200. CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 31, at 278-85 (arguing that transnational communities or
"epistemic communities" insinuate themselves into policy-making processes, but the resources
and public spheres for decision remain, nonetheless, within the power of states).
201. See id. at 281.
202. RICHARD A. FALK, THE STATUS OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL SocIETY 428, 433, 441-42
(1970) (arguing in favor of (i) maximum judicial independence from executive supervision
when the "reality of dual membership in specific instances" cannot be compromised or other-
wise avoided and (ii) normative autonomy of international law to lessen dependence of judicial
outcome on provincial orientation and outlook of the forum); see also Anne Marie Slaughter,
International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6 EuR. J. INT'L L. 503, 516 (1995) (rejecting dualism
in favor of a multifaceted series of functional and ideological relationships in an imagined
world of liberal states between individuals and groups in transnational society, state
institutions in relation to these social actors).
203. Shapiro, supra note 41, at 61-64.
204. For a fresh look at the relationship between international and municipal law, see
HEISKANEN, supra note 95, at 83-88. The now classic postrealist exposition of this problem is
Myres S. McDougal, The Impact of International Law upon National Law: A Policy-Oriented
Perspective, 4 S.D. L. REV. 25 (1959) (discussing inclusive and exclusive decision-making by
participants who project certain perspectives of authority or lawfulness purporting to allocate
various systems of competence for decision-making between general community of states and
particular states in world power process).
205. See Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV. 610 (1988).
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WORLD CIVIL SOCIETY
of the decision. This meaning differs from that of general jurisdiction
or "dispute-blind" jurisdiction exercised when a cause of action is
unrelated to a defendant's "presence" in the forum306
The doctrines of incorporation and transformation are devices
constructed to adjust anticipated tension between international and
municipal law or to avoid it.2 7 Neither objective is satisfactory for
making international law part of U.S. municipal law. This is because
to incorporate new customary human rights law, statutory authority
is required. Yet, human rights treaties, reservations, or conditions
imposed by the political branches and a general judicial reluctance to
view them as self-executing undercut the treaty as supreme law of
the land.20 8 For international economic law, however, customary
principles have long been incorporated through comity and the law
merchant. Commercial treaties generally are self-executing. Trade
agreements seldom are made under the treaty power and generally
are made law by executive-congressional agreement and enactment,
often under fast-track authority.20 9
Incorporation of customary international law into municipal law
through common law is the dominant doctrine in common law
countries, developed first as a monist theme to unify international
and municipal law.210 Common law monist doctrine is usually -but
not always -opposed by the continental theorists of dualism because
it "shows the dualist theory to be inconsistent with existing law."211
A political and moral choice about the hierarchy of rules is forced by
semantic and syntactical formalism in doctrines of incorporation, but
without clarifying substantive values in decision processes,
206. Id.
207. See ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAw AND How WE
USE IT 206 (1994) (arguing that domestic court responses to clash between international and
domestic law is often instinctive with little discussion of monist or dualist approaches to
incorporation).
208. See, e.g., Core Document Forming Part of States Partie U.N. Doc. HRI/CORE/1/Add. 49
(1994).
209. Compare Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L.
REV. 799 (1995) (challenging strict interpretation of the U.S. Constitution Treaty Clause,
according to which a treaty, including NAFTA, must be approved by two thirds of the Senate)
with Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in
Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARv. L. REv. 1221 (1995) (arguing that it is unconstitutional to
bypass the Senate's required 2/3 vote).
210. See GERALD FIzTMAuRICE, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
CONSIDERED FROM THE STANDPOINT OF THE RULE OF LAW [92 REC. DES COURS] 71-72 (1957); see
also HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 446-47 (1952); J.G. Starke, Monism and
Dualism in the Theory of International Law, 17 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 66 (1936).
211. 1 HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAw 221 (1970); see also Ferrari-Bravo,
International Law and Municipal Law: The Complementarity of Legal Systems, in THE STRUCTURE
AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY DOCTRINE AND THEORY
715 (R. St. J. MacDonald & Douglas M. Johnston eds., 1983).
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J. OF TRANSNATIONAL L. & POLICY
according to Myres McDougal, who, in a superb treatment of the
subject, rejected the pluralist-dualist-monist controversy? 12  He
assailed this characterization of the relationship of international to
municipal law as nothing more than a formalistic quibble over some
mystical "incorporation" or "transformation," inadequate to under-
standing actual social and power processes involving the interpene-
tration of complex patterns of authority and control that affect
shared values across all boundaries? 13 To McDougal, the conti-
nentalist Hans Kelsen was the "master monist" of hierarchical
formalism.214 Kelsen himself characterized the normative structure
of his formal choice of systems of legal order as the primacy of norms
of "internationalism and pacifism" over those of "nationalism and
imperialism."215 He subordinated all domestic norms to internation-
al law, using the syntax of hierarchy, the grundnonn, as the apex
norm from which the validity of all lesser norms is derived? 16 His
law was an international metropolitan law, as David Kennedy has
shown in comparing Kelsen's structure with that of John Jackson's
cosmopolitan transnational economic structure.217
The doctrine requiring transformation of one system of rules into
those of the other reflects a dualist premise that the two legal sys-
tems are completely different and incommensurable, with some mys-
tical operation needed to integrate them in decision. This doctrine is
no more satisfactory to U.S. realists and pragmatists than the one of
incorporation.218 Recent commentators also think that the monist-
dualist-pluralist discussion is quite meaningless? 19
A domestic process in aid of world civil society is not helped by
characterizing the choice for domestic courts as one between loyalty
to national political authority or loyalty to the authority of interna-
tional community of states as a whole, without central institutions.
When domestic courts are faced with such a stark choice, they invari-
ably resist subordinating any ambiguous national norms or silence to
212. MYRES S. McDOUGAL & W. MICHAEL REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW ESSAYS: A SUP-
PLEMENT TO INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 439-42 (1981).
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. See generally KEISEN, supra note 210.
216. See MCDOUGAL & REISMAN, supra note 212, at 439-42.
217. See Kennedy, supra note 79, at 7-19 (arguing that the new pragmatism of Jackson
replaces a Kelsenian public order of sovereign states with an integrated market of economic
actors).
218. See McDOUGAL & REISMAN, supra note 212, at 441-42; see also Blakesley, supra note 198.
219. See David Kennedy, Theses About International Law Discourse, 23 GER. Y.B. INTL L. 361-
62 (1980); see also MARTrI KOSKENNIEN, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTER-
NATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT 40-41 (1989).
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WORLD CIVIL SOCIETY
those of the international legal order. Instead, U.S. federal courts
will effectively subordinate sources of international law to the
national public order even if their rhetoric denies it220  Federal
judges in the United States nationalize international law sources and
extend them, whether they are human rights or economic rights,
from baseline assumptions. They reject the theory that choice of law
means grounding that choice in the subordination of the national
polity to that of the international legal order, or choosing which
political authority issuing rules ought to be the controlling coercive
order. An emerging world civil society, however, does not compel
federal judges to make that "either/or" choice in litigation.
The "proper" function of U.S. domestic courts in the international
legal order has been a familiar question for a long time.2 21 If a
domestic court holds the political organs or officials of its own state
accountable to the larger community of states for gross abuses of
human rights of citizens of the state without legislative authoriza-
tion, the claim would be to recognize a redistribution of constitutive
power.222 If U.S. courts choose to internalize these expectations,
should they do so solely on their own judicial authority? Federal
question jurisdiction originating in 1876 does not grant such general
power by the constitutional text without a jurisdictional grant by
Congress.223 Should U.S. federal courts continuously restate a
cosmopolitan political relationship of all citizens to all states as
independent judicial agent loyal to an emerging international legal
order? Should they recognize dual loyalties, both to the domestic
polity and to the international legal order? We considered earlier the
220. See Nathaniel Berman, But the Alternative Is Despair: European Nationalism and the
Modernist Renewal of International Law, 106 HARv. L. REV. 1792 (1993).
221. Banco National de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 US. 398 (1964), focused the discussion when,
as a matter of federal law, it prohibited New York conflict of laws principles that would apply
the policy or law of the forum from determining the validity of an act of a foreign state done
within its own territory. See RICHARD A. FAUK, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE INTERNA-
TIONAL LEGAL ORDER 75 (1964) (deference to foreign law is proper when diversity is
legitimate-as in economic or social laws; when diversity of values of two national societies is
illegitimate-as in allowing abuse of genuinely universal human rights - domestic courts
properly fulfill their role by refusing to further the policy of foreign or domestic law and by
giving maximum effect to universality or international law); Richard B. Lillich, The Proper Role
of Domestic Courts in the International Legal Order, 11 VA. J. INT'L L. 9, 33 (1970) (preferring an
activist role of domestic courts both in economic and in human rights questions by refusing
deference either to foreign law or to the domestic executive and by applying international law
directly in litigation).
222. Internal accountability of political branches under international law through their
domestic courts differs conceptually from the easier question of external international
responsibility of one state to all other states for its human rights abuses of its own citizens. See
KAMMINGA, supra note 189, at 171-90.
223. See Finley v. United States, 490 US. 545, 547-48 (1989).
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J. OF TRANSNATIONAL L. & POLICY
constitutional problem of looking to extraconstitutional sources were
international law to be considered formally part of U.S. law under
the Supremacy Clause. Here, we ask whether federal courts should
recognize their own national role as an example or model for world
civil society.
We know that major claims to recognition of their own interna-
tional competence by domestic courts without authority from Con-
gress would deeply offend domestic political authority and intro-
duce a problem of judicial supremacy in the United States as old as
Marbury v. Madison.224 We have already noted the skeptical recep-
tion of these kinds of questions when federal courts consider human
rights claims based upon the concept that customary international
law is an extraconstitutional limitation on national power as well as a
rule of substantive decision.22
As we shall see in greater detail later, federal courts do not give
more than passing recognition to the contemporary concept of jus
cogens of human rights invoked before federal courts, and have never
used it doctrinally to create causes of action or trump statutory
sovereign immunity recognized among sovereigns when a breach of
international law is alleged. 226 Jus cogens claims are the most hier-
archical and peremptory of all norms of international public order
and, as argued, would force a structural choice of loyalty to an
emerging international public order of international society over that
of the horizontal state-to-state legal order. Judges faced with that
stark choice of loyalties between a national public order and a
nascent international public order invariably will choose loyalty to
their own constitutional authority unless the international override is
explicitly recognized by Congress.227 This problem of protection and
allegiance is an old structural problem of federalism in the United
States.
C. Preemption by International Law as Supreme Federal Law
If the decision whether international law is part of United States
law is a federal question-whether exclusive or not-it should follow
from the Supremacy Clause that if the Supreme Court does recognize
a rule of international law as federal law, then any inconsistent state
224. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
225. See supra text accompanying notes 182-83.
226. See Siderman de Blake v. Argentina 965 F.2d 699, 717 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Karen
Parker & Lyn B. Nelson, Jus Cogens: Compelling the Law of Human Rights, 12 HASTINGS INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 411, 441-42 (1989).
227. Princz v. F.R.G., 26 F.3d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
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WORLD CIVIL SOCIETY
constitution or law would be preempted 2 8  But federal courts
seldom invoke international law directly to preempt state law mainly
because the Supreme Court's early reasons for dormant foreign
power preemption are so ill defined.2 9 Decentralization of political
institutions, moreover, is accelerating with the Court's post-cold war
cut-back of such preemption doctrine in Barclays Bank, a new judicial
devolution respecting state sovereignty. 3
1. Federalization of Civil and Human Rights
Professor Lea Brilmayer argues that customary international law
(including international human rights law) as federal law is
exclusively a federal interest within the cognizance of federal courts,
which preempts any inconsistent state constitutions or laws and
must be applied by the states under the Supremacy Clause?3 '
"Brilmayer's syllogism" reads:
1. All federal laws preempt inconsistent state law under the
Supremacy Clause;
2. International law is federal law;
3. Therefore, international law preempts contrary state law.232
Her resolution is "a presumption that Congress will ordinarily
want the states to comply with international law unless it has
explicitly stated otherwise; state law inconsistent with international
law will, therefore, typically be preempted."233 However, as we have
seen, federal court jurisprudence is not so friendly to that presump-
tion. What matters more than the syllogism is whether international
law substantively concerns economic and sovereign rights or human
rights. The key question is whether federal courts are justified in
presuming the former as federal law but not the latter, is an under-
lying trend which is revealed in actual decisions reminiscent of the
228. See Lea Brilmayer, Federalism, State Authority and the Preemptive Power of International
Law, 1994 Sup. Cr. REv. 295, 295 (arguing that international law as federal law should be su-
preme and preempt inconsistent state law).
229. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 420 (1968). In this case, Justice Douglas suggested
(during cold war) a new dormant foreign relations preemption of a state statute without
Congressional preemption by statute. But that doctrine is in doubt. See Harold G. Maier, The
Bases and Range of Federal Common Law in Private International Law Matters 5 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 133,140 (1971).
230. Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 US. 298 (1994) (finding that absent
Congressional action, California could tax multinational corporations on basis of worldwide
combined reporting method without national preemption).
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 299.
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J. OF TRANSNATIONAL L. & POLICY
constitutional era of Lochner v. New York. 234 It is striking to note how
closely the current federal court presumptions in incorporating inter-
national law resemble the Lochner era's baseline of national protec-
tion against state interference with freedom of contract and property
under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments, but not of national protection of fundamental rights of
citizens from state interference. Until the New Deal transformation
reversed those substantive presumptions, federal courts refused to
interfere in civil rights between citizen and state, except when legis-
latures or Congressional enactments burdened property or contract
without the strictest justification from the police power.
The apparent contradiction in the presumptions about incor-
porating international law as part of U.S. law cannot be answered
without considering where the allegiance of federal judges lies.
Arguments for federal judges to protect universal human rights and
freedoms under international law from any deprivation by a citizen's
own government at any political level are structurally similar to the
interposition of the federal courts between the states and its citizens
or residents for protection of fundamental rights under the Con-
stitution as it evolved from the Slaughter House era. There is one
profound difference, admittedly tautological- under the Supremacy
Clause, all judges have sworn loyalty only to the Constitution and
not to a law of nations made pursuant to a world constitution. Might
the founders have envisioned the kind of international community of
185 independent countries whose practice, if accepted as law, would
become automatically part of United States law by operation of the
Supremacy Clause, without any process of ratification through the
process of representational democracy except for the participation of
an elected president acting on behalf of the country under the foreign
relations power in the development of customary international law
by state practice?235
One of the few protections incident to national citizenship left by
the Slaughter House Cases,236 which first narrowed the Fourteenth
Amendment's Privileges and Immunities Clause to the point of
extinction, is that of diplomatic protection of citizens,237 a distinct
234. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
235. See Philip R. Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary International Law, 33 UCLA L.
REV. 665, 718-23 (1986) (arguing that the process for making customary international law,
which includes foreign governments and other non-US. participants, is not representative of
the American political community nor responsive to it).
236. 83 U.S. 36 (1873).
237. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides: "No State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." US.
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WORLD CIVIL SOCIETY
practice under customary international law of state responsibility.
Among the privileges and immunities of national citizenship which
are protected against abridgment by any state in the United States, in
contrast to those of Article IV which remain within the province of
the several states, the Court included diplomatic protection explicitly
from nineteenth-century practice:
Another privilege of a citizen of the United States is to demand the
care and protection of the Federal Government over his life, liberty
and property when on the high seas or within the jurisdiction of a
foreign government .... [A~ll rights secured to our citizens by
treaties with foreign nations are dependent upon citizenship of the
United States, and not citizenship of a State.238
Except as provided in the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
or in other clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment or Constitution,
the national government has no power to protect citizens of a state
against acts of the state government which deprive them of privi-
leges and immunities accorded under state law, and does not
discriminate between residents and nonresidents. Justice Miller
rejected the argument that the Fourteenth Amendment transferred
"the security and protection of all the civil rights [which are con-
sidered fundamental] from the States to the Federal government [or]
to bring within the power of Congress the entire domain of civil
rights heretofore belonging exclusively to the States."2 39  In his
famous dissent, however, Justice Field noted:
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Slaughter House Cases distinguished privileges and immunities of
citizens of the United States from those of citizens of a state.
238. Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. at 79-80. Diplomatic protection in the law of state
responsibility for injury to aliens was the principle which Chief Justice Marshall used in The
Charming Betsy to interpret a statute to avoid conflict with international law. Murray v. The
Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 677 (1804). The statute prohibited commercial transactions
between persons under U.S. protection and those residing in French territory and authorized
privateers to enforce it by seizure. See id. at 677-78. He held that it did not apply to the seizure
by an American, Captain Murray, of the Schooner Charming Betsy, then owned by a former
U.S. citizen under Danish protection but thought to be trading with French territories under a
ruse. See id.
239. Id. at 77. Justice Miller explained why the apparently clear meaning of the clause
should not be interpreted so radically:
But when, as in the case before us, these consequences are so serious, so far-
reaching and pervading, so great a departure from the structure and spirit of our
institutions; when the effect is to fetter and degrade the State governments by
subjecting them to the control of Congress, in the exercise of powers heretofore
universally conceded to them of the most ordinary and fundamental character;
when in fact it radically changes the whole theory of the relations of the State and
Federal Governments to each other and of both these governments to the people;
the argument has a force that is irresistible, in the absence of language which
expresses such a purpose too clearly to admit of doubt.
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j. OF TRANSNATIONAL L. & POLICY
The question presented . . . is nothing less than the question
whether the recent Amendments to the Federal Constitution protect
the citizens of the United States against the deprivations of their
common rights by State legislation. In my judgment the Fourteenth
Amendment does afford such protection, and was so intended by
the Congress which framed and the States which adopted it.24°
These fundamental rights, implied in the Bill of Rights and else-
where, have been incorporated and made applicable against state
action by the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, effectively
ensuring protection by the national government of all individuals-
both aliens and citizens-and corporations against infringements by
state governments. Justice Bradley, dissenting in Slaughter House
Cases, had made it clear that the Fourteenth Amendment also aimed
at disloyalty by some of the states to the national government?41
Further, Justice Swayne, also dissenting, viewed the Amendments as
a new Magna Carta: "By the Constitution, as it stood before the war,
ample protection was given against oppression by the Union, but
little was given against wrong and oppression by the States. That
want was intended to be supplied by ... [the Fourteenth] Amend-
ment."242 These protections against the states have included many of
the same freedoms guaranteed under the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights.243
It took the Supreme Court over a century to develop a juris-
prudence of incorporation of provisions of the federal Bill of Rights
as against the states within the context of an organic federal polity
under a written constitution. Allegiance by federal judges to an
international legal order which guides the incorporation of universal
international law under the Supremacy Clause is a far more radical
shift of political allegiance and structure than finally occurred
through the Civil War Amendments. Since all principles of custom-
ary international law are supposedly treated with the same respect
We are convinced that no such results were intended by the Congress which
proposed these Amendments, nor by the Legislatures of the States which ratified
them.
Id. at 78.
240. Id. at 89 (Field, J., dissenting).
241. The mischief to be remedied was not merely slavery and its incidents and
consequences; but that spirit of insubordination and disloyalty to the National
Government which had troubled the country for so many years in some of the
States, and that intolerance of free speech and free discussion which often
rendered life and property insecure, and led to much unequal legislation.
Id. at 123 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
242. Id. at 129 (Swayne, J., dissenting).
243. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(I), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,
pt.1, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
[Vol. 6:2 Supp.
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WORLD CIVIL SOCIETY
by federal courts, only one explanation-other than a judicial sub-
stantive preference of values - seems at all plausible. Where does the
federal judiciary's political allegiance in fact lie? Brilmayer's begin-
ning syllogism, as she readily concedes, begs that question. What
principles or interpretive canons short of enactment by the political
branches should federal courts rely upon to justify invoking sources
of international law as supreme federal law, thereby preempting all
inconsistent state law and prevailing over prior inconsistent federal
law?
2. Federal Devolution of Sovereignty
Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, who is most
sympathetic to the rule of international law, has little difficulty sub-
ordinating judicial branch loyalties to policies of the representative
political branches in saying whether any international law should be
recognized as domestic law.244 Early federal court decisions incor-
porating international law relied upon a special jurisdictional statute,
such as in the alien tort or admiralty provisions of the Judiciary Act
of 1789,245 to imply federal judicial power to decide 246 When cus-
tomary international law was invoked, it was mainly to preserve the
sovereign prerogatives of the states system as in defenses of sov-
ereign immunity, an objection of one sovereign being subjected to
the jurisdiction of another sovereign, a horizontal privilege or right
ousting courts of jurisdiction.
Recent cases interpreting the Eleventh Amendment, however,
strengthen the quasi-sovereign powers of state governments as
against claims of violation of federal law. Supreme Court cases
interpreting treaties or deciding international law questions try to
avoid preemption of state prerogatives. 47 Using "sovereignty" of
states in a federal system whose autonomy is grounded in classic law
of nations, the Supreme Court adopts Justice Sutherland's centraliz-
ing principle of sovereignty 248 ironically, to resist the supremacy of
244. O'Connor, supra note 2, at 13. Justice O'Connor's plea emphasized the building of
new international institutions under a rule of law influenced by federalism and sustained by
the consensual treaty power or executive acts under the control of the political branches, with
deferential judicial review. Id. at 17-18.
245. 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
246. For a survey, see Note, The Federal Common Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1512 (1969).
247. See Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Bd., 512 US. 298 (1994) (reversing tendency of
dormant preemption in Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 420 (1968)).
248. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 US. 304 (1936). That foreign
relations power of the president is grounded in external sovereignty inherent in the law of
nations, and that external sovereignty passed from the former colonies when they became
Summner 1997]
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J. OF TRANSNATIONAL L. & POLICY [Vol. 6:2 Supp.
an explicitly controlling federal statute.249 By implication or analogy,
if Congress has limited or narrowed power to preempt a sovereign
act of a state, why should international law as part of federal law fare
any better? Political devolution within a "sovereign" nation-state is
becoming more common, as in the Scottish claim to restoring its
parliament, Quebec's claim to autonomy within a Canadian confed-
eration, Puerto Rico's claim to Commonwealth status, if not indepen-
dence, and Taiwan's claim to autonomy while remaining within
China. Judicial devolution seems uniquely an American phenome-
non. This judicial devolution of "sovereignty" to the states does not
remotely consider applying international law to limit the traditional
structures of national sovereignty, as modern critics of national
territorial sovereignty have theorized. 50 Instead, the structure of
devolution means a nationalizing tendency of U.S. courts toward
insulating intermediate political institutions from law made by the
international community of states.251 Federal law here acts as a
buffer, preventing international law from entering U.S. constitutional
law as preemptive of state law. This judicial devolution perversely
gains support by an argument invoked in Skiriotes v. Florida252 that
since international law as part of U.S. law permits the U.S. to
regulate conduct of its own citizens on the high seas, Florida, like-
wise, could regulate the conduct of its citizens upon the high seas?53
independent states to the national government when the Constitution was ratified. See id. at
316-21.
249. The tribal claims of Native Americans against a state or local government, for
example, are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 116
S. Ct. 1114, 1122 (1996) (stating that "each State is a sovereign entity in our Federal system,"
which Congress has no authority to subject to the jurisdiction of federal courts for vindication
of individual rights under federal law).
250. See generally CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 31.
251. Another possibility-holding intermediate political institutions responsible as quasi-
sovereign entities under customary international law, subject to supervisory responsibility of
the central state- is not a new idea either, even if current thinking of the Supreme Court might
not face up to it. See Gordon A. Christenson, Attributing Acts of Omission to the State, 12 MIcH. J.
INT'L L. 312, 357-60, 367-68, 370 (1991).
The concept of "intermediate responsibility" would pierce through the fictional
personhood of a State and attribute both acts and omissions to autonomous but
politically connected subdivisions of a modern State. Rather than holding the State
accountable for failure to control its political subdivisions and parastatals, this
concept would entail direct accountability under international law of intermediate
political and, perhaps, parastatal entities. The central State properly should be
held responsible as well; but for its failure of supervision or control on behalf of
the community of States rather than for the direct acts or omissions of the political
subdivision or parastatal.
Id. at 357-58 (footnotes omitted). For a critique of recent Supreme Court decisions refusing to
give domestic effect to treaty provisions, see Rogoff, supra note 81.
252. 313 U.S. 69 (1940).
253. Id. at 77.
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WORLD CIVIL SOCIETY
The argument cited The Paquete Habana to the effect that international
law is "a part of our law and as such is the law of all States of the
Union.... ."254 So long as there is no conflict with acts of Congress,
the argument maintained, the state can invoke international law?5s
International law, emanating from the political community of
sovereign states, does not automatically or formally reach govern-
ments closest to many human institutions of world civil society. If
these institutions check the power of the international community of
states, surely the Supreme Court in this federalist guardian's role
also acts to strengthen world civil society by decentralizing the
public spheres within a federal system. The Supreme Court has
every reason to know exactly what is at stake in its judicial reluc-
tance to recognize as supreme federal law the lawmaking acts of the
international political community of nation-states law without ap-
proval- tacit or otherwise-by the representative institutions of the
presidency and the Congress.256 These are the institutions which
translate problems from the private political sphere of a pluralistic
civil society into the public political spheres at all levels 5 7
The syntactic and semantic leap from syllogisms-that interna-
tional law as part of U.S. law preempts state law in conflict-hides a
deeper leap downward for the most powerful national judiciary in
the world. The Supreme Court's recent decisions restate values
favoring structural devolution as an analogy or example of a de-
centralized public order, embryonic for a diverse global community
with an emerging civil society of its own. This contemporary
reinterpretation is wholly consistent with the Court's present
understanding of the founding political philosophy of United States
federalism.
254. Id. at 72-73 (citing The Paquete Habana, 175 US. 677, 700 (1900)).
255. Id. at 73-77.
256. The tradition of states rights, dual sovereignty, and the proposed constitutional
amendment curtailing the treaty power during the cold war reveal this strong structural
resistance to international law. Diplomatic correspondence during the nineteenth century
asserted that the national government of the U.S. could not constitutionally interfere with the
sovereign powers of the states. As recent as in the reservations, conditions, and under-
standings accompanying ratification of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights,
the United States Senate and president continued the tradition of resisting interference with the
federalist principle of state sovereignty. Moreover, in Verdugo-Urquidez, the Chief Justice
outlined a view of certain rights of "the people" (including the Fourth Amendment) as
pertaining to a class of persons who are part of the national community by citizenship or
connection. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990). This relationship does
not apply to limit the power of the national government in relation to the seizure of evidence
from aliens abroad, since they are not part of the national polity and have no voluntary
connection with the United States. See id.
257. See generally ROSENBERG, supra note 13.
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j. OF TRANSNATIONAL L. & POLICY
This article sees a major shift in purpose and function for federal
courts in international litigation, one which differs from pervasive
recommendations by commentators for using international economic
or human rights law as common law rules of decision or guides to
statutory interpretation in the federal judicial process. 58  In the
emerging approach, federal courts will be compelled by argument
and communication by computer to consider the international inter-
ests and purposes to be served at each phase of a case, whether
jurisdiction, substantive or procedural rules of decision, or enforce-
ment of judgment. They should resist choosing these jurisdictional
or decisional rules purely on the basis of loyalty to an international
political order. The emerging purpose and function of these deci-
sions projects the United States federalist experiment outwardly, as
an authentic example from within its own judicial integrity of a
participant in a world civil society.
D. Federal Courts' Architecture for World Civil Society
Traditional and contemporary international law regimes exist
alongside one another to help protect economic and human rights
expectations of individuals and associations in world civil society?59
Whether cases or controversies arise from horizontal state-to-state
relations, such as claims of extraterritorial jurisdiction, acts of state or
sovereign immunity, or from vertical relations between government
and individuals or between private individuals (as in human rights
or economic freedoms claims), federal courts decide them by
choosing which rules of decision to apply from among available
sources of foreign and traditional or new international law. The
resulting patterns of judicial decisions produce a three-part legal
conception of world civil society. First, it is deferential in interstate
political relations, except when a foreign sovereign enters the market
economy as participant or abuses fundamental human rights.
Second, it is transnational in recognizing economic private ordering
systems of contract and property across borders backed by municipal
law. Third, it is national in defining and incorporating human rights
law.
258. The Act of June 25, 1948 (Rules of Decision Act), Pub. L. No. 80-773, 62 Stat. 869
(codified at 28 U.S.C. 1652 (1994)), first distinguished between federal rules of court procedure
and statutory or common law rules controlling the substantive decision. The law of nations
was considered part of common law of the entire country. See 1 WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY,
POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 626-27 (1953).
259. See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 31, at 1-3; STEPHEN D. KRASNEP, STRUCTURAL
CAUSES & REGIME CONSEQUENCES, REGIMES AS INTERVENING VARIABLES IN INTERNATIONAL
REGIMES 2 (1983).
[Vol. 6:2 Supp.
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WORLD CIVIL SOCIETY
The structure for this three-part federal court conception of world
civil society is in five descriptive axioms.
1. Federal Courts Internalize the Political Structure of Nation-State
Systems
Global society functions transnationally by coexisting within the
whole community of sovereign nation-states, while exerting consid-
erable independent "hydraulic pressure" upon national institutions
and international regimes to bring the public force to bear on com-
pliance with international expectations of human dignity, environ-
mental safeguards, and prudent enterprise2 6° Even strong, devel-
oped countries are revising their capacities for providing economic
and social entitlements for their own people in light of complexities
of global technological innovation and enterprise. Central state
planning and control of the means of production are in a process of
retrenchment, if not reformation, on every continent, with regulation
becoming more international. Transnational production and ex-
change place severe pressures upon central state structures of redis-
tribution in the democratic social welfare states as well. Rapid social
and technological change may trigger political instability, violence,
joblessness, and predatory or opportunistic behavior in advanced
democracies as well as in newly democratized nations of Eastern
Europe and Asia or in the developing formerly Third World
countries.
Paradoxically, both demands of international human rights
organizations upon national officials or courts and demands by
transnational associations representing private enterprises for free
market exchange and reduction of trade barriers challenge any tight
internal control within each sovereign state. 61 The international
system of states protects itself from these pressures by continuing to
recognize the immunity of foreign states and political heads of states
in the courts of other states, subject to narrow exceptions such as
when sovereign functions enter the commercial markets. Under Su-
preme Court guidance, federal courts interpret the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act restrictively, in deference to the political branches,
with the presumption that any foreign state involuntarily sued in
any court in the U.S. is entitled to immunity unless explicitly
provided otherwise in one of the statute's exceptions. Summarizing
the well-developed law on this subject is beyond the scope of this
260. CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 31, at 1-29.
261. For a description of trends of recent decisions in federal courts, see supra Part II.D.
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article; however, it is interesting to note that the courts do not use
any of the available tools of customary international law, such asjus
cogens norms, to influence this presumption in any significant way.
Even special amendments to the statute to allow suits against certain
states for acts of terrorism are interpreted restrictively? 62 The net
effect is to subject foreign states to federal court discipline when they
become market participants, but to immunize foreign states for
human rights abuses. Federal courts, moreover, defer to the political
branches whenever foreign policy may be involved. This means that
the underlying political structure of the states system has been made
part of federal law, including the presumptions of territoriality
implicit in statutes, based upon traditional international law.
Within this matrix, federal courts are fashioning methods to
guide decisions at each stage of transnational civil litigation. Old
strategies and policy arguments which have in the past favored a
dual allegiance-that domestic courts simultaneously serve both the
international and the domestic legal orders-place federal courts in
the position of choosing among various sources of law on the basis of
political loyalty to lawmaking authorities when there is tension
between international law and municipal law. This characterization
of choice is somewhat of a deception, for as we have just seen,
federal courts do not always resist applying international law in
appropriate cases or controversies without a statutory basis. More
accurate is the conclusion that federal courts find structural or
doctrinal approaches to protect transnational economic rights more
effectively than they do so-called universal human rights, just as
federal courts first protected property and freedom of contract from
state action under the Fourteenth Amendment before they protected
civil rights from state encroachment. Thus any preference in choice
between loyalty to the metropolitan order and loyalty to a cosmo-
politan vision on the basis of a hierarchy of norms becomes analyti-
cally meaningless, avoiding substantive choices. 63 It allows judges
to duck responsibility for using and integrating public and private
international law within the new circumstances of world civil
society.264
262 Smith v. Libya, 101 F.3d 239 (2d Cir. 1996).
263. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 79, at 7-9.
264. See Gordon A. Christenson, Customary International Human Rights Law in Domestic
Court Decisions, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 225,226,233-37 (1996).
[Vol. 6:2 Supp.
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2. Federal Courts Federalize "Up" and Nationalize "Down"
The American Law Institute holds as black letter that "[i]nterna-
tional law and international agreements of the United States are law
of the United States and supreme over the law of the several
States." 265 The first structural choice federal courts have to make,
accepting that view, is whether to "nationalize" the question of loyal-
ty between the international legal order and national political
authority and "federalize" the accompanying subordination of politi-
cal authority of the states. During the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, using the Fourteenth Amendment, the federal judiciary
nationalized portions of the law of nations of the eighteenth century,
such as the law merchant, maritime law, prize law, and private
international law, and federalized domestic civil rights between a
state and its citizens. Today, post Erie and post cold war, federal
courts nationalize international law "down" to the locus of decentra-
lized judicial loyalty to political power and federalize "up" to the
locus of loyalty to centralized political power. By analogy, simul-
taneous globalization and devolution in international relations sym-
bolize the idea of pluralism or federalism through overlapping and
proliferating functional jurisdictions, within the larger world power
processes, entirely consistent with world civil society and its
demands.
Federal courts by removal "federalize" state decisions which
attempt to interfere with values of an emerging world civil society
recognized as national interests. The Erie doctrine first announced
antipathy for general common law (which included the law of
nations).266 Federal judges struggled with this decentralized recep-
tion of public international law into municipal law? 67  Professor
Jessup sounded the first alert on the eve of World War II. 68 The
Lauritzen269 and Sabbatino270 decisions in the international era follow-
ing victory by the Allies attempted to accommodate public and
private international law to the Erie doctrine in federal decisions
265. RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 58, § 111(1).
266. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Just after deciding Erie, however, Justice
Brandeis described the law governing apportionment of water in an interstate stream between
two states as "federal common law," which prevails over statutes or decisions of either state, a
clear indication the public international law principles were part of federal common law under
the judicial power in certain cases without statute. See Hinderlinder v. La Plata River & Cherry
Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92,110 (1938).
267. See Erie R.R. Co., 304 U.S. at 78.
268. Phillip C. Jessup, The Doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins Applied to International Law,
33 AM. J. INT'L L. 740 (1939).
269. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 US. 571 (1953).
270. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 US. 398 (1964).
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recognizing a paramount national interest in international relations,
but without recognizing customary international law as federal
common law. That U.S. forum courts should make this attempt
explicit by reintegrating international conflict of laws (private
international law) theory and public international law sources theory
was not well understood, as Professor Henkin explained 2 71
As federal judges remove federal questions from state courts,
they find themselves deciding questions of jurisdiction, forum non
conveniens, substantive claim, procedure, remedies, and aiding en-
forcement when either international economic issues or human
rights law is invoked in U.S. courts as the basis for decision in civil
cases. They select among substantive policies contained within the
various rules of decision from diverse sources, choosing as they
always do in practice anyway, from practical trade-offs, reasonable-
ness, and intuition.272
Once a federal court has jurisdiction over an international
economic or human rights law claim, it should not necessarily-
unless required by statute-choose international law as the sole
operational rule of decision in either human rights or economic
rights claims to the exclusion of valid foreign or domestic law. Like-
wise, the selection of forum rules of procedure, evidence, or
remedies should not exclude consideration of questions of interna-
tional comity or consequences to international cooperation when the
forum judge has discretion in shaping decisions. Federal courts have
chosen principles of interpretation and presumptions differently to
reflect substantive preferences that do not readily appear from the
adage that international law is part of the law of the United States273
or that statutes should be construed to avoid conflict with interna-
tional law.274
For example, in an important recent case, Jaffee v. Redmond,275 the
Supreme Court created a strong psychotherapist-patient evidentiary
privilege in all federal cases, announcing a new federal common law
rule under Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence? 76 This new
271. Louis Henkin, Act of State Today: Recollections in Tranquility, 6 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
175 (1976).
272. McDougal, supra note 96, at 2483-85.
273. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900); see also Sweeney, supra note 70, at 446-47.
274. Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 US. 677 (1804).
275. 116 S. Ct. 1923 (1996).
276. Id. at 1924. Rule 501 provides:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or
provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant
to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or
political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common
[Vol. 6:2 Supp.
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judge-made rule eliminated trial court discretion whether to follow
state law in a diversity case. In dissent, Justice Scalia questioned the
wisdom of the privilege in civil litigation, which in his view seriously
affects justice and search for truth through a new federal common
law rule justified from the often contradictory authority of substan-
tive statutes creating the privilege in the fifty states, a task he would
rather leave to Congress.277 Referring obliquely to the Erie doctrine,
he hinted that the evidentiary privilege was more than merely
procedural.278 This case has important international implications not
considered in any of the reasoning which helped formulate the new
rule (there was no foreign or international interest involved).
When international litigation is before federal courts, even
stronger arguments than Justice Scalia's favor trial court discretion in
shaping the rules of decision. Evidence of privileged communication
which might be taken abroad under the Hague Evidence Conven-
tion279 would not be allowed under the Federal Rules of Evidence
applicable as forum rules of procedure 280 Strong evidentiary and
procedural law of the federal forum in such a case would preclude
any flexibility to choose a different rule of evidence in any litigation
before a federal court involving evidence from abroad that might be
produced under foreign law without an absolute privilege. Why
law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of
reason and experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to
an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision,
the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision
thereof shall be determined in accordance with State law.
FED. R. EvID. 501.
277. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1940 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
278. In his dissent, Justice Scalia alluded to a perversion of the Erie doctrine:
The Court suggests one last policy justification: since psychotherapist privilege
statutes exist in all the States, the failure to recognize a privilege in federal courts
"would frustrate the purposes of the state legislation that was enacted to foster
these confidential communications." This is a novel argument indeed. A sort of
inverse pre-emption: the truth-seeking functions of federal courts must be adjusted
so as not to conflict with the policies of the States .... Moreover, since.., state
policies regarding the psychotherapist privilege vary considerably from State to
State, no uniform federal policy can possibly honor most of them. If furtherance of
state policies is the name of the game, rules of privilege in federal courts should
vary from State to State, a la Erie.
Id. at 1935-36 (citations omitted).
279. Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil
and Commercial Matters, Feb. 1, 1977,1144 U.N.T.S. 249.
280. At present, a federal judge has discretion whether to control discovery under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or allow discovery under the Hague Evidence Convention
under the Airospatiale case. Arguably, Jaffee eliminates any discretion in the discovery of privi-
leged communication which occurred abroad. See Socidt6 Nationale Industrielle AMrospatiale
v. United States Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522, 536-37 (1987) (preserving federal court's discretion
not to use the Hague Evidence Convention for discovery abroad when foreign parties to
litigation are proper parties before the court).
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shouldn't a federal court be able to avoid a potential conflict with a
treaty by choosing to admit evidence under a qualified privilege
grounded in substantive policies of other political communities
when the substantive law of decision is the applicable foreign law?
Might not the application of foreign substantive law under conflict of
laws analysis also entail a choice of foreign privilege as well, rather
than characterizing it as the procedural law of the forum? By fed-
eralizing the privilege "up," the Supreme Court may also have
nationalized it "down," creating a procedural rule which in effect
might largely determine the substantive rule of decision in transna-
tional litigation by eliminating any discretion.
3. Federal Courts Protect Transnational Economic Freedoms Liberally
A second construct, which reinforces the value of global enter-
prise, is that federal courts interpret international economic law
liberally to protect capital markets and voluntary market exchange,
unless instructed otherwise by Congress. Transnational enterprises
need national institutions to protect private expectations of contract
and property in investment and exchange across national borders,
including national courts and administrative agencies, to enforce
decisions and arbitrate disputes. These national institutions must be
backed up by international cooperation through national courts and
agencies. Even international regimes require national administration
and judicial machinery to implement international regulation 281
Free-market capitalists seek private control over production and
exchange while demanding protection under the coercive state legal
order for transnational contracts and property. Free-market enter-
prises seek freedom from national barriers or regulatory controls
through internationally supervised free trade agreements, deregu-
lation, cuts in transfer payments, and protection of contract and
property expectations (including newer intellectual property) across
national boundaries to minimize economic risk.
Giving respect both to international comity and to economic
agreements between sovereign nation-states, federal courts have
extended judicial enforcement of private economic ordering across
national boundaries. Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Naviga-
tion are interpreted to avoid conflict with later civil rights statutes
and give effect to the protection of the flow of capital and invest-
ments.28 2 Judicial enforcement of foreign judgments and arbitral
281. See id.
282. See Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 180-85 (1982); Papaila v.
Uniden America Corp., 51 F.3d 54, 55 (5th Cir. 1995); Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d 389 (7th
[Vol. 6:2 Supp.
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awards by federal courts tacitly recognizes an effective public system
of cooperation among nation-states for sustaining and regularizing
productivity and consumption through global free markets and pri-
vate exchange protected by contract and property rights enforced
from mutual respect among national courts. Federal statutes are
liberally interpreted to enforce party autonomy, especially in private
arbitration provisions in agreements ousting national courts of juris-
diction through party choice of law and forum in international trans-
actions and investment arrangements.283 Unless directed otherwise
by statute, a national judiciary which sanctions such voluntary defec-
tions from judicial protection of the public or community's interests
also makes legitimate its own escape from a judicial function which
internalizes the external surplus or externalizes the internal costs in
supervising a public interest in private transactions affecting the
national economy.284
4. Federal Courts Protect New International Human Rights Only
When Authorized by Congress
The architectural guide for protecting human rights in federal
courts shifts to respect the political relationship between states and
citizens yet would begin to open federal jurisdiction by reinter-
preting existing statutes to remedy the most serious abuses of
internationally recognized human rights.285 Human rights demands,
for example, seek to hold state officials accountable for deprivations
Cir. 1991) (deferring to treaty which reciprocally protects American and Japanese investments
and business operations, including presence of managers and technical personnel, thereby
avoiding abrogation of treaty by subsequent Civil Rights Act of 1964); Starrett v. Iberia Airlines
of Spain, 756 F. Supp. 292, 295 (S.D. Tex. 1989) (holding that treaty with Spain does not cover
discriminatory replacement of US. national with national not a citizen of Spain).
283. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625 (1985);
see also Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 116 S. Ct. 1652 (1996).
284. See Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARv. INT'L L.J. 1 (1991); see also
THOMAS E. CARBONNEAu, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: MELTING THE LANCES AND
DISMOUNTING THE STEEDS 119-20 (1989).
285. See THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY
LAW 118-32 (1989); Jeffrey H. Blum & Ralph G. Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction over International
Human Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act After Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 22 HARV. INT'L L.J.
53 (1981); Thomas Buergenthal, The US and International Human Rights, 9 H. Ris. L.J. 141 (1988);
Anthony D'Amato, What Does Tel-Oren Tell Lawyers?: Judge Bork's Concept of the Law of Nations
Is Seriously Mistaken, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 92 (1985); Henkin, supra note 58, at 1561-67; Richard B.
Lillich, Invoking International Human Rights Law in Domestic Court4 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 367, 393
(1985); Paust, supra note 58; Human Rights Law Symposium, 4 HOUS. J. INT'L L. (1981); Symposium,
Federal Jurisdiction, Human Rights and the Law of Nations: Essays on Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 11 GA.
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 305 (1981); see also RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 58, §
703 rptr. note 7.
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without the protection of official immunities 8 6 Thus federal courts
should extend the federal judicial power to incorporate and sanction
new human rights expectations of the international community
when they find the slightest congressional authorization 287 Without
direction from the political branches, however, federal courts do not
easily recognize or incorporate new customary international human
rights law from sources of international law? 88  Liberal interpre-
tation of jurisdictional statutes is urged by prominent human rights
advocates with experience in bringing human rights problems first
into the public sphere.289 When customary international law or
treaties create or recognize international legal obligations among
nation-states to protect their own nationals according to international
standards in conflict with those provided under domestic law,
federal courts will not exercise the judicial power to enforce the
international human rights standards. They refuse to recognize such
law under the Supremacy Clause unless the obligation is explicitly
incorporated by statute or treaties that are expressly made self-
executing by the political branches? 90 Even then, federal courts tend
to construe treaties affecting human rights quite narrowly? 91
Incorporation through a narrowly construed statute or treaty, but
not solely by judicial recognition, appears to be the structural
286. See, e.g., Board of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. 2342, 2347-2348 (1996); see
also Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996); Siderman de Blake v. Argentina,
965 F.2d 699,711 (9th Cir. 1992).
287. See Hoffman & Strossen, supra note 71; Bayefsky & Fitzpatrick, supra note 155, at 27-
28; John M. Rogers, The Alien Tort Statute and How Individuals "Violate" International Law, 21
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 47 (1988); Jean-Marie Simon, The Alien Tort Claims Act: Justice or Show
Trials?, 11 B.U. INT'L L. J. 1 (1993). Contrast this pessimism or skepticism with Professor
Lillich's optimistic appraisal as recent as 1985, that "there is plenty of international human
rights law extant, that domestic courts increasingly are being briefed on such law, and that they
either are taking or should take this law into account in reaching their decisions." Lillich, supra
note 285, at 367.
288. Bayefsky & Fitzpatrick, supra note 155, at 27-28.
289. In the brief amicus curiae in Negewo v. Abebe-Jiri, arguments claim that the Alien Tort
Statute and the Torture Victim Protection Act confer both subject matter jurisdiction and a
cause of action over tortious acts of torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, cruel and inhuman
and degrading treatment in Ethiopia in violation of the law of nations, as the Second and Ninth
Circuits have held. Brief for Appellant, Negewo v. Abebe-Jiri, 72 F.3d 844 (11th Cir. 1996) (No.
93-9133). While these statutes surely created federal subject matter jurisdiction, the rules of
decision that shape the litigation are generally left for the trial judge and always involve a mix
of forum, international, and foreign law. Nothing in the brief suggests otherwise; nor could it
in light of Judge Kaufman's explicit and narrow holding in Filartiga that the rules of decision
governing a cause of action are not necessarily to be guided by only one source. Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
290. Phillip R. Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary International Law, 33 UCLA L. REV.
665, 684 (1986) ("American courts have rarely applied customary international law, and have
almost never applied it as a direct restraint against a government or a governmental interest.").
291. Rogoff, supra note 81, at 559-63.
[Vol. 6:2 Supp.
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principle for federal courts in handling questions of international
human rights law.
5. Federal Judicial Devolution Limits Congressional Preemption of
State Law
While federalizing certain questions of foreign relations law
before state courts, the Supreme Court is beginning to rethink several
aspects of what might be viewed as structural devolution within the
system of nation-states. This architectural structure has several
parts. First, by recognizing the "sovereignty" of the states of the
union through the Tenth Amendment, the Court might curtail the
national power to preempt states either directly or by the dormant
foreign and domestic commerce clause. 92 Second, the theory of
international responsibility of political subdivisions entails possibly
new supervisory responsibility by the central government, which is
accountable to the international community of states for acts of the
intermediate political subdivisions considered "sovereign" and,
therefore, directly responsible under international law?93 New ques-
tions arise: Does the national government continue its exclusive
privilege and power to protect U.S. citizens diplomatically? What is
the parens patriae power of state attorneys general to bring class
actions on behalf of injured citizens? What is the power of the U.S.
Attorney General?
The U.S. position in the nineteenth century in free speech and
criminal libel cases against foreign diplomats was that, under the
Constitution, the federal government could not interfere with state
292. See US. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 729 (1995) (striking Arkansas' term
limitation amendment).
293. The dilemma of the national authority in a federal or decentralized system is that
it either must be responsible without complete control over local authorities (as
in the United States) or must create a fiction of local autonomy and self-
determination while in fact increasing State complicity and control .... Just as
in the possibility of purely private responsibility, attribution doctrine also might
allocate to political subdivisions certain autonomy of responsibility by
foreclosing attribution of certain acts of local officials to the central government.
Allowing intermediate responsibility under international law solves a practical
problem, but no State under the present system would accept its limitation of
State power and interposition of international law internally. Intellectually,
however, free political association and self-determination are ideas closely allied
to the theory of private responsibility. Attribution doctrine can help promote
these movements by preventing full State entry into private spheres and by
showing the way toward intermediate responsibility for unusual subpolitical
entities, which themselves have claim to recognition by the international
community but are not insurrectional movements.
Christenson, supra note 151, at 333-35.
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law and remedies. 294 This position seems inconsistent with Chief
Justice John Jay's 1793 opinion in Chisholm v. Georgia,295 which even
for the Confederation spelled out a theory that the political organi-
zation of states as a confederated or federated whole entailed the
central responsibility of each state to all states collectively (the
United States) or to its national government, which in turn was
responsible to other nations under the law of nations for any breach
by one of its states. Interestingly enough, this concept was at the
heart of the erga omnes doctrine of the International Court of Justice
in 1972-some obligations are of such fundamental interest to the
international society that they entail an obligation by each state to the
international community of states as a whole for abuses even within
the jurisdiction of such state.2 96 Whether such a concept of interna-
tional public order would provide the justification sufficient for a
federal judge to trump state and federal law, even the Constitution,
is quite a different matter, one we take up next.
Architecturally, the most unifying and universal of all the
abstract modem myth structures of international law is the concept
of jus cogens, which might yet come to symbolize not only the
political order of the international community of sovereign states as
a whole, but the interests fundamental to international society-or
those now identified as within the sphere of world civil society
together with those of the public spheres informed by it. How have
the federal courts handled their encounters with claims which invoke
this peremptory norm of the highest status in international law?
V. Jus COGENS IN U.S. COURTS: NATIONALIZING SUPER-NORMS OF
WORLD CIVIL SOCIETY
In questions of allegiance and protection in an emerging world civil
society, the vitality of the speculative peremptory norm jus cogens in
international law might best illustrate a wise judicial stance of
abstention or deference to the political branches. Invoking this super-
norm in any of the communities where law may be made (the universal
human community, the political community of sovereign states, and
the polity of citizens in a sovereign nation-state) is metaphor for
overriding any public order system in conflict 297 This means doc-
trinally that recognizing the validity of such a supernorm by the federal
294. MOORE, supra note 158, at 163-64.
295. 2 U.S. 419,474 (1793).
296. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 5).
297. Gordon A. Christenson, Jus Cogens: Guarding Interests Fundamental to International
Society, 28 VA. J. INTL L. 585 (1988).
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WORLD CIVIL SOCIETY
courts might trump the law of a particular community by a supposedly
universal law with no constitutional foundation, a fantasy no less
powerful than St. Augustine's universal human community in time and
space, an image of comfort and security with compulsory effect.
Professor Ackerman makes a similar argument from a dualist
democracy, distinguishing between fundamental choices people make
by extraordinary processes to create a "higher lawmaking" and choices
or decisions made by government every day, such as elections,
legislation, and "normal lawmaking," not to confuse a normal electoral
victory with a mandate to overturn by normal legislation the
"considered judgments previously reached by the People."298 This
legitimacy of supernorm lawmaking is like a norm ofjus cogens, but the
question whether it can be imported from the international community
-is different. Ackerman nearly reaches an absolute jus cogens principle
based upon fundamental human rights norms when he argues that in
any new peoples' choice of constitutional reform, there should be
introduced possibly a jus cogens-type norm, for example, preventing
constitutional amendment of certain of the provisions of the Bill of
Rights. This would foreclose the possibility of a peoples' revision of
fundamental rights in derogation of them. Virtually no theoretical
justification is offered by Professor Ackerman for that kind of assertion,
not even an argument from international norms such as those of jus
cogens, and his proposal is doubly dangerous, as we shall see?99
The foundational order of such an international public law concept,
if accepted even theoretically, may impose even greater duties on
federal systems. In place of a dual set of constitutional loyalties of
federal judges-one to national and another under Erie-to state or
local political authority, each within its own jurisdiction under a written
domestic constitutional order, an international peremptory norm
entails a triadic hierarchy of loyalties, with the conceptual, if not real,
possibility of an overriding allegiance to a truly universal "people's"
law. In the United States, as we shall see, if peremptory rules of
international law were accepted as U.S. law, the Supremacy Clause
would preempt any inconsistent state constitutions and laws and
298. BRUcE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS6 (1991).
299. Professor D'Amato points out the difficulty with this kind of argument in the context
of an absolute jus cogens norm within the community of sovereign states. D'Amato, supra note
285, at 92. Even more difficult is the argument from within a polity without the use of an
external system of reason as a principle of reference. Either way, the principle from interna-
tional law would be counterdemocratic if used as the limiting structure denying derogation
from such fundamental norms by a people intent upon a fundamental revision of their basic
law, but then the concept itself is antidemocratic. See Anthony D'Amato, It's a Bird, It's a Plane,
It's Jus Cogens!, 6 CONN. J. INT'L L. 1 (1990).
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1. OF TRANSNATIONAL L. & POLICY
perhaps limit the U.S. Constitution itself.0 0 This idea does not have
wide support in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals and is far too radical
a doctrine to merit Supreme Court consideration on the merits.0 1
Moreover, if the analogous decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court in its
newly found respect for state sovereignty were extended, even Con-
gress might be disabled from incorporating a peremptory rule of
international law prohibiting, for example, the execution of juveniles
convicted of capital crimes or limiting the First Amendment's prohi-
bition of bans on hate speech, in effect a reconstruction of "intermediate
sovereignty."
Much scholarly commentary in the United States accepts and
advocates the incorporation by federal courts of jus cogens norms in
implementing customary international human rights law.0 2  Some
norms are so universally compelling, the argument goes, that such a
norm of international public order should be maintained as a principled
basis for shaping domestic rules of decision governing violations of the
most important human rights of citizens by their own governments. 03
The value of a peremptory norm of jus cogens quality is that concep-
tually it would override any other rule of international law in conflict
(such as the old customary law of sovereign immunities) and-it is
contended-domestic law in conflict as well. To be effective, however,
this kind of norm requires the public power of the international
community or a single power acting on behalf of that community as a
whole to bring the norm to bear to change the internal political relation-
ship between citizen (or minority) and government. 3°4
Antimonies, therefore, abound. Using the concept of jus cogens as
the basis for protecting a person's judicial claim against a government
from a judicial defense of sovereign immunity (either directly or
through an implied waiver of sovereign immunity) converts an abstract
concept into an overriding principle of international public order. In
the classic foundation of the traditional system of nation-states, each
state retains its propensity to subordinate another state through its own
nationalized conception of international law in its own courts (or the
300. ACKERMAN, supra note 298, at 6-8.
301. Princz v. F.R.G., 26 F.3d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
302. See MYRES McDOUGAL ET AL, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBUC ORDER 274 (1980);
SCHACHTER, supra note 134, at 339-42 (accepting incorporation conceptually, but cautious about
implementation in practice); see also RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 58, §
703 rptr. note 3. For an extensive bibliography on the issue, see Princz, 26 F.3d at 1180-82
(Wald, J., dissenting).
303. See David F. Klein, A Theory for the Application of the Customary International Law of
Human Rights by Domestic Courts, 13 YALE J. INT'L L. 332 (1988).
304. This point has been long made clear by Myres McDougal and Reisman. See generally
McDOUGAL & REISMAN, supra note 212.
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WORLD CIVIL SOCIETY
propensity for a powerful state to intervene in another's internal affairs
under the guise of protecting minorities from atrocities such as
genocide by their own government under principles of international
law, perhaps justified as jus cogens), without an adequate consensus of
the community of states as a whole. Citing a number of cases in federal
courts that have invoked and accepted the concept abstractly, both
activists and scholars, nonetheless, reason that the jus cogens principle
has now been incorporated into U.S. law.3 5
The invocation of these norms as peremptory in domestic human
rights litigation in the United States began in 198806 Decisions are
beginning at least to discuss substantive questions fundamental to
international society as seen by forum courts. Nonetheless, I see no
basis in jus cogens concepts for deriving any meaning favorable to a
theory of incorporating international human rights by domestic courts
without a statutory enactment or constitutional delegation. No U.S.
court has invoked the international prohibition against official torture
as a peremptory or jus cogens norm to justify a cause of action by itself,
except by possible dictum. In fact, courts in the United States have
uniformly rejected application of an assertedjus cogens norm as the sole
basis for a cause of action.
Norms of the status claimed for jus cogens are so powerful,
proponents argue, that they overcome immunity defenses and may
even limit constitutional powers internally, as if they were a new,
higher natural law. This argument favors jus cogens as authority for
federal jurisdiction in causes of action for the most egregious and
unconscionable international wrongs (as if a constitutional tort). For
instance, jus cogens was invoked (but found not established) as basis for
U.S. citizens' civil suit against their own government to recover for
injuries growing from U.S. responsibility for its breach of important
peremptory norms in the use of coercion in Nicaragua 3° 7 While some
language in several decisions of courts of appeal states that U.S. courts
have recognized the concept of jus cogens as part of U.S. law, not a
single case has been decided on that basis alone without having been
overturned.3°8 This kind of advocacy is highly risky, for the effective
305. See, e.g., Cunningham, supra note 52, at 544.
306. At that time, I published a comprehensive critical study considering all aspects of the
concept as symbolic of an emerging international public order. See generally Christenson, supra
note 297.
307. Committee of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir.
1988).
308. The best example is Princz v. F.R.G., 26 F.3d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1994), which overturned
Judge Sporkins' reliance on jus cogens. Judge Ginsburg's answer, see id. at 1174 n.1, to Judge
Wald's dissent seems to represent the dominant view of federal judges, that absent federal
statute, jus cogens, even if shown valid in international law, does not confer jurisdiction. Judge
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result of being overwhelmingly rejected in particular cases has been to
raise to an almost impossible threshold the human rights victims' task
of demonstrating the existence of norms of customary international
human rights law when a statutory basis exists. Several U.S. courts of
appeals seem to have adopted the exceedingly onerous burden of
proving the existence of a norm of jus cogens quality as the threshold to
limit claims under the Alien Tort Statute?0 9 The burden upon human
rights victims is now to establish that the tortious breach of the law of
nations "must be of a norm that is specific, universal, and obliga-
tory,"310 and the statute may apply only to "shockingly egregious viola-
tions of universally recognized principles of international law."31 The
Alien Tort Statute, however, does not contain this language. Its text
refers only to tortious breach of a treaty or the law of nations, a norm
shown by reference to traditional sources of international law whether
custom, treaty, or general principles' 12
A more likely explanation for this resistance is that domestic courts
do not want to enforce the new customary obligation when it directly
affects a government's relations with its own citizens without direction
from the political branches while keeping the door open for the most
egregious of these wrongs. Ironically, then, jus cogens becomes the
device for limiting actions under the Alien Tort Statute. Thus domestic
courts may retain credibility against internal political attack and stave
off an onslaught of litigation from home and abroad. Conflict of laws
theory would deepen that deference, allowing a judge more easily to
consider the public interest represented best by balancing policies
Wald's dissent strongly favored the incorporation of jus cogens norms as customary interna-
tional law providing both in personam and subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 1180-83.
309. When the Ninth Circuit clearly joined the Second Circuit in concluding that the Alien
Tort Statute creates a cause of action for violations of "specific, universal and obligatory inter-
national human rights standards" conferring fundamental rights upon all people in relation to
their own governments, it linked its justification to jus cogens. See In re Estate of Ferdinand
Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994). The court included prohibitions against torture,
summary execution, or causing disappearances but linked this holding with its own dictum in
Siderman de Blake v. Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 717 (9th Cir. 1992), that under international law
"official torture violates jus cogens" and satisfies "the specific, universal and obligatory
standard .... In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1479 (9th Cir. 1994). "[The right
to be free from official torture is fundamental and universal, a right deserving of the highest
stature under international law, a norm of jus cogens." Id.
310. In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 25 F.3d at 1479 (citing to jus cogens as a reason
torture violates customary international law). Note the ambiguity in whether the burden is to
demonstrate the universality of the norm or universality of respect for the norm, a semantic
quibble, perhaps, but one that could make even more difficult the threshold burden if inter-
preted by a judge to mean a norm of universal quality.
311. Zapata v. Quinn, 707 F.2d 691, 692 (2d Cir. 1983).
312. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).
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underlying federal or international interests to guide the forum court in
shaping its rules of decision.
In addition to actions in federal courts authorized by statutes, the
strategy of appealing to external authority to remedy alleged human
rights abuses in the United States has reached regional forums such as
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, where individuals
may present petitions against their own governments, including
decisions of national courts? 13 Consider the Roach case brought by
petition before the Inter-American Human Rights Commission by a
juvenile under capital sentence in the United States. 14 The Commis-
sion determined that the United States had violated a norm ofjus cogens
in sentencing a juvenile to death. 15 Does this recommendation and
practice stand for anything?3 16 Does it represent recognition (opinio
juris) of a general rule of state practice against executing juveniles
convicted of murder, or does it, when the United States rejected and
ignored the decision, represent, in a broader context, evidence of state
practice rejecting that general norm for a domestic rule that permits a
state to try vicious juvenile offenders as adults, even for capital
313. See Rick Wilson, Report No. 6: Litigation at the Inter-American Human Rights Commission
and Court, in INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LIBERTIES REPORT 28,29-33 (1994).
314. Case 9647 (Roach & Pinkerton v. United States), Inter-Am. C.H.R. 147,
OAE/SER.L./V./Il.71, doc. 9, rev. 1 (1987).
315. See id.; see also Christenson, supra note 297, at 638. In reviewing the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights conclusion that the United States had violated ajus cogens norm
by executing juveniles convicted of murder, I pointed out: "[Pleremptory norms in the past
have worked to the advantage of established power. The Commission's decision, if accepted,
would reverse that tendency." Id. The Commission's new peremptory norm reaching indi-
viduals in the Inter-American system surely would limit a powerful state's treatment of its own
citizens when it "shocks the conscience of mankind and the standards of public morality." Id. I
wondered, however, if the claim, which reached into the internal relationship of federal to state
power, might not actually have the opposite effect-reinforcing the "traditional ways of
interpreting treaties and limiting the emergence of new customary international law concern-
ing a nation's treatment of its own citizens." Id. My skeptical but not entirely pessimistic
conclusion was:
[T]he use of collective coercion against the human person under assumptions of
state sovereignty poses cosmopolitan questions. What justification must officials
and elites provide without the immunity of official orders? Jus cogens norms
increase the need for justification for otherwise legitimate, collective coercion to be
made directly to the larger international society whose demands and expectations
may not be reflected adequately by governments ....
Even so, they should act as if they seek to hold the nation-state system of
international law itself accountable to a global society whose fundamental interests
are not the survival of the states system but the security and well-being of all
people. Jus cogens symbolizes that paradox.
Id. at 638, 647.
316. As Bodansky points out, the opinion by the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights is a political recommendation and has no binding authority. The Role of International Law
in Human Rights Litigation in the United States, in AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE EIGHTY-SECOND ANNUAL MEETING 456, 472 (1988) [hereinafter ASIL
EIGHTY-SECOND MEETING] (remarks by Daniel Bodansky) [hereinafter Bodansky].
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J. OF TRANSNATIONAL L. & POLICY
offenses? This conduct in interpreting customary practice by a major
power scarcely. convinces persistent objectors that they may not object
to the community's recognition of an emerging rule simply by classify-
ing it as a jus cogens norm.317 Why wouldn't this specific event-quite
apart from the morality of the domestic rule- demonstrate state
practice that juvenile violence in particular cultures as a matter of
customary international law should be left to the domestic polity under
principles of democratic self-determination so long as procedural
fairness is accorded? Absent gross violations approaching international
crimes or breaches or threats to peace, legal intervention from outside
has no forum or process to provide a legal remedy such as injunctive
relief in the particular case under customary international law of jus
cogens.
In any event, this theory of allegiance is unlikely to succeed as a
strategy to expand jurisdiction of the federal forum or subject matter
jurisdiction.318 Domestic courts loyal to the national constitution are in
effect being asked to choose between loyalty to the authority of the
national state or allegiance to international public policy and law
fundamental to international society. In my interpretation, the opening
wedge has led not to the internationalization of domestic law in
important matters, but to the nationalization of jus cogens. We should
also consider its influence from that angle. Just as domestic law has
nationalized other customary international human rights law in the
United States, so also have the federal courts captured and domes-
ticated jus cogens. For that very reason, among others, Professors Bruno
Simma and Philip Alston have rejected the customary international law
approach and favored use of jus cogens principles and of general princi-
ples from more universal sources such as the United Nations Charter,
resolutions, conventions, and general principles of law?19 The sub-
stance of the discussion before federal courts is really quite similar, but
it is reasoned from within the practical context of a democratic federal
317. See Jonathan I. Charney, Universal International Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 529 (1993); see
also MARK W. JAN1S, AN INTRODUCnON TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 62-66 (2d ed. 1993). Under
Charney's and Janis' positions, if the rule against capital execution of juveniles is a jus cogens
nonconsensual norm, the United States would be compelled to follow the norm despite its
persistent objection to it. However, because it disagreed with the decision of the Commission
and rejected the norm as a matter of state practice, one could fairly say that the United States
nationalized jus cogens by subordinating it to the constitution. Every nation is likely to do the
same when its constitution is at odds with an emerging peremptory norm.
318. Christenson, supra note 297, at 632-33 (arguing that new purpose for jus cogens may be
at odds with its historic function as a keeper of order as against disruptive personal freedoms,
placing its functions in contradiction if forced to choose between allegiance to emerging
international society or the states system itself).
319. Simma & Alston, supra note 134, at 103 (arguing that threshold requirement for
emergence of jus cogens norms is at least as high as for development of general customary law).
[Vol. 6:2 Supp.
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WORLD CIVIL SOCIETY
union, one of whose purposes is to deter the corruption of government
through factions. Tyranny from a priori transcendental universals is just
as corrupting as if it were unabashedly the result of pure selfish greed.
There have been a fair number of relevant federal cases 20 In the
Princz case, the District of Appeals Court of Appeals overturned District
Judge Sporkins's incorporation and reliance on jus cogens. In an
important footnote, Judge Ginsburg summarized the dominant view in
the federal courts in his answer to Judge Wald's dissent. 21
While it is true that "international law is a part of our law" ...
it is also our law that a federal court is not competent to hear a
claim arising under international law absent a statute granting such
jurisdiction. Judge Wald finds that grant through a creative, not to
say strained, reading of the FSIA against the background of
international law itself.
We think that something more nearly express is wanted before
we impute to the Congress an intention that the federal courts
assume jurisdiction over the countless human rights cases that
might well be brought by the victims of all the ruthless military
juntas, presidents-for-life, and murderous dictators of the world,
from Idi Amin to Mao Zedong. Such an expansive reading ...
would likely place an enormous strain not only upon our courts
but, more to the immediate point, upon our country's diplomatic
relations with any number of foreign nations. In many if not most
cases the outlaw regime would no longer even be in power and our
Government could have normal relations with the government of
the day-unless disrupted by our courts, that is.322
Jus cogens is also a public order concept, which can be invoked in
support of the status quo of the system of independent and
autonomous states, through Articles 2(4) and 51 of the United Nations
Charter or through customary norms against forcible intervention or
illegal aggression, all norms thought to be of jus cogens quality, though
horizontal in structure.3 23 Antimonies arise in jus cogens concepts just
as they do in traditional international law, requiring careful analysis of
interests.
320. See Smith v. Libya, 101 F.3d 239 (2d Cir. 1996); Princz v. F.R.G., 26 F.3d 1166 (D.C. Cir.
1994); In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994); Siderman de Blake v.
Argentina, 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992); Committee of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua v.
Reagan, 859 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
321. Princz, 26 F.3d at 1174 (Wald, J., dissenting) (strongly urging the incorporation of jus cogens
norms as customary international law as a basis for both in personam and subject matter
jurisdiction).
322. Id. at 1174 n.1 (citation omitted).
323. Christenson, supra note 297, at 596-98.
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J. OF TRANSNATIONAL L. & POLICY
In no case has jus cogens formed the basis for a rule of decision not
overturned on appeal. It has, however, substantially increased the
justification required for establishing a rule of customary international
human rights law cognizable under the Alien Tort Statute. As ex-
plained elsewhere, I believe that its use as a domestic rule of decision
requires skill and great care, less as a direct rule of decision limiting or
overriding government power and more as public policy requiring the
state to bear a heavy burden of justification when it breaches funda-
mental human rights norms universally respected. 24 As a guide to
choosing rules of decisions to achieve the fundamental goals of interna-
tional society in human dignity and economic freedoms, federal courts
might use it more effectively than if invoked directly.
Most new claims involving customary international human rights
law, not already accepted as creating federal causes of action, now
encounter a much stiffer burden than is required to establish traditional
customary international law, from evidence of state practice and opinio
juris. The burden of justification for a statutory federal cause of action
for tortious breach of the law of nations has been stood on its head.
Prohibitions against slavery, genocide, torture, and arbitrary murders
or disappearances are actionable for aliens because they are recognized
as jus cogens norms, apparently now the criterion for when tortious
wrongs violate the law of nations. It is practically impossible to demon-
strate a norm of jus cogens quality for tortious wrongs such as taking of
property or censorship of free expression, but there may be a strong
argument demonstrating such a rule under ordinary customary inter-
national law. However, the federal forum threshold now seems to be
the higher one, reinforcing the traditional public order principles of
restraint in exercising jurisdiction through incorporating new rules of
customary international law. Under the test of when a tort in violation
of a rule of international law amounts to a cause of action under the
Alien Tort Statute, would discrimination against women or racial
discrimination short of apartheid325-each a violation of human rights
law-be recognized as such under the statute? If a cause of action will
lie under a rule of customary international law against official torture
abroad, might failure to prevent domestic violence and torture within a
family or private group be any less gross an abuse of the dignity of the
human person? Does vigilantism need to rise to the level of death
324. Id. at 626-30. "[B]ecause a peremptory norm is not easily demonstrated, there is
danger that the Court could convert ajus cogens argument into a nearly impossible test of when
to give domestic effect to international human rights standards." Id. at 627.
325. The prohibition against discrimination is now accepted as a legal obligation under
Article 55 of the United Nations Charter.
[Vol. 6:2 Supp.
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WORLD CIVIL SOCIETY
squads to merit civil responsibility under international law? Do
disappearances, arbitrary murders, and inhumane punishment of men
by enemies in power warrant international jurisdiction for remedy?
What about rape or torture of women under an averted eye, or theft of
domestic property, or censorship of expression which is considered
seditious by a foreign government and its friends?
Especially inventive, but going nowhere, are the recent claims that a
violation of a jus cogens norm by a recognized government constitutes
an implied waiver of sovereign immunity for purposes of domestic
suits against that government. 26 Another claim is that peremptory
norms place limits upon certain constitutional powers granted under
the Constitution. Not only are these claims misguided in international
law, but the citation of dictum as if established doctrine has affected
seriously the credibility of human rights advocacy. Ironically again,
each citation of jus cogens as justification for jurisdiction or a cause of
action has turned against the proponent and has been used as justifica-
tion for refusal to imply a cause of action from customary international
human rights law. Thus, even when there is a statutory authority to
remedy a violation of the law of nations, the jus cogens argument has
narrowed the statutory remedy already granted.
Putting aside the dubious reception given emerging customary
international human rights norms, no court of appeals has affirmed any
finding on a rule of decision based solely upon a rule derived fromjus
cogens. The Ninth327 and D.C. Circuit 28 Courts of Appeals have
reversed district courts that have decided cases solely uponjus cogens
principles. Recently, boldly asserted challenges to the very core of the
states system, namely sovereign equality and reciprocal respect, have
failed. As a result, the recent cases relying upon jus cogens to support
implied waiver of sovereign or visiting head of state immunities, now
invoked under customary international law, have actually strengthened
the defense. 329 Judge Newman's recent opinion in Smith v. Libya330
gave full and respectful treatment to thejus cogens claim by representa-
tives of two victims of the Lockerbie air disaster. They had argued that
the sovereign immunity defense of Libya was impliedly waived or
overridden by jus cogens norms,331 especially in light of Congress'
326. See Sidernan de Blake v. Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 714-19 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Princz,
26 F.3d at 1174 (citing Adam Belsky et. al, Implied Waver Under the FSIA: A Proposed Exception to
Immunity for Violations of Peremptory Norms of International Law, 77 CAL. L. REV. 365 (1989)).
327. See In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994).
328. See Princz, 26 F.3d at 1116.
329. See LaFontant v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
330. 101 F.3d 239 (2d Cir. 1996).
331. See id. at 242.
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1. OF TRANSNATIONAL L. & POLICY
amendment to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act allowing jurisdic-
tion for certain acts of state terrorism under narrow conditions (the
amendment did not apply to economic damages claimed and did not
revive the earlier wrongful death actions brought personally by the
family).332 Judge Newman construed the statute narrowly, favoring
immunity of a foreign sovereign, unless specifically withdrawn by
statute: "Congress can legislate to open United States courts to some
victims of international terrorism in their suits against foreign states
without inevitably withdrawing the entire defense of sovereign
immunity for all jus cogens violations. ', 33
It is easy to see how jus cogens arguments are attractive in suits
against foreign sovereigns. Other than peremptory norms of interna-
tional law, so universally compelled that they override all treaty or
customary law in conflict with such powerful norms, we have no
theory of international public policy adequate to the task of displacing,
limiting, or interpreting the domestic exercise of constitutional powers
delegated within a state, thereby affording international protection.
What universal sources from a global human community of citizens can
possibly lead to that result? The most we now can agree upon as a
legitimate source of general or customary international human rights
law is shared consensus about interests fundamental to a society of
independent nation-states. Even ajus cogens norm conceptually comes
into existence only when accepted or recognized by the international
community of states as a whole. Human beings, except as they influ-
ence their own governments, have no direct relationship of citizenship
or participation in such a community despite movement toward
according the individual status and protection under the international
order now emerging.33
In a critical review, before the spate of cases reached the federal
courts, this author maintained:
The content of a peremptory norm, having no prior meaning
apart from decision, must flow from some authority or political
leader informed by the deepest expectations of international
society. Whoever has power to negate the claim to prescribe or
change an ordinary norm on that basis has control of the super-
norm's content. The empirical analysis then becomes an inquiry
332. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-132, § 221(a),
110 Stat. 1214,1241 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7)).
333. Smith, 101 F.3d at 244.
334. See Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather
Than States, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 1 (1982).
[Vol. 6:2 Supp.
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WORLD CIVIL SOCIETY
into political power and the demands and expectations from within
the entire international community, beyond the system of States.335
In plainer words, before the rule of customary international human
rights law against torture or disappearances or arbitrary state execu-
tions could be justified as peremptory, some political power would
have to be seen as credible enough to intrude into the domestic affairs
of a powerful state, such as China or India, to compel a change in
official policy. In view of all the litigation in U.S. federal courts that has
followed this inquiry, my conclusion needs only slight revision. It
should be modified to support choice of law analysis by forum courts
with split allegiance. By refusing to make the false choice between state
sovereignty, to which they traditionally defer, and an emerging
international legal order not yet here, forum courts should use jus
cogens analysis as an instrument of judicial choice for reaching the
substance of the important conflicts among inclusive and exclusive
communities. By seeing these conflicts in transnational litigation within
federal jurisdiction and weighing them through the prisms of both
pragmatic interest analysis and universal respect for human dignity,
federal judges will decide on the facts, as they always have, when they
have discretion. Forum courts should choose a rule of decision "as if" a
truly global society whose interests are the most inclusive of all interests
they might imagine would accept it, even as they serve the nation-state
system by remaining deferential to their own political authority.
Where does this leave federal courts? It leads them not to formal
incorporation of public international law norms, nor to a single canon
aimed at interpreting domestic law to avoid conflict with international
law, but toward the craft of transnational litigation.
VI. FEDERAL COURT DECISION PROCESS AS EXAMPLE FOR WORLD
CIVIL SOCIETY
The questions most troublesome to federal judges in the United
States do not grow from the general principle that customary interna-
tional law is part of U.S. law "like, if not as," federal common law by
analogy.336 They stem from such difficulties as: (1) locating sources of
customary international law; (2) finding sources of foreign law and
determining the applicable international conflict of laws principles; (3)
recognizing state practice and usage as law; (4) identifying and
applying new customary law as codified or crystallized in United
Nations declarations, resolutions, and conventions; and (5) determining
335. Christenson, supra note 297, at 645.
336. See generally Henkin, supra note 58.
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1. OF TRANSNATIONAL L. & POUCY
when to defer to the political branches, foreign courts, or to decide as
common law judges. These are authentic concerns that echo similar
choices in conflicts of law jurisprudence? 37 As Falk puts the central
issue, it "depends on the capacity of these courts to withstand internal
political influence when confronted with an issue of international
law."338 To the extent that municipal courts find ways to avoid apply-
ing international law to serve the foreign relations interests of the
national government, "they confirm cynical perceptions of international
law as a body of law that is subordinate to or a rationalization of
national policy."339
Federal courts seldom choose international law as the law gov-
erning liability between private parties, but they do provide a forum
by which the parties may argue about which rules of decision or
principles ought to govern the case. Should federal forum law al-
ways govern procedure and remedies, especially when litigation is
between foreign parties and foreign officials? As the era of inter-
penetration advances, national courts might function quite well
without having to choose in civil matters between loyalty to the
status quo of state sovereignty or an imaginary international govern-
ment that does not exist. The new conditions within which world
civil society now functions reinforces federal courts in their consid-
eration of interests of governments and the international system in
stability, cooperation, and effectiveness. Achieving the goals of
human rights and economic enterprise and freedoms with security
according to law, without having to choose allegiance to a com-
munity of sovereign states acting as if it were the world polity, is a
worthy task for the federal judiciary.
A. Choice of Law and Public International Law
Conflict of laws theory merges most easily with public interna-
tional law theory in U.S. domestic courts when government interest
analysis, as developed by Brainerd Currie, is expanded to include
international public interest.M4 That analysis should balance, or at
least consider in a reasoned justification, any overriding policies of
the international community of states, the values of human dignity
contained in emerging international human rights law, the economic
337. See generally BRILMAYER, supra note 85; see also Harold G. Maier & Thomas R. McCoy,
A Unifying Theory for Judicial Jurisdiction and Coice of Law, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 249 (1991).
338. FALIK, supra note 202, at 433.
339. Id.
340. See generally BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECrED ESSAYS ON THE CONFucr OF LAws (1963).
[Vol. 6:2 Supp.
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WORLD CIVIL SOCIETY
values of international wealth production and distribution, and
respect for the stability and predictability of the interstate system. 41
International choice of law problems in civil litigation between
private parties and their relationship to public international law are
no easier than choosing to incorporate international law into domes-
tic law, making it law of the United States. 42 Choosing between
foreign and domestic rules of decision to justify a decision in "inter-
national" litigation, especially when working within the framework
of the Erie doctrine, has never been simple. 43  Federal and state
judges handle these problems frequently, however, when federal
common law allows a choice between state and federal law as well as
in intrastate choices.3" Whether relying on interest or policy analy-
sis, comity and reciprocity, better law principles, or the greater cer-
tainty of vested positive rights in lex loci delicti doctrines, U.S. judges,
beginning with Judge Story, have handled similar questions realis-
tically by analyzing interests to shape rules of decisions. Only in the
last several decades, however, have federal courts faced choices
involving conflicts between foreign or domestic internal rules of
decision and those emerging from the "new" customary internation-
al human rights law, invoked in actions asserting federal diversity or
subject matter jurisdiction. 345
341. See generally BRILMAYER, supra note 85.
342. See John R. Stevenson, The Relationship of Private International Law to Public International
Law, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 561 (1952).
343. Judge Learned Hand's mistake in Bergman v. De Sieyes, 170 F.2d 360 (2d Cir. 1948),
was grounded solidly in Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938): "[Allthough the courts of
[New York] look to international law as a source of New York law, their interpretation of
international law is controlling upon us, and we are to follow them so far as they have declared
themselves." Bergman, 170 F.2d at 360; see also Edwin Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Part of the
National Law of the United States [Part 11h, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 792 (1953).
344. See Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV.
883 (1986) (remarking that power to create federal common law is, and should be, broader and
more discretionary with federal judges than generally assumed).
345. Judge Kaufman in Filartiga explicitly left this choice of law problem to the trial judge
on remand, commenting later in an article in the New York Times Magazine that the broad
response to torture is best left to the policy makers and cautioning that the Alien Tort Statute
should not be read as "engaging in messianic moral imperialism." Irving Kaufman, A Legal
Remedy for International Torture?, N.Y. TMEs, Nov. 9,1980, § 6 (Magazine), at 44, 52.
On remand, District Judge Nickerson began his underappreciated opinion by stating that
the
Court of Appeals decided only that Section 1350 gave jurisdiction. We must now
face the issue left open... namely, the nature of the "action" over which the sec-
tion affords jurisdiction. Does the "tort" to which the statute refers mean a wrong
"in violation of the law of nations" or merely a wrong actionable under the law of
the appropriate sovereign state? The latter construction would make the violation
of international law pertinent only to afford jurisdiction. The court would then, in
accordance with traditional conflict of laws principles, apply the substantive law of
Paraguay. If the "tort" to which the statute refers is the violation of international
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The temptation of U.S. courts, following contemporary conflict of
laws analysis, is to accept the realist proposition that all decisions
before domestic courts are made finally by forum law. 46 The realist
dilemma states that if all decisions are those of forum policy, then by
incorporating customary international law or by comity and recipro-
city, independent norms of universal respect are negated. Interna-
tional law will be nationalized by court deference, and, even if courts
do internalize by analogy what they view as universal norms, the
basis for that subjective choice is ultimately national policy presided
over by a deferential Supreme Court nationalism.
The most basic doctrinal and theoretical relationships between
domestic rules of decision and customary international law in the
United States might be rethought more modestly and less chauvin-
istically, when the purpose for each is the protection of human
dignity and economic liberty within the context of an individual's
allegiance to different and changing political communities 47 These
relationships are undergoing rapid change, both conceptually and
empirically.
The vested rights analysis prefers stability and predictability,
promoting a forum's loyalty to the state's political institutions.' 48
This respect for rights vested under foreign law allows, as in Europe,
for the use of private international law to give maximum deference
to the law of the place governed by those institutions. When U.S.
legal realists abandoned the vested rights analysis and adopted the
interest analysis along the lines of Brainerd Currie's theory349 the
preference was justified because the interest analysis was more
responsive to balancing fairness to the parties with government
interests through legislative purposes. Yet in choosing between a
law, the court must look to that body of law to determine what substantive
principles to apply.
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp 860,862 (E.D.N.Y 1984).
This reasoning was decidedly not "messianic moral imperialism" because the forum court
gave full respect to the law of Paraguay and simply used the customary international law of
human rights to prevent the hypocrisy of denial by Pena, the Paraguayan citizen official, that
Paraguayan law did not cover official torture because it had not been applied in the past. The
court then proceeded to apply the law of Paraguay to include moral damages adding punitive
damages under international law and public policy of the forum court, a somewhat more
controversial determination. See id. at 864.
346. See Maier & McCoy, supra note 337, at 249-54.
347. Whether individuals are now properly subjects of international law (as the standard
treatises now proclaim) and whether international law first must be incorporated or
transformed into municipal law (the old monist-dualist debate) before it can be applied as a
domestic rule of decision are questions that should be revisited, but this paper does not make
that attempt.
348. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) oF CoNFucT oF LAwS (1930).
349. CURRIE, supra note 340.
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WORLD CIVIL SOCIETY
rule of decision based upon foreign law of the place of residence of
both parties in an Alien Tort Statute action and one based upon
customary international human rights law preferred by the plaintiff,
why shouldn't the interest analysis prefer the foreign law as an
expression of the legislative purpose of local policy-makers so long
as it meets the international human rights standard.B50 Otherwise,
the decision would amount to a choice between U.S. forum law or
international law, and what practical difference does it make whe-
ther or not U.S. law incorporates the new international human rights
law in that event? Forum court law might apply in an actual conflict,
but only if the legislative expression has clearly incorporated
international law. Without such expression, foreign law might be
closer to legislative policy so long as it does not offend international
law. But there are other interests to weigh, including those of the
international community in balancing human dignity with stability
and respect for other democratic states within a developing world
civil society.
A comparative impairment conflicts theory at one point asked
whether the long-run interests of states as a whole might be better
furthered by applying the law of the state with the more serious
governmental concern. In human rights litigation, a three-way con-
flict of laws might arise between the United States, the foreign state
of human rights abuse, and the international community of states as
a whole. Admittedly, in theory, this tension might not pose a true
conflict, and forum courts tacitly or consciously will take into
account other interests as well.
Choice also involves, for example, the interests of classes of for-
eign plaintiffs represented by entrepreneurial lawyers who choose a
federal forum for advantage when forum law allows international
class actions, punitive damages, and equitable remedies to preserve
defendant's foreign assets (and the advantage of lead counsel
350. Bodansky argues that federal interests prefer international standards that both
countries have accepted over either forum or foreign law.
[A] state has a much greater interest in the enforcement of international standards
than it has in enforcing the legal standards of a foreign state. Thus, if a state has a
sufficient interest to adjudicate a transitory tort, based on foreign law, it also
should have a sufficient interest to adjudicate a tort committed in violation of
international law.
Bodansky, supra note 316, at 472.
Yet, a state may also have an interest to promote the universal respect by other states
themselves to recognize and enforce such standards as provided in the United Nations Charter
and other human rights documents, see supra note 41. Those interests require balancing inter-
national law from two perspectives-horizontal and vertical-in shaping rules of decision
under my arguments.
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J. OF TRANSNATIONAL L. & POLICY
attorneys fees).351 The more serious government concern is to
balance the availability of a remedy with deterrence as forum policy,
considering both the states system and abuses by particular states.
Inevitably, forum court law decides the issue, making common law
judges vulnerable to political attack.
Robert Leflar's "better law" theory352 generally fares no better in
international human rights analysis, for the better law nearly always
turns out to be forum law, which incorporates and restates interna-
tional law according to forum policies. The "better law" theory
requires a court to decide if forum law or foreign law is superior, in
theory resolving true conflicts in a way that would not depend on
the law of the forum where the cause of action is litigated 53 But
better for whom or for what? Better for the state's interests, for the
interests of the international community of states as a whole, for the
human rights victims' interests in justice, or for the defendant former
official's interest in fairness? In human rights litigation such as
presented above in the second hypothetical (suit by an alien against a
foreign official present in the United States), better law analysis
might begin with the use of customary international human rights
law in U.S. law for the purpose of a cause of action under a
jurisdictional statute, but not for determining punitive damages or
limitations of actions, depending on the facts. International law
might not be preferred as the better law in all cases?3 4 The net effect
could be that the forum court would resist exercising subject matter
jurisdiction, or recognize a universal cause of action without statu-
tory authority. Once the jurisdictional threshold is crossed, however,
the forum court would apply its own rules of decision for damages
and procedure. This mish-mash is likely to produce a negative reac-
tion in other countries when enforcement of a judgment abroad is
necessary. Similarly, when an evaluation of the interests of the
international community suggests that the choice of law flowing
from U.S. realism is not so much international interest analysis or
351. In In re Estate of Marcos, forum law applied to certification of an international class of
victims in the Philippines, to equitable remedies to preserve the estate's assets, and to the
survival of action. Philippine law was applied to allow punitive damages, but interests of
international community as a whole were not evaluated. In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 25
F.3d 1467, 1477 (9th Cir. 1994). When international law provides no limitation of action in a
claim of torture and genocide, forum law was used as limitation. See, e.g., Princz v. F.R.G., 26.
F.3d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
352. See Robert A. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 267 (1966); Robert A. Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influencing Consideration4 56
CAL. L. REV. 1584 (1966) [hereinafter Leflar, Conflicts Law].
353. See Leflar, Conflicts Law, supra note 352, at 1587-88.
354. For the use of forum law as limitation of action when international law provides none,
see Princz, 26 F.3d at 1166, and Lillich, supra note 159.
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WORLD CIVIL SOCIE7Y
better law analysis as it is an Americanized version of customary
international human rights law, federal courts should make the
choice as if the values of world civil society, not the interests of states
alone, are taken into account. Otherwise, a national version of a
better law is a paradoxical gloss of avoidance and resistance coupled
with a plaintiff's forum of great imagined advantage for damages
and procedure once in the door.
If the choice of law analysis truly considers both the interests of
the international community of states (one of the elements outlined
in the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts) and the values of world civil
society, measured by developing standards of human decency and
enterprise, does it matter whether the forum state has incorporated
customary human rights law into its municipal law? The effec-
tiveness of economic and human rights law normally requires
international cooperation and national enforcement (unless outside
sanctions are provided through Security Council action). The pre-
dominant interest and expressed preference of the international
community are that domestic legal orders progressively be revised to
achieve international standards. Theorists of new customary human
rights law properly insist that the choice of the rule of substantive
decision applied in U.S. courts should be at least the international
standard, if that is more protective of victims of abuse within the
United States.355
However, if U.S. statutory law which incorporates international
law by reference affords better remedies only for aliens, then there
would be no possible way, short of Congressional enactment, for
courts to incorporate international human rights standards into ac-
tions for citizens and residents alike, a strange anomaly. The conse-
quence is not likely to promote universal respect and observance of
fundamental human rights. It may promote the opposite - the
choice of domestic law to reject international law remedies for citi-
zens against domestic officials before domestic courts and choice of
international law for aliens who sue officials of their own countries
in U.S. courts.
The better choice of law strategy is to encourage courts to use
international law to inform statutory causes of action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, or at least the enactment of statutes to accomplish the same
thing. The national judicial interest should not seek to limit court
access, but increase it in these matters, for it is uniquely equipped to
address the international legal process claims that arise from global
355. See, e.g., Bayefsky & Fitzpatrick, supra note 155.
Summer 1997]
HeinOnline  -- 6 J. Transnat'l L. & Pol'y 499 1996-1997
 O T  499 
    ized   
i l      
       
     
l    led 
'  t i   s 
 r     
  rs   t   
ti nal it      
 t )  i ts)      
  i  r s   
  r  ted 
    l  
i        
l ti n l t  
     
      l 
    l     
i l   r   
 l      
  .     i l 
     i   
 t t s.355 
t r   tes i l 
  e      
  i l ,  
  ti al   
   
   t ce  
t l  t  t   
  ti nal  i s 
  l       
ti al   i s 
 
      
ti al     .c  
   t t lis    
  t     
        
 i l    l 
y  i , ra   
J. OF TRANSNATIONAL L. & POLICY
participation, which is both a national political goal and reality.
With symmetrical and consistent judicial behavior among the
national tribunals of the most influential countries, human rights
might then be expected to gain as much credibility as economic
freedoms. For the time being, U.S. courts operate on the assumption
that domestic law is at least as good as universally recognized inter-
national human rights law. Litigators question that assumption be-
cause a cause of action may be better under international law and the
remedy may be better under U.S. law. However, such a result is not
necessarily good public or private international law.
If there are legitimate choice of law questions, given that federal
jurisdiction and causes of action are open to aliens, the question of
substantive law would be whether the forum court provides a more
adequate remedy under domestic tort law. Because forum law in the
United States facially meets the international law standard in the
eyes of federal courts, why wouldn't it be in the paramount interest
of the international community and also in the federal interest to
expect foreign law to be held to the same standard and either chosen
or interpreted to achieve that end? Not needing to replace foreign
law with international law, with the internal resistance generated,
domestic courts will promote peace and security of the entire inter-
national system in the long run by prudential use of choice of law
principles instead of the either/or dichotomy from the incorporation
debate. For these reasons, I think the choice of law analysis of new
customary international law as the primary rule of decision govern-
ing liability, but the choice of U.S. law to govern punitive damages
and equitable relief, is unlikely to be acceptable to the international
community or its interests in the long run. When assets of the
defendant may be in the banks of a third state, the enforcement of
foreign awards in that state will be less vulnerable when the interest
of the international community is part of the court's reasoning in
awarding damages to an entire class of aliens.
Theoretically, constructing doctrine from conflicts jurisprudence
is compatible with an overlapping juridical consensus for respecting
fundamental human rights among a community of states while also
respecting municipal law governing the primary relations of citizens
and government that reflect each nation's culture and political
identity internal to the polity.357 A mutual reciprocal respect of those
356. See Bodansky, supra note 316, at 472.
357. Universality does not deny these concerns. For textual references to "universal
respect" for observance, see materials cited supra note 40. For overlapping consensus among
[Vol. 6:2 Supp.
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WORLD CIVIL SOCIETY
horizontal political relationships by domestic courts reinforces a
court's allegiance to its own state's political institutions. Overlap-
ping recognition of universal respect for human rights reinforces
each.
A strong legal realist tradition in the United States, reflected in
government interest, minimum contacts, and policy analyses of con-
flicts of laws questions, recognizes that jurisdiction is the central
question. All other questions involve forum choices about law and
policy. Once the court has jurisdiction over persons and subject mat-
ter, these choices become forum law questions subject to constitu-
tional requirements, such as giving full faith and credit358
When universal respect for human rights begins to suggest to
federal judges that their loyalties also run to an emerging world legal
order (but within the jurisdiction of federal courts) to address
questions arising from customary international human rights law, a
potentially revolutionary idea may be unleashed and quite naturally
will be resisted. The legal realist might answer that all international
law is domestic law because only decisions made by a forum with
coercive power over the parties count as law to guide other deci-
sions.359 But that answer is also instrumental and inadequate as
Lasswell and McDougal first explained at the outset of World War II
when they proposed a comprehensive postrealist process of decision
in service of human dignity.3 6 At all stages of functional realist
analysis, questions of substance, not merely of loyalty to the polity
authorizing coercion, have to be faced - including the questions of
consequences of a forum decision when the parties are not com-
pletely subject to the forum polity's coercive powers. A sound choice
of law analysis would not attempt to resolve any conflict among
rules of decision, but rather, would seek the best balance of policies
and interests at stake to guide decisions functionally within an
emerging world civil society.
society of societies, see John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, in ON HUMAN RIGHTS: THE OXFORD
AMNESTY LECrURES 41 (1993).
358. Maier & McCoy, supra note 337, at 25-55.
359. Harold G. Maier, Baseball and Chicken Salad: A Realistic Look at Choice of Law, 44 VAND.
L. REV. 827, 838 (1991). Disagreeing with Professor Brilmayer's political rights basis for
applying a foreign rule of law, Maier states:
There can be no burden and no political right not to be burdened until some
authoritative decisionmaker realistically contemplates applying the rule to a party
in a case, and the only authoritative decisionmaker that can apply it is the forum
court. The court derives that authority solely from its own body politic.
Id.
360. Harold D. Laswell & Myres S. McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional
Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203 (1943).
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J. OF TRANSNATIONAL L. & POLICY
When domestic courts in the United States exercise international
jurisdiction, they can best avoid the stark either/or choice of
allegiance between two artificially incommensurate public order
systems by considering customary international law in choice of law
analysis for shaping rules of decision in which the new human rights
law or economic freedoms collide with the old horizontal states
system. "Indeed, in its modern version," Dickinson pointed out over
a half-century ago, "the doctrine [of incorporation] is essentially like
the modern Anglo-American doctrine underlying the so-called
conflict of laws or private international law."361 In the post-World
War II and post-cold war periods, the United Nations system has not
changed this attitude in the federal courts for human rights, although
it may have for global economic free markets.
The best way to approach "international jurisdiction" is by
analogy to "federal jurisdiction" in a federal system such as in the
United States, where both federal and state courts may have judicial
competence to decide federal questions arising under the laws or
Constitution of the United States when not exclusive to federal
courts.362 In a federal system, special problems of dual sovereignty
are better understood and accepted than problems of dual loyalty
between national state institutions and the international community
of states or international society.
In federal systems such as Germany, Canada, or Nigeria, an
observer might notice the beginnings of "triple loyalties": first, to the
law of the laender, province or state; second, to federal or national
law; and third, to the law of regional or international communities.
In the United States, most federal and state courts do not view
international law as emanating from a political community to which
they owe allegiance. The reason they will respect and choose to
apply foreign law under principles of comity or give full faith and
credit or respect to state law not their own, is membership in the
political community to which they owe allegiance and which gives
advantages or burdens by coercion. International law, however,
does not command the independent allegiance of judges in the
United States unless it is first politically domesticated by actions
more explicit than the abstract argument that the phrase, "laws of the
361. Dickinson, supra note 93, at 260.
362. "Domestic jurisdiction" is the concept establishing the boundary in the conflict
between state autonomy and the limits on autonomy imposed by international principles of
human rights, one of Schachter's antimonies in international human rights law. SCHACHTER,
supra note 134, at 329-30.
[Vol. 6:2 Supp.
HeinOnline  -- 6 J. Transnat'l L. & Pol'y 502 1996-1997
502 J SNATIONAL . ouey [ l. :   
en stic rts   ited tates rcise t r ational 
j risdiction, t ey n t oid  rk t r/or ice f 
llegiance n  i ll  s rate lic r 
ste s  i ering t ry ti al  i  ice f  
l sis  i  r les  i   ich   an  
 r ic r edo s i  t    rizontal t s 
t . ,   r  ,   i ted t r 
- entury  e i  ration]  i lly i  
t  rn - erican i  rlying  lled 
flict  s  t  t r tional  "361   t- orld 
r  t- ld  ,  ited ti s te   t 
ed       , lt ough 
t  e  ic   
     t r ational j ris iction"   
l gy ral         
t  ,       i l 
tence        
       l 
   i l l s i ty 
 t     l s   
 l    l  
 l  
     ,  
   l  :  
   
   ti al  
    
l   t   
   
 
 i  i  
    
   
 t   
  
l   t  
i supr   , at . 
.  j i  t  t i  t  fli t 
 st li i t   i t ti l ri i l  f 
ri ts, c i i  ri t  la . . 
r  t 13 , - . 
WORLD CIVIL SOCIETY
United States" in the Supremacy Clause includes customary interna-
tional law as part of federal common law.
Incorporated long ago, however, are international expectations
with deep constitutional underpinnings coextensive with the law of
nations, such as principles of territorial independence, nationality,
sovereign immunity, jurisdiction, and nonintervention. 63 For my
purposes, a domestic court exercising international jurisdiction with
dual loyalties cannot escape deciding among conflicting policies.
U.S. courts often escape by deferring to the political branches unless
the executive or legislative branches have incorporated the interna-
tional rule of decision into municipal law. Deference is basically a
judge's substantive choice of state autonomy over human rights
limitations, a choice to preserve political loyalty to the state over that
to the international human community. Where customary interna-
tional law is of the traditional kind treated as part of U.S. law and
self-executing by courts, the conflict with dual loyalty is resolved
also to favor the state, but only because the government's interests
are supported by the underlying assumptions of customary interna-
tional law.
The reason that the law merchant, maritime law, and natural law,
in addition to the law of piracy,3" have been recognized and applied
without statutory incorporation is because they reinforce loyalty to
the state based on the bond of nationality. Domestic courts will
apply these habitually observed allocations of judicial power axio-
matically as incorporated into municipal law, unless the political
branches explicitly provide otherwise, because they maintain the
integrity of constitutionalism in which the national judicial power is
maintained in balance with the political powers.365 This equilibrium
forms the baseline structure for the old horizontal customary interna-
tional law tradition incorporated by the method of looking to state
practice and usage recognized as law by opinio juris communis.
However, in world civil society, this notion is false because a nation
cannot internalize the costs of global economic displacements that
363. See Turley, supra note 83, at 343-49.
364. See United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153 (1820) (holding that piracy jure gentium con-
stituted a prosecutable crime under law of nations without requiring precise statutory incor-
poration); see also Sweeney, supra note 70, at 458-62.
365. The Supreme Court's canon against construing statutes to have extraterritorial reach
unless explicitly clear is based upon the law of nations' principle of territorial sovereignty and
independence. See EEOC v. Arabian. Am. Oil Co., 499 US. 244 (1991); see also LaFontant v.
Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128, 137 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (finding that visiting head of state immunity
from customary international law survived the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §
1604 (1994), not explicitly covering it).
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J. OF TRANSNATIONAL L. & POLICY
have effect internally without an international regime to prevent
free-riding by other nations.
The identification, clarification, and application of international
economic and human rights norms strain the allegiance of domestic
courts to the state's political organs far more than when traditional
customary law norms are applied. Because choices of rules of
decision or procedure made by domestic courts in the legal realist
view are always forum law decisions, they bend to the reality of
interest analysis in the case at hand and respect the power to make
the decision effective.366 Thus I reluctantly agree that international
law questions before domestic courts always are forum law ques-
tions for common law judges, absent political directives. 67
B. Deciding Questions of International Law When Presented
The traditional view of international law is that it is made by a
normative consensus of the political community of states, accepted
as law by governments presumably representing their popula-
tions.368 Consensus in this view scarcely claims to maintain legiti-
macy from linkage to the workings of civil society within all
countries as it does in a democratic republic? 69 To avoid counter-
majoritarian difficulties in democracies, this consensus may be
accepted as municipal law by domestic courts only after political
direction (through ratification or enactment) or constitutional man-
date.370 We have seen that contemporary federal judges in the
United States seldom fashion decisions from simplistic syllogisms
constructed from a formal premise that international law is part of
United States law or that foreign law should be applied under
conflict of laws principles of comity and reciprocity. Such doctrines
often mask other biases, sometimes deeply hidden in political
assumptions.
366. See Maier & McCoy, supra note 337, at 249-51.
367. See generally ASIL EIGHTY-SECOND MEETING, supra note 316, at 456-78.
368. See RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 58, § 101.
369. See THOMAS M. FRANcK, THE POWER OF LEGIIMACY AMONG NATIONS (1990).
370. Brilmayer rejects the countermajoritarian argument when international law is the
basis for invalidating inconsistent state law. Brilmayer, supra note 228, at 329-32. Koh rejects it
for reasons that seem to say that universal agreement among governments entails consensus
among peoples or for reasons of neonatural law entrenching fundamental human rights.
Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L REV. 181, 183-88 (1996). Turley
rejects it for similar reasons. Turley, supra note 83, at 340.42.
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WORLD CIVIL SOCIETY
1. Bringing International Norms into Public Awareness
Lucid opinions by federal judges often articulate important
consensual norms of international law, while still refusing to turn
them into rules of decision until given approval by the political
branches.371 In Smith, Chief Judge Newman, whose opinion dis-
missed a suit against Libya under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act, considered whether Article 25 of the United Nations Charter
created an obligation to abide by decisions of the Security Council 72
Plaintiffs had argued that a Security Council decision had committed
Libya to pay compensation to the victims of the Lockerbie Pan Am
Flight 103.373 In rejecting that argument, Judge Newman wrote:
Such a contention would encounter a substantial constitutional
issue as to whether Congress could delegate to an international
organization the authority to regulate the jurisdiction of United
States courts. It would take an explicit indication of Congressional
intent before we would construe an act of Congress to have such an
effect.374
Sometimes, federal courts accept a nonstatutory defense of
international law to dismiss a claim or otherwise to decide one, or to
articulate a rule under international choice of law principles. District
Court Judge Weinstein invoked customary international law of head
of state immunity to deny personal jurisdiction over a suit against
Haiti's ousted visiting head of state, President Aristide?75 Interna-
tional law will not be used to override such a defense, however,
unless authorized by Congress. Further, Court of Appeals Judge
David Ginsberg declined to consider whether a peremptory norm of
international law might overcome Germany's claim of sovereign
immunity from suit under Nuremberg principles unless given the
green light by Congress.376 We explain these apparently incoherent
decisions377 by the simple fact that federal courts "nationalize"
371. See Smith v. Libya, 101 F.3d 239 (1st Cir. 1996).
372. Id. at 246.
373. See id. at 246-47.
374. Id. at 247. Note that Justice O'Connor even suggests that the Supreme Court might
have to decide whether any Congressional delegation of federal powers to an international
organization is unconstitutional. O'Connor, supra note 2; see also Barry Friedman, Federalism's
Future in the Global Village, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1441 (1994).
375. See LaFontant v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
376. See Princz v. F.R.G., 26 F.3d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
377. Traditional theories of incorporation of international law into municipal law-
monism and dualism- are of little help in multistage processes of decision involving pluralistic
interests. For a discussion of the competing concepts, see Starke, supra note 210. An example of
the American pragmatic approach is found in Louis Henkin, The Constitution and U.S. Sover-
eignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L REV. 853, 864 (1987).
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J. OF TRANSNATIONAL L. & POUCY
international law. Thus it is well understood that international law is
recognized as United States law only when made by the treaty
power under authority of the United States or "made pursuant to the
Constitution" by action of the political branches (as statutes or
executive directives) or by decision of federal courts by analogy (as
judge-made federal common law). 78 If a federal court is to guard
interests of its civil society under constitutional powers, it checks the
claims invoking international law (whose source is agreement of
states or custom) against authority from domestic political institu-
tions closer to the democratic processes. This constitutional function
(as rule of recognition) guards the pedigree of any claimed rule of
international law before a court moves inside any complex transna-
tional litigation to apply rules of procedure and obligation 7 9
2. Guardians of Pedigree
When international law is invoked, the first decision is constitu-
tive. A federal court acts as constitutional guardian of pedigree,
deciding whether or not to recognize the constitutional (or statutory)
validity of a rule of international law invoked. World civil society
has little relevance here, for the constitutive decision is part of the
public sphere of the states system, which itself recognizes the legiti-
macy of internal constitutional integrity of each state. Is a treaty
provision valid law, self-executing, and not in conflict with later
federal law?380 Have Congress and the president acted within their
shared or exclusive powers and with sufficient specificity to pre-
scribe or incorporate a rule from international law.881 Has the
Supreme Court adopted a rule of customary international law as
378. See RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 58, §§ 111-115; see also
Henkin, supra note 58.
379. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 208-31 (1961). Hart thinks of international law
as a set of customs, practices, and agreements (primary rules of obligation) governing relations
among states. Id. He does not believe that international law has yet developed secondary
norms of recognition that determine the validity of primary rules and the process of changes in
them. Id. at 230-31. In transnational litigation under federal jurisdiction when international
law may be invoked, federal courts as guardians of pedigree perform the recognition function
first, which then triggers the use of sources of primary rules to shape rules of decision in the
case. The domestic question of constitutional or statutory validity fulfills the function of Hart's
secondary rule of recognition in the absence of central international authority. Id.
380. See Altman & Co. v. United States, 224 U.S. 583, 601 (1912) (finding that a commercial
agreement made by the president under authority of an act of Congress was a "treaty" within
the federal judicial power); United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. 51 (1833) (determining that the
treaty in question was self-executing); Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 314 (1828) (finding earlier
that the same treaty was not self-executing).
381. See Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. 110 (1814).
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judge-made federal common law taking judicial notice of sources?8N2
Does the Supreme Court require application of foreign law under
principles of comity with or without reciprocity? 83
Commentators often maintain the theoretical possibility that "a
case presenting claims based on customary international law may
arise under federal question jurisdiction."384 Yet, I have searched in
vain for any such case, brought successfully by a private party under
federal question jurisdiction alone, which has affirmed a cause of
action arising solely under customary international law without the
aid of a statute.385 Theoretically, it is possible for a rule of customary
international law to develop with direct applicability by private
parties in national courts. Whether federal question jurisdiction in
such circumstance (say, involving grave offenses against the global
environment) would be available without a more specific statute
remains an open question.386
382. See Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 US. 91 (1972) (finding that federal common law is as
authoritative as same federal statute); Ivy Broadcasting Co. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 891
F.2d 486, 492 (2d Cir. 1968) (stating that laws created by federal judicial decisions as well as by
Congressional enactment are "laws of the United States" supporting federal cause of action
under 28 U.S.C § 1331); see also Field, supra note 344, at 890.
383. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 US. 113 (1895) (recognizing validity of enforcement of
foreign judgments guided by mutuality and reciprocity of civilized nations); see also ARTHUR T.
VON MEHREN & DONALD T. TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF MuLTISTATE PROBLm 237-54 (1965)
(stating that reciprocity should not be used to refuse to apply laws of another state but may be
used to bring a wayward state or nation "to come into line with the civilized community').
384. George Slyz, International Law in National Courts, in INTERNATIONAL LAW DECISIONS IN
NATIONAL COURTS 71, 90 (Thomas M. Franck & Gregory H. Fox eds., 1996).
385. Judge Kaufman's suggestion that the general federal question provision of 28 U.S.C. §
1331 "might also sustain jurisdiction" on the basis of a rule of customary international law was
in a footnote in the Filartiga opinion, which explicitly preferred to rely upon the Alien Tort
Statute. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887 n.22 (2d Cir. 1980). Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d
232 (2d Cir. 1995), reserved the question. The Kadic court found that included crimes against
humanity and war crimes fell under the scope of specific statute but stated that general federal
question jurisdiction was an "issue of some uncertainty that need not be decided in this case."
Id. at 246. A number of recent cases rested upon a more specific statute, although citing federal
question jurisdiction. See, e.g., Abebe-Jiri v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844 (11th Cir. 1996); Xuncax v.
Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 178 (D. Mass. 1995); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531,1544
(N.D. Cal. 1987).
386. In Sequihua, Judge Black maintained federal question jurisdiction over questions
involving international relations which are incorporated into federal common law, presenting a
question under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and refused a remand, but then dismissed the case on grounds
of interference with foreign relations and forum non conveniens. Sequihua v. Texaco, Inc., 847 F.
Supp. 61, 61-62 (S.D. Tex. 1994). In Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, 806 F.2d 344 (2d. Cir.
1986), the claim of a sovereign state in U.S. courts presented a clear federal question but was
backed by constitutional provisions envisioning suits by foreign sovereigns based upon inter-
national law.
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1. OF TRANSNATIONAL L. & POLICY
3. Federal Interest in Complex Transnational Adjudication
The interests of world civil society have more relevance in the
second judicial function, transnational litigation of the case. Here, as
we saw in the original hypothetical problems, there is practical
interest in the transnational process of adjudication by which federal
courts choose among competing jurisdictional, procedural, sub-
stantive, remedial, and enforcement rules in cases in which inter-
national law or comity is invoked to influence at least one of those
stages of litigation. Federal courts may be less inclined to contrive to
avoid that highly generalized, often mouthed and seldom applied
maxim that "international law is part of our law, and must be
ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate
jurisdiction as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly
presented for their determination."387 The difference is that federal
courts might use principles of both public and private international
law to support the values of world civil society, which are not
necessarily coextensive with interests of the international community
of states.
Federal courts need flexibility and reasonableness to choose or
shape rules of jurisdiction and decision by weighing important inter-
ests at stake in international litigation. From the viewpoint of world
civil society outside formal dominance of the system of sovereign
states, federal common law adjudication honors the premises of
federalism and popular sovereignty which value pluralistic institu-
tions in domestic civil society. Comparable institutions of human
enterprise operate and coexist transnationally, alongside or residu-
ally within the political system of nation-states as a whole. A federal
judge is likely to be influenced more by arguments within familiar
traditions of jurisdiction, choice of law, and judicial discretion than
by formal arguments derived from law made by the international
community of states and applied directly to individuals in
litigation.388
As we have seen, it is nearly always fatal to argue to federal
judges that the Constitution requires them to accept international
law as providing a private cause of action or a rule of decision
387. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (applying customary international prize
law while sitting as the highest prize court in the United States under admiralty jurisdiction).
388. See Elliot E. Cheatham & Willis L.M. Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 COLUM. L.
REV. 959, 962 (1952) ("[Sjmooth functioning of the interstate and international systems in
private law matters should be the basic consideration in the decision of every choice of law
case"); see also Hessel E. Yntema, The Objectives of Private International Law, 35 CAN. B. REV. 721,
734 (1957) (arguing that two objectives of international conflict of laws are "cooperation among
states" and "respect for interests of other states").
[Vol. 6:2 Supp.
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WORLD CIVIL SOCIETY
without direction by the political branches or prior decision by the
Supreme Court.389 Without statutory guidance or a treaty in force, as
summarized above, the modem Supreme Court has given very little
recent guidance to lower courts for determining whether new
international law is part of United States law and virtually no
guidance on recognizing any customary international law of human
rights as federal law. 9° Learned lower federal court judges, how-
ever, are often freer to craft transnational law of the case in both
economic and human rights disputes. They have sufficient discre-
tion to domesticate relevant international public and private law in
each phase of the processes of decision as if pluralistic values
favoring the kind of civil society served by federalism with a bill of
rights ought to govern as well the implementation of similar
processes for resolving disputes within a larger world civil society.
Professor Koh's Roscoe Pound Lecture at Nebraska explains such
processes as normative and transnational:
Transnational legal process describes the theory and practice of
how public and private actors-nation-states, international organi-
zations, multinational enterprises, non-governmental organizations,
and private individuals-interact in a variety of public and private,
domestic and international fora to make, interpret, enforce, and
ultimately, internalize rules of transnational law.
Transnational legal process has four distinctive features. First,
it is nontraditional: it breaks down two traditional dichotomies that
have historically dominated the study of international law: between
domestic and international, public and private. Second, it is non-
statist: the actors in this process are not just, or even primarily,
nation-states, but include nonstate actors as well. Third, transna-
tional legal process is dynamic, not static. Transnational law trans-
forms, mutates, and percolates up and down, from the public to the
private, from the domestic to the international level and back down
again. Fourth and finally, it is normative. From this process of
interaction, new rules of law emerge, which are interpreted,
internalized, and enforced, thus beginning the process all over
389. Consider the unfavorable treatment by most federal courts of arguments invoking as
sole authority the most compelling rules of international law, the so-called peremptory norms
(jus cogens). See, e.g., Princz v. F.R.G., 26 F.3d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (rejecting, in the absence of a
statute, incorporation of jus cogens norms against inhumane treatment as a basis for in
personarn and subject matter jurisdiction).
390. For example, the Supreme Court has not ruled upon the validity of Judge Kaufman's
opinion in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980), recognizing new customary
international human rights law as within the subject matter jurisdiction of the Alien Tort
Statute. However, the specific norm addressed by the Second Circuit was made precise by
Congress in the Torture Victim Protection Act.
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1. OF TRANSNATIONAL L. & POLICY
again. Thus, the concept embraces not just the descriptive work-
ings of a process, but the normativity of that process. It focuses not
simply upon how international interaction among transnational
actors shapes law, but also on how law shapes and guides future
interactions: in short, how law influences why nations obey.391
C. Questions Federal Courts Should Ask
Decisions within the embrace of transnational legal process are
normative because they should reflect the values of the larger world
civil society. Thus federal courts are not free from weighing interna-
tional and foreign consequences of decisions once jurisdiction has
been exercised. They still must choose the best law to govern specific
decisions on liability, procedure, compensatory, and punitive dam-
ages or equitable relief. There is abundant experience in transnation-
al litigation in economic and commercial cases, but not as much
when international human rights law has been invoked as the basis
for a cause of action or other complaint: (i) anticipating the reason-
ableness for any claims of limitations to jurisdiction to prescribe law
or to adjudicate; (ii) furnishing the threshold basis for triggering
subject matter jurisdiction under a federal jurisdictional statute; (iii)
shaping the substantive rule of decision for the case from all sources
of law, including its procedure, damages, and other remedies; and
(iv) considering the reasonableness of decision to maximize the
recognition and enforceability of judgments abroad from the view-
point of cooperation and comity. 92
Less formalistic and more dynamic decision processes are impor-
tant for the free institutions of world civil society. Conscious and
comprehensive decision-making opens questions in all aspects of
transnational litigation for federal judicial craft. 93 The following
summarizes those questions federal courts should ask as guardians
of their own civil society and as example for world civil society.
1. Jurisdiction
Should courts ever invoke customary international law alone as
federal law for the purpose of exercising federal jurisdiction over
civil cases or controversies arising under laws of the United States or
federal common law? Without a clearly applicable statute, recent
trends say no. Peremptory norms of customaryjus cogens quality by
themselves do not confer federal question jurisdiction. Customary
391. Koh, supra note 370, at 184.
392. See Christenson, supra note 264, at 251-53.
393. See Koh, supra note 79.
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WORLD CIVIL SOCIETY
international law does provide a base for Congress to exercise federal
jurisdiction to prescribe or adjudicate issues within international
jurisdiction. It also may be used in determining the jurisdictional
threshold under a specific jurisdictional statute such as the Alien
Tort Statute or the Torture Victim Protection Act, but why not also
under a general jurisdictional statute such as 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the
Federal Tort Claims AcO94 or 42 U.S.C. § 1983?
Federal courts should exercise removal jurisdiction to create an
exclusive federal forum non conveniens doctrine in litigation likely to
have adverse impact on foreign relations or best decided in other
courts.3 95 Here, the discretion of federal courts is broad to consider
the interests not just of the nation state system, but of the separate
civil society representing world life beyond those interests. 396 As in
Bhopal litigation 397 or the Sequihua case,398 trust in another court sys-
tem would decentralize decision-making, requiring other legal
cultures to handle the litigation for reasons of fairness or conven-
ience. Federal jurisdiction is asserted in order to defer to those other
public spheres, creating need for courts to cooperate or at least
communicate.
Once U.S. courts take jurisdiction of a dispute involving a ques-
tion of international law, the empirical reality is that the federal court
architectural structure effectively domesticates an international norm
when it shapes rules of decision, whether viewed as vertical (be-
tween individuals or individuals and officials) or horizontal (be-
tween states), even if statutes have not. Choice of law principles
become, then, more relevant for judges to select among the various
rules of international or foreign law.
2. Substantive Rules of Decision
Assuming a federal court has subject matter jurisdiction over a
transnational case or controversy, should customary international
law by itself ever determine the law governing the cause of action?
So far, U.S. courts will not incorporate a cause of action from
customary international law, even in a diversity action, without a
394. Pub. L. No. 79-601, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2671-2680 (1994)).
395. But see Jacqueline Duval-Major, One-Way Ticket Home: The Federal Doctrine of Forum
Non Conveniens and the International Plaintiff 77 CORNELL L. REV. 650, 671-72 (1992) (arguing
that suits abroad are not as affordable-and not as favorable to plaintiffs-as those in the US.,
which often prevents any recovery at all).
3%. Stephen B. Burbank, The World in Our Courts, 89 MIcH. L. REV. 1456 (1991).
397. In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, 634 F. Supp. 842, 867
(S.D.N.Y. 1986), affd as modified, 809 F.2d 195,197 (2d Cir. 1987).
398. Sequihua v. Texaco, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 61 (S.D. Tex. 1994).
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J. OF TRANSNATIONAL L. & POLICY
statutory base. Even with a statutory jurisdictional basis, choice of
law principles do not require the application of customary interna-
tional human rights law and often might prefer foreign law or forum
law for reasons of forum choice of law policy. Although traditional
customary international law has been incorporated as the rule of
decision in prize, maritime, or commercial cases when no controlling
executive or legislative policy intercedes, domestic courts resist
extending this to human rights law between individuals and officials
or between individuals without political or legislative directive. Jus
cogens norms of substantive customary human fights law at least
raise the awareness of the problem of international public policy in
the choice of new customary norms when authorized by statute. So
far, jus cogens principles have served to constrain choices by increas-
ing the strictness of the criteria for allowing causes of action for
international common law torts under the Alien Tort Statute and
other jurisdictional statutes.
3. Procedural Rules Governing the Case
Should U.S. forum law alone continue to govern procedure and
evidence in civil or human rights litigation with important effects in
other countries, especially in global class action suits which include
class members from other countries? Federal forum non conveniens
doctrine is a rule of federal procedure and applies in diversity ac-
tions involving state law, without offending Erie principles.399
Choice of law principles should apply to limitations of actions
brought by foreign plaintiffs or certification of class actions com-
prised largely of claimants in other countries. 0 ° Procedure, especial-
ly in class actions with large numbers of members in many countries
should be shaped by the forum court within its discretionary
authority to anticipate consequences that might offend principles of
fairness in international litigation or of the international system or
399. See American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 114 S. Ct. 981 (1994) (finding that in state
admiralty proceeding federal forum non conveniens doctrine does not preempt state procedure
as substantive matter); Sibaja v. Dow Chemical Co. 757 F.2d 1215 (11th Cir. 1985) (finding that
federal court application of doctrine was not substantive and did not transgress Erie's
constitutional prohibition).
400. In Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717 (1988), Justice Scalia reaffirmed the Court's
reliance on international law to hold that the Full Faith and Credit Clause permits a state to
apply its own procedural rules to actions before its courts which apply the substantive law of
another state, as when a statute of limitations of the forum is longer or shorter than that of the
state whose substantive law applies. Id. at 717-18. But where, under Erie, procedure may
become substantive for the purpose of predicting uniformity of substantive outcome, so also
when international law or foreign law is asserted as a substantive basis for a cause of action or
otherwise, perhaps a federal court should have discretion to evaluate procedure for its impact
on substantive outcome in transnational litigation.
(Vol. 6:2 Supp.
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WORLD CIVIL SOCIETY
yield easy objections to the recognition and enforcement of judg-
ments abroad.40 1
4. Choice of Law Governing Remedies
What law should govern the choice of remedies sought or
allowed, including compensatory and punitive damages, equitable
relief and injunctions in aid of future enforcement. For example, in
In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, before a federal district court in
Hawaii, where subject matter jurisdiction and cause of action were
governed by customary international law of human rights against
torture under the Alien Tort Act, the question whether plaintiffs'
class action claims survived the death of Marcos was governed by
state common law.40 2 Both foreign and forum law determined
compensatory and punitive damages. Federal forum law, however,
guided equitable relief in the form of a preliminary injunction to
freeze defendant's assets (whether within or without the United
States) when plaintiffs were awarded punitive damages at trial and a
danger exists that the estate might transfer or conceal its funds,
thereby denying recovery to the class. Merely because customary
international law of human rights provides subject matter jurisdic-
tion and shapes the substantive rules of decision in federal court
does not mean that no other international or foreign law questions
should be considered during the course of litigation. The reason-
ableness at each stage of the proceeding would determine the credi-
bility of the ultimate outcome within the civil society of institutions
and states which also have interests in the outcome.
5. Anticipating Transnational Enforcement of Judgments
Most scholars in the United States address the law and policy of
federal and state courts primarily in the recognition and enforcement
of foreign judgments or arbitral awards in the United States.40 They
raise questions about American public policy of the forum doctrine
and whether there is imbalance in favorable enforcement policies in
federal courts4°4 compared with unfavorable treatment perceived in
401. For criticism of judicial reluctance to take foreign procedure into account sufficiently,
see Stephen B. Burbank, The Reluctant Partner: Making Procedural Law for International Civil
Litigation, 57 LAw & CONTE?". PROBS. 103 (1994).
402. See In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994).
403. See BORN, supra note 53, at 933-86, 987-1052.
404. See, e.g., Ackermann v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 845 (2d Cir. 1986) ("[I]ncreasing inter-
nationalization of commerce requires 'that American courts recognize and respect the judg-
ments entered by foreign courts to the greatest extent consistent with our own ideals of justice
and fair play."') (quoting Tahan v. Hodgson, 662 F.2d 862, 868 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
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I. OF TRANSNATIONAL L. & POLICY
foreign court enforcement of American court judgments. 5 In the
transnational legal process, federal courts might consider the global
implications of decisions at the earlier stages of litigation. In ques-
tions of jurisdiction, procedure, and choice of law, federal judges
have enough discretion to prepare any judgments for acceptance
abroad by paying close attention to principles of international law.
For example, what principles of public or private international law or
comity might a federal judge use in anticipation of enforcement of a
final judgment rendered for breach of customary international
human rights law arising in another country against assets sought
through courts of a third state?4° 6 Within the ongoing activities of
the global society, are the interests of the international community of
states harmed or furthered by a judgment for punitive damages
awarded to a class that includes foreign citizens who were inade-
quately represented before the federal judgment forum? What is the
best law for the human rights victims? Will the representative of the
class as third party champion be allowed financial incentive to pro-
tect members of the class internationally, thereby to become an
important actor beyond any particular country's dominance?
Enforcement of judgments based upon international torts when
defendant's assets are located abroad is not yet reflected in human
rights law. If the basis for judgment is breach of the customary norm
against torture, for example, does a foreign court have to give it
respect if certain other aspects of the U.S. judgment contravene the
policy of the forum where assets are found? Would there be any
argument from prudence or comity to persuade a foreign forum to
interpret its policy generously? If the federal court judgment is
based upon the law where the wrong occurred, would the enforce-
ment of the judgment in a third country be any easier? In suits
under the Alien Tort Statute involving exclusively foreign classes,
would a foreign court recognize or enforce a judgment of punitive
damages (from which attorneys fees would be paid) or honor the
award of minor damages, with members of the class bound by the
judgment? Even if American due process were satisfied in constitu-
ting the class, might another government interested in protecting its
own citizens claim that the federal court did not proceed fairly under
international standards? Members of the class, for example, might
mount a collateral attack through their own government. An
405. For suggested remedies, see Arthur T. von Mehren, Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Judgments: A New Approach for the Hague Conference?, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 271
(1994).
406. See discussion of the hypothetical problem supra Part III.B.
[Vol. 6:2 Supp.
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WORLD CIVIL SOCIETY
attorney general might nationalize the class as India did in the
Bhopal litigation. Would victims of human rights abuses benefit
ultimately from those procedural struggles?
Merely allowing litigation to proceed to judgment and award
under customary international human rights law means little by
itself beyond symbolism if the judgment is vulnerable.4° 7 Decision-
makers acting within their discretion as judicial members should
identify and select rules of procedure and decision from domestic,
foreign, and international law that most effectively advance the goals
of world civil society-human rights and international commerce.
6. Factors of Interest Analysis
At each functional point in litigation, a forum federal court
should begin its analysis with the interests and purposes for each
rule of procedure or decision selected. Choices should reflect reason-
ableness in balance among international interests for stability and
predictability and effectiveness in achieving the values of world civil
society. When universally recognized international human rights
norms and a reasonable free market system for investment and
trade, subject to statutory and constitutional limitations, are the
means and ends most important for civil societies beyond the
sovereign state, federal courts have the tradition and competence to
play a prominent leadership role in articulating these values in the
processes of decision.
VII. CONCLUSION: INTEGRATING PUBLIC WITH PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW
A comprehensive process of decision at each stage in transna-
tional litigation cannot escape the integration of public and private
international law within domestic law by federal courts. °  Such
consciousness in domestic court decision-making at each phase of
the case should eliminate a problem for judges on making a hard
choice between loyalty to a sovereign political community, to some
vague allegiance to a states system that is changing, or a new loyalty
to a cosmopolitan world community not yet here. Arguing for "a
407. In Paul v. Avril, 901 F. Supp. 330, 336 (S.D. Fla. 1994), an award of $41 million,
including punitive damages assessed under forum law, was made to six Haitians tortured by
the military regime of former dictator Prosper Avril. The search for assets in hidden foreign
accounts is under way. If a foreign court or government refuses enforcement on the grounds
that punitive damages are neither provided under international law nor under the law of the
place, would the United States have grounds under international human rights law to seek an
international remedy against that state?
408. See generally LOWENFELD, supra note 94.
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1. OF TRANSNATIONAL L. & POLICY
shared approach to international law-private international law as
here defined," Professor Lowenfeld's approach best serves to achieve
this integration. His commitment to reasonableness as a guide in
international litigation persists -"reasonable expectations, genuine
links, the duty to evaluate and balance, the distinction between over-
lap in regulation and direct conflict and between potential conflict
and actual clash." °  Lowenfeld adopts Story's view that private
international law cannot escape being public, concluding that "it is
now clear that public law is no longer out of bounds for international
lawyers, that private international law embraces public law, and
indeed that this is where the action is."410 His views would
strengthen the function of federal courts in hearing about public
concerns from the perspective of world civil society and not from the
perspective of a public international law formed by states by which
these concerns are rendered out of bounds -the so-called public law
taboo. Similarly, when federal courts "nationalize" public interna-
tional law, they make it amenable to criteria of reasonableness in
choosing whether or not to apply it in civil litigation.
However, rather than relying only upon "reasonableness" as an
international legal argument or doctrine to internalize restraints from
the international system, might not a federal judge prefer to link
reason to the important substantive ends of an emerging world civil
society - universal respect for human rights and protection for
human enterprise in capital investment and voluntary market ex-
changes? These are surely the primary ends to maximize when
deciding rules of decision, questions of fairness, presumptions, reme-
dies, and effective enforcement in cooperation with international and
foreign courts! When federal judges want to assume leadership, the
architecture for those decisions is already in place to support these
purposes.
409. Id. at 230.
410. Id. at 232.
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